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The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N. Ver

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Aliya
Asharshilyk (The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years) D.N. Verhoturov
Introduction
Asharshilyk – in Kazakh means “famine”. This simple word has become a symbol of terrible tragedy and disaster for the Kazakh people - the great famine in 1932-1933 years, when dead about half of the Kazakhs, and hundreds of thousands were forced to run far away beyond Kazakhstan in search of salvation from death.
This terrible tragedy has left a sharp and chopped imprint on the Kazakh people, on their culture and worldview. Huge wounds of the people still weren't quite tightened, and even today's youth acutely perceives the martyr death of the ancestors. This terrible tragedy can not leave anyone indifferent and detached.
Before famine Kazakhstan was the free country that was dominated by voluntary customs of nomads cattle-farmers, and in which practically there were not prisons because of impossibility to support them in the conditions of a nomadic life. Almost all misdemeanors punished by the penalty: ayip or toguz, depending on the seriousness of the offense. But after the famine, when the whole volosts emptied Kazakhstan has become a country of slaves, who were fitting on buildings and production of ore, in the land of huge camps behind barbed wire and place reference. Famine became a prolog to all other disasters which fell upon Kazakhstan, including nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk range, tests of the bacteriological weapon on Ascension Island on the Aral Sea, resettlements to Kazakhstan representatives of the numerous repressed people, the development of a virgin soil and the related with it ecological disaster. It became possible only because after devastating famine at the leadership of the Soviet Union the image of Kazakhstan as "empty country" in which it is possible to do was strongly and anything fixed for a long time.
In this sense famine was the tragedy not only of Kazakhs, but also all other people who lived before it or appeared against their own will in Kazakhstan.
Certainly, if there was not this devastating famine, the history of Kazakhstan would have gone completely the other way.
The famine in Kazakhstan has never been and will not be a political weapon of struggle than famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine. Famine takes another place. Firstly, it is memory, heavy and painful memory of sufferings and martyr death of hundreds thousands of people. Not to do on the famine the political capital, it is the moral duty of nowadays living people before the dead.
On the other hand, it's fond memories of those righteous people who in terrible years made all efforts for rescue of the relatives or even absolutely casual people, shared with them a piece of bread and a flour handful, took children, helped to settle and get a job. This is an example for all of us as even among revelry of death to remain human and compassionate sufferings of others. Yes there will arrive with them the grace of God!
Finally, it is a searing memory of those murderers who plunged all people into the abyss of the terrible disasters.
Secondly, it is the intention to prevent the recurrence of such terrible disasters in the future, not only in Kazakhstan, but generally in the world. Unfortunately, famine in Ethiopia, in Somalia and in other places shows that from it while nobody is insured, and to indulge to complacency still early. In the world about 800 million people are malnourished and are on the verge of hunger, they need to the help.
This book primarily aims to understand the economic causes of famine in Kazakhstan and to identify those conditions and decisions that led to such unknown economic disaster for Kazakhstan which has eclipsed all largest disasters in the history of the Kazakh people, even Ақтабаң Шыбурыңды (Aktaban Shiburindi) or "Years of great disaster" in 1723 - 1724, when Kazakhs suffered a severe defeat from Djungars. Any jute, even the heaviest, didn't cause such severe famine.
This research is necessary for several reasons. Firstly, since then the geographic and climatic conditions of Kazakhstan changed in the direction of growth of deserts and desertification, and make very difficult conditions for agriculture, as plant-growing and animal husbandry. Studying of the economic reasons of famine allows understanding that it is impossible to do nothing under any circumstances, in order to not cause one more such economic accident.
Secondly, materials of history of great famine allow understanding, how to diagnose similar economic accidents at early stages, and to prevent them while they didn't turn into destructive disaster.
Thirdly, it is experience of fight against famine which has the big relevance as in the regional plan (as in Tajikistan, Afghanistan and other countries people are still, unfortunately, continue to starve), and also in the world plan, for prevention catastrophic famine in other countries, and corrections of policy of the international humanitarian organizations.
This experience needs careful and comprehensive study not only because it is very significant, but also because for it is paid for extremely high price. Memory of the dead appeals to such disaster has never been allowed to continue. Author

Chapter One
Prologue of tragedy
On September 12, 1925 year, from a train at the station Kyzyl-Orda (former Perovsk) was came a man who played a central role in tragedy of immense proportions, which was the largest of those that covered Kazakhstan. His name was Philip Isaevich Goloshchekin. He was an old revolutionary, previously held several positions in Samara province, where he was chairman of the Provincial Council of Workers, Peasants 'and Soldiers' Deputies, chairman of executive committee and was a member in the Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) (Russian Communist Party). Now he had become the first secretary of Kazkraykom RCP (b).
The formalities connected with election of the new secretary were settled very quickly, and already on September 18, 1925 the newspaper “Soviet Steppe” placed biographic article about comrade Goloshchekin on the occasion of him arrival in Kyzyl-Orda. The same article designates also date with which the great tragedy began1.
Not especially disappeared that Philip Goloschekin's promotion on a post of First Secretary of Kazkraykom was appointment, rather than Bolsheviks’ choice of Kazakhstan. Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) RCP (b) under the leadership of Lazarus Kaganovich, with the full support of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Iosif Stalin, while conduct extensive personnel policy making appointment to the various positions. On the top, in the Central Committee Politburo of RCP (b) in that moment was fierce political struggle, and Stalin, taken the leadership of Organizational bureau, he created a basis of his power, appointing the loyal people. Obviously, Philip Goloshchekin was included by Stalin and Kaganovich in this number, and got an appointment at a sufficiently high office, much higher than all the posts that after Revolution held Goloshchekin. Before that, he successively held the positions of Secretary of Perm, Yekaterinburg and provincial committees of the Ural Regional party, and then was transferred to the Soviet work and held posts the Chairman of Provincial executive committees of the Soviets in Kostroma and Samara provinces. New appointment provides a much wider volume of work as Kazakhstan was much more than any province, and also was higher because Kazakhstan was while Kazakhs Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KazASSR), which was the part of RSFSR, having own government and own independent People's Commissariat.
On practice which has already established by then the secretary of regional committee actually directed all authorities, and this appointment for Goloshchekin was actually appointment as the head of whole autonomous republic.
His previous biography together with cash conditions that developed in Kazakhstan, allows understanding the logic of this destination. Kazakhstan during the Civil War was the scene of the fighting, many of its regions were heavily ruin. Besides, Kazakhstan already had two waves of famine. First - in 1918-1919 years, the second - in 1921-1922 years, after whose economy of KazASSR restored with great difficulties, and Republic poverty reigned. Because after the revolution Goloshchekin held, predominantly economic posts, he must be in Orgburo RCP (b) was considered a specialist on the farm, and directed in order to help economic reconstruction of the country. Also, according to the comrades of Orgburo, Goloshchekin was acquainted with local conditions, as in 1919 he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of Turkic Republics, and in October 1919 - May 1920 he was a member of the Turkic commission of
1 V. Mikhailov Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 16-19
VTsIK (All-Russian Central Executive Committee) and SNK (Council of People's Commissars) of RSFSR. It isn't excluded that his candidate was offered by Kaganovich who in 1922 was delegate of XI Congress of the RCP (b) from Turkestan, and immediately thereafter received appointment from Stalin in Orginstruktorsks department at the Central Committee Secretariat RCP (b) 2.
On the economic purpose of his appointment to the post of Secretary Kazkraykom RCP (b) indicates also that Goloshchekin in 1921 year sometimes was Glavruda's chairman(head controlling ore extraction) and then Kazakhstan perceived as the most important base of color metallurgy and source of copper and lead ores, and also in Samara’s province he actively dealt with economic issues. In particular, there he led Gubposledgol, i.e. Provincial Committee to Combat consequences of famine, and managed to achieve some success. All these circumstances of his biography, obviously, forced to Stalin and Kaganovich stopped on his candidacy.
In view of these facts, in 1925 year, his appointment in Kazakhstan seemed justified and appropriate. Before Goloshchekin enough well showed himself on the party, military, government and economic posts, he was an Old Bolshevik and a revolutionary, was well acquainted with Lenin and Stalin, and from all points of view was seen likely as a reliable and executive fellow hard Bolshevik. This circumstance was emphasized with Goloshchekin's active participation in the organizations of execution of a family of Nikolay II in Yekaterinburg in 1918 year. About this, of course, well known in the Politburo and Orgburo. Signs of that, what Goloshchekin will be engaged in Kazakhstan later, in 1925 weren’t looked through. This opinion about Goloshchekin as the hard Bolshevik and good handyman seen quite a long time kept in the Central Committee, and had impact on a situation as there was a decision about removing Goloshchekin were not easy, and decided only after the economic disaster became apparent. Philip Goloshchekin definitely enjoyed great confidence.
In those years appointments to leading posts in much bigger degree were defined by a political position of this or that party member, his attitude towards party leaders, than real administrative and economic skills. Sometimes such appointments were very successful, as, for example, Felix Dzerzhinsky's appointment to a post at first people's commissar means of communication, and then and chairman of VSNKh (Supreme Soviet of the National Economy). Dzerzhinsky showed their talents of administrator, and managed to achieve the output of railways from a protracted post-war crisis, and then managed to give the initial impetus of industrialization3. Many managers do not understand the technical and economic issues, led through the old specialists. But at that time there were many leaders who could not do anything themselves and no one else have relied. They them suffered on the leading posts only for the political reasons. So the appointment of Philip Goloshchekin in 1925 year was justified from the standpoint the current immediately after the Civil War practice. Of course, the witnesses of Goloshchekin’s arrival in Kyzyl-Orda could hardly assume that this person will bring a terrible disaster to the country. On the background of not yet cooled memory of the Civil War, fights, famines and poverty, his arrival was seen as a not threat.

2 D.N. Verkhoturov Stalin's economic revolution. M., "Olma-Press", 2006, p. 129
3 D.N. Verkhoturov Stalin's economic revolution. M.,"Olma-Press", 2006; S.S. Hromov F.E. Dzerzhinsky on the economic front 1921-1926 gg. M., "Thought", 1977
On the contrary, it isn't excluded that his appointment as many then connected with best hope for a speedy recovery of Kazakhstan and the building of communism.
We so in detail stopped on Goloschekin's arrival in Kzyl-Orda and his biography in order to show that his appointment was obviously not incidental but at the same time was not originally carried a clearly expressed signs of any evil intention which could be born in the Central Committee of RCP (b) or among Stalin's environment. He was transferred to Kazakhstan with the explicit hope that Goloshchekin will be able to raise economy of the republic. These facts allow us to understand the degree of confidence, which he enjoyed until his retirement in 1933 year, and the extent of his personal contribution to catastrophic developments of situation.
It seems that his personal contribution to the economic catastrophe was determining factor. Many researchers, in particular Valery Mikhaylov, repeatedly emphasized that Goloshchekin who was the old revolutionary with a long probation and merits before revolution, probably, didn't receive that power and glory on which counted in 1917. Now he was given authority over the whole autonomous republic, and he apprehended it as opportunity to realize all the unsatisfied revolutionary ambitions. But to this subject we shall return.
Now it should be taken into account, in what state there was at that time Kazakhstan and what was its economy. Goloshchekin’s politics unfolded against the backdrop of the economy KazASSR, which can be defined as a prolonged crisis.
Usually economic condition of Kazakhs ASSR in Soviet literature rated very optimistic: "By the time Kazakhstan slightly recovered from the ravages of civil war and famine of 1921-1922 years. Gross grain harvest in 1925 totaled 92 million poods and approached the pre-war levels; the animal husbandry restored which undermined by hard times ... "4.
But with such an optimistic assessment of the Kazakhstan economy immediately after Civil War can hardly agree. The situation was very heavy, especially after the two waves of famine.
The two waves of famine
The dramatic events of the Civil War caused their economic consequences and the most explicitly reflected in the economic situation. The severe famine which has captured many regions of Kazakhstan was the brightest and visible consequence of Civil war in economy.
The famine in Kazakhstan immediately after the Civil War, very few known and almost never mentioned in the literature. Much attention is attracted terrible famine of 1921 in the Volga region and in Ukraine, to combat all forces which threw the RSFSR and international assistance to fight with which was created "Pomgol." But here about famine in Kazakhstan practically anything essential it wasn't reported. If famine in 1932 could be investigated by eyewitnesses or their children, here are eyewitnesses of earlier famine died long before there were researchers, wishing to understand this question.
Of all the numerous publications on the economic history of Kazakhstan, any details about the famine of 1921-1922 is supplied by only one publication- the collection of the documents "Socialist Construction in Kazakhstan during the Recovery Period (1921-1925 years)", in which included very wide list of documents including some detailed reports by food situation and fight against famine. Separate information is available in other publications.
4V. Mikhailov Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 80
Valery Mikhailov correctly notes: "Some reason when we talk about famine in the steppe then immediately meant famine of 30 years. But in Kazakhstan, it was the second famine. The first was in 1919 - 1922 years. Therefore, when researchers will deal with this issue, it should be divided into first and second periods "5. Indeed, the first two waves of famine also became one of the causes of hunger in 1932 year, and they were a significant economic factor that should be considered Goloshchekin. Thus it is necessary to pay attention to this issue.

The difficulties of agriculture in Kazakhstan began immediately with the beginning Civil War. In 1917 in agricultural areas it was observed the crop failure, and in the winter of 1917/1918 years came jute6. While jute marked in 1916/1917 years7. It should be noted that the observation of the Kazakhs, large jute there were usually associated with the year қoyan (hare) the traditional 12-year Mushel. Some jutes even got their names. Jute in 1867 / '68 years - zhalpak koyan zhity, in 1879/1880 years - uly koyan (great hare), in 1891/1892 years - kіshі koyan (little hare), and in 1915/1916 years - takyr koyan (naked hare)8.
The lack of the food became notable at once, and in April of 1918 year the question of crops on all free lands rose before Vernensk Party organization, i.e. food shortages are being felt in one of the most productive areas of Semirechye. In 1919, state crops already practiced, the entire crop from which was at the disposal of food authorities.
The civil war, guerrilla actions accompanying it and banditry are also very strongly undermined possibilities of agriculture in Kazakhstan. Combat operations mainly conducted on the territory of the main grain areas, located in the Northern Kazakhstan.
Certain contribution to deterioration of situation in agricultural production made the surplus-appropriation system, which preparing significant amounts of grain brought, meat, wool, skin and another products. A surplus-appropriation system, that entered by SNK decree on January 11, 1919 year, provided delivery of all agriculture products, from above legislatively established consumer norm, for needs of the organization of supply of army and the population in RSFSR. At the end of 1919 – the beginning of 1920 when White Guards in Kazakhstan were crushed, the surplus-appropriation system was entered into KyrRepublic (Kyrgyz Republic).
According to a surplus-appropriation system in 1920/1921years it was prepared:
Bread-700, 8 thousand of poods, Millet – 411, 9 thousand of poods,
Meat – 280 thousand of poods, Wool – 24, 6 thousand of poods,
Leather – 215 thousand of units9
5V. Mikhailov Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p.
6 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov -Essays of the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 25
7S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 26
8Kazakhs economy at the turn of XIX-XX centuries. Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 80
9G.I. Chulanov, B, Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays of the history of the national economy- Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 36
According to other sources, only during the existence of the surplus-appropriation system in Kazakhstan has collected 4.02 million poods of meat. The agriculture of Kazakhstan weakened by two jutes in a row, poor harvests, in a number of areas ruined by military and guerrilla operations, numerous requisitions, was influenced also by blow surplus-appropriation systems. The reason of sharp reduction of quantity of cattle in 1920-1921 years there were, no doubt, large-scale preparations to surplus-appropriation system.
In general, Kazakhstan was considered as one of the most important regions of animal husbandry therefore even in the spring of 1921, after introduction of the tax in kind, the Council of People's Commissars of RSFSR expected to collect 2, 57 million poods of meat, of which 0.58 million poods accounted for the tax in kind the rest expected to receive by barter and purchase for money10. KASSR People's Commissariat for Agriculture also counted on a quite good crop of 1921 year, with gross collecting in 86 million pounds, which had to give surplus to 26 million tons of grain11.
However, the outcomes of the Civil War in agriculture were quite disappointing. Number of livestock decreased in 1920 year to 16.3 million of heads versus 29.9 million of heads in 1913 year (according to the Central Committee of the CEC Pomgol KASSR, the figures are somewhat different: in 1917 year - 29.7 million of heads, in 1920 year - 9.7 million of heads)12. Cultivated area has fallen from 4.1 million hectares to 3.2 million hectares. Gross grain yield decreased by 26% in comparison with 1913 year13. The total figures do not reflect the real situation, because in some provinces due to fighting crops decreased in times: in the Ural province more than doubled, in Semirechensk province – in three times.
In other words, the possibilities for the production of food products in Kazakhstan declined sharply, and now even the average yield could lead to a food shortage. This fact is noted by the Central Committee Pomgol at the CEC (Central Election Commission) KASSR: "In view of such significant reduction of cultivated area and loss of livestock, we could calculate that even with an average yield partial famine KASSR would have been inevitable.14" At the beginning of 1921 the agriculture of Kazakhstan was in such state that was one adverse factor that accident burst enough. This circumstance again will repeat subsequently at collectivization; the agriculture reached to approximately same sharply critical condition. In 1921 falling in agriculture proceeded. The cattle livestock according to the Central Committee Pomgol fell to 6,2 million of heads, and a cultivated area to 3,04 million hectares15.

10S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 126
11G.F. Dahshleyger, K Nurpeisov., History of the peasantry of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. 1. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1985, p. 97
12Socialist construction in Kazakhstan in the recovery period (1921-1925 years.). Collection of documents and materials. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 198
13 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays on the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 32
14-15Report of the Central Committee at the CEC Pomgol KazASSR Against Famine, June 20, 1922 - Socialist Construction in Kazakhstan in the recovery period (1921-1925 years.). Collection of documents and materials. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 198
The disappearance of an additional 3.5 million of heads of cattle and a reduction of crops on 200,000 hectares in itself created a very tense food situation, which turned into economic disaster by drought of summer 1921 year.
It was a very severe drought, the main damage of which was in arid regions of Kazakhstan. Completely lost harvest in the Ural, Orenburg, Aktobe, Kostanay regions16. In these areas during normal moisture, precipitation hardly suffices for average wheat growing conditions and an amount of precipitation only on 50-60 mm exceeds stocks of the moisture necessary for average conditions of vegetation of wheat17. The drought, the almost complete absence of measures to detain the snow and the accumulation of moisture in the soil in 1921 year, led to the death of the crop. However, due to different local conditions, the position of the harvest could differ greatly from county to county, and in some of them the crop, allowing to hold on at least till spring could be reaped. RSFSR was held differentiation of counties. If the in county yield made less than 6 pounds per capita, it admitted starving.18.
KASSR People's Commissariat for Agriculture cruelly miscalculated an assessment of prospects of a crop. In 1921 year actual collection was only 4.7 million poods, while hungry food ration and seed fund needed at least 22.1 million poods of grain19. The plan of collecting the food for an allotment which else continued, it was executed for only 17, 5%, and from 22 million poods of grain only 6 million poods are collected20. However, because of the drought in 1921 year, the peasants did not could pass any surplus appropriation system or tax in kind.
In December of year 1921 in five areas and Adaevsk county of KASSR (with total population of about 2.5 million people), 1.2 million people or 48% starved. Famine accrued from the most affected counties, in which wasn't absolutely any crop, to less injure. But at the beginning of spring of 1922 when all poor stocks were eaten, famine burst at full force. According to rough estimates In April of 1922 year in Kazakhstan about 2.3 million people or 92% of the population were starved. Regarding the status of nomadic areas at this time there is practically no information, however, we can assume that there was a mass migration in the more favorable areas.
In other areas of the RSFSR situation was much more complicated. In poor harvest provinces, according to reports of the Central Committee of Pomgol at VTsIK, lived 31 million 714 thousand people21. Number of hungry people in Kazakhstan amounted to 7.2% of the total number of hungry people in the same year. The first reaction to this situation was the formation in July of 1921 year at the Central Election Commission Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR Central

16 G. Kang- History of Kazakhstan. Almaty, "Almatykitap", 2005, p. 172
17 From experience of development virgin and lay lands in Kazakhstan (collection of articles). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing House ", 1955, p. 12-16
18 Y.A. Poles. 1921-th year -Victory over hunger. M. "Politizdat," 1975, p. 16
19G.F. Dahshleyger, K Nurpeisov., History of the peasantry of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. 1. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1985, p. 97
20G.F. Dahshleyger, K Nurpeisov., History of the peasantry of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. 1. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1985, p. 60
21Y.A. Poles. 1921-th year -Victory over hunger. M. "Politizdat," 1975, p. 18
Commission for Famine Relief, which was headed by Comrade Chairman Kazakh Central Executive Committee Mandeshev. In July 18, 1921 year, the Central Committee Pomgol was formed and headed by Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, M.I. Kalinin. Pomgol in Kyr Republic was formed almost simultaneously with the formation of the central Pomgol.
The main mean in the fight against famine was the distribution of state rations for starving. They cover not whole population, but, nevertheless, the volume of distribution, according to the Central Committee Pomgol was quite significant. State rations for starving included 10 pounds (4 kg) of bread, 6 pounds (2.4 kg) of cereals and 4 pounds (1.6 kg) of meat per month22.
In November of 1921 year, in the territory covered by modern Western Kazakhstan, distributed 139,000 rations. In January-February of 1922 year distributed 171,850 rations. But already in March the number of state rations for starving sharply increased. In March-May has already distributed 392 thousand rations23. Food assistance encompassed about 17% of hungry people at the peak of the famine. According to the Central Committee of Pomgol the Kazakh SSR for seven months, from November of 1921 year to May of 1922 year were distributed 1 million 810,700 state rations for starving. It required distribution approximately 72,400 of tons of grain, 4.3 thousand tons of cereals and 2,800 tons of meat.
State ration for starving included a predetermined quantity of food, mainly bread, flour, cereals and vegetables. He could be given to the starving in two forms. In agricultural areas it is often given through the canteen at which from state rations for starving prepared hot food. In nomadic areas big distribution was gained by delivery the state ration for starving in a dry form, though 173 nutritious yurts also were open. Also with food rations, starving supplied shoes, clothing, essentials, and to them received medical help24.
Food assistance was provided through other channels. In the same report, the CC of Pomgol indicated that the American Committee for Relief ARA opened in Kazakhstan in 1549 canteens with the issuance of 297,759 rations per day. International Working Committee for Famine Relief in April-May of 1922 year, provided 10,097 rations a day, intended for workers in industrial enterprises, that very few then in Kazakhstan. The Red Cross has provided some time food to 14,000 people a day. In the Ural province worked medical and nutritional detachment from Ukraine, which in March was distributing 4000rations per day. Finally, the Quakers sent in Kostanay Province 60 wagons of grain25.

22 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays on the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 130
23Report of the Central Committee at the CEC Pomgol KazASSR Against Famine, June 20, 1922 - Socialist Construction in Kazakhstan in the recovery period (1921-1925 years.). Collection of documents and materials. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 198
24 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays on the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 111
25Report of the Central Committee at the CEC Pomgol KazASSR Against Famine, June 20, 1922 - Socialist Construction in Kazakhstan in the recovery period (1921-1925 years.). Collection of documents and materials. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 200
Estimate the loss of population from famine is very difficult due to the extreme lack of reliable data. Population decline of Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR from 1914 to 1922 years is estimated at about 1 million people, according to other 1.7 million people. However, without a doubt, some of them died during the Civil War, part of the population migrated, and some part loss, apparently is attributed to the imperfection of statistical accounting of the population, especially the boundaries of the autonomous republic while repeatedly changed. Loss from famine in 1921 - 1922 years can be estimated approximately in the range from 200 to 400 thousand people. Judging by the documents in Kazakhstan at that time was not observed mass mortality, such mortality from starvation in the Volga region and in the Ural. To this order of figures points also number of the children who have been brought together in orphanages.
The active help to the starving allowed in June, 1922 of the Central Committee Pomgol at Kazakh Central Executive Committee to draw a conclusion: "Judging by the latest data arriving with that, it is necessary to believe that hunger in KASSR is considerably weakened"26.
Subsequently, Kazakhstan has had a very broad support in the food supply and the rehabilitation of agriculture. Till October 1, 1922 year, 1 million 402,4 thousand poods of the food from which 251,1 thousand poods it was sent from other provinces of RSFSR and from parts of Red Army were collected, and 143,2 thousand poods are collected at the expense of donations and assignments27. External non-governmental assistance amounted to 28% of the total harvested food for republic. The remainder was come to the centralized rescue of the state and collecting oft ax in kind for the Autonomous Republic. All the tax in kind and purchased by barter bread was in 1922 year booked for a republic.
In sowing campaign in 1922 Kazakhstan has received considerable support of seeds, which amounted to 60% of the seed fund. In 1923-1924 years 11, 5 million poods of seeds were sent to Kazakhstan and 3, 8 million rubles of money advance28 especially for needs of agriculture recovery. Farmers for a long time could not give seed loan issued during the famine years, and it was delayed until the harvest in 1924 year, and many farms altogether exempt from its return29.
Famine does not back down in 1922 year. Some of its manifestations on provinces and counties were observed until 1925 year. For example, in March-April of 1923 year, the entire Northern Kazakhstan and adjacent areas of Siberia were covered by sporadic famine. According to the State Information Summary, which were drafted in the OGPU, in the Ural province about 70,000 children starved, in Akmola county there were 24 thousands of starving and in Tarski border county of Omsk province does starving 30-40% of the population30.

26Report of the Central Committee at the CEC Pomgol KazASSR Against Famine, June 20, 1922 - Socialist Construction in Kazakhstan in the recovery period (1921-1925 years.). Collection of documents and materials. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 202
27 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays on the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 130
28S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 131
29"Soviet steppe», № 1, 20 November of 1923 year
30Soviet village acoording to OGPU. 2 T. 1923-1929. Documents and materials. M., "Rosspen", 2000, p. 74, 91, 96
Immediately after the suppression of famine there was the urgent task of restoring agriculture and increase food production as KyrRepublic could not live only at the expense of external sources. But with recovery of agriculture and increasing plowing had great difficulties associated with the maximum low technical level of the industry. According to estimates of the Commissariat KASSR at minimal consumer normally required to provide reserves in the amount of not less than 60 million poods of grain31. Given a yield of 92 million poods, the reserves of grain only allowed covering the needs and something to direct for seeding. The harvest in the dry steppe zone was very unstable, and the sizes of plowing were very minor. On the average in the first half of the 1920th years the farming sowed 5,8 hectares, the average annual crop made 6,2 centners from hectare. Thus from 10 years 3-4 years were barren, when the harvest was usually 1.5-2 centners per hectare, or even less. In lean years, farmers barely returned sown grain. Features of droughty climate of Kazakhstan, multiplied by a primitive agro technology, and total absence of actions for moisture detention, in particular affected. Situation with cattle was better; the quantity of cattle by 1926 year doubled in comparison with spring of 1922 year, from 7, 8 million heads to 13, 5 million heads32. But it was only not much more, than Kazakhstan had in 1920 year (13, 1 million heads). Thus level of marketability of animal husbandry didn't exceed 7-10%.
The technological level of agriculture, even in plant growing was the lowest. According to data in 1920 year in Kazakhstan were in the use of 317, 5 thousand wooden ploughs, the roes deer and sabans, 207, 8 thousand wooden harrows, 30, 9 thousand iron harrows, and only 8234 horse seeders. Tractor and more difficult agricultural cars appeared only when there was Soviet the authority, and also were an extraordinary rarity. Certainly, KyrRepublic’s guide made huge efforts for delivery to Kazakhstan the agricultural tools as far as it could be made in those conditions when plants only began to rise after military ruin, and purchases abroad were very limited. Yet, the efforts have certain result. In 1923-1925 it were imported 21691 ploughs, 1089 seeders, 22594 harvesting machines of different types, 1155 threshing machines, 391 tractors33. But also it was very little, in particular taking into account huge spaces of Kazakhstan and a large number of almost not cooperated country farms (in 1926 year 1220668 farms are considered34). Cooperative movement then wasn't far a driving force in agriculture. Valery Mikhailov leading figures of Cooperatives in 1925 year: 2811 co-operatives, which consisted of more than 320 thousand households35, 26.2% of the farms. At the same time, not all co-operatives were manufacturing, a large part of them was the consumer, sales, credit co operations.

31G.F. Dahshleyger, K Nurpeisov., History of the peasantry of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. 1. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1985, p. 97
32 G.I. Chulanov, B. Ishmuhamedov., P.I. Antonov, M.M. Rozmanov- Essays on the history of the national economy Kazakh SSR (1917-1928 years) v. 1. Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1959, p. 112-113
33S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 196
34 G.U. Chulanov, B.M. Ishmuhamedov, T.V. Checheleva, Z.G. Zhubanov- Essays about the history of the Kazakh SSR national economy. T. II. (1928 - June 1941.). Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1962, p. 228
35V. Mikhailov Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 80

Economy Kazakh ASSR was completely dependent on agriculture. In gross output the agricultural sector occupied 84, 4%, and separately animal husbandry – 48, 5%36. With such parameters, in KAZASSR was extremely limited space for economic maneuver. Similar situation didn't give up special hopes for fast and dynamic lifting of this main branch of economy of KAZASSR. Gross agricultural output only in 1927/28 reached the prewar level, i.e. in 1925 year; talk about the restoration was very, very early. On the contrary, the state of agriculture at the time can be estimated as a state of protracted crisis, with a slight tendency towards improvement.
The level of industrial development, transport, and communications in KyrRepublic in the mid-1920-th years was stunningly low. Practically there was no processing of agricultural production, to such an extent, that the main part it was simply taken out by raw materials out of borders of the republic. The live cattle, because of the extremely poor development of meat-processing, were taken out. The only industry that before the revolution grew vigorously in Kazakhstan was the handling and embossing of leather. During the Civil War, this industry has made a major contribution to the victory of the Red Army with the delivery of footwear and equipment, and after the war became the leading industry in KyrRepublic. Its value retained long enough. Leather industry and on the eve of the first Five-Year Plan gave 22% of industrial production in KAZASSR. But at the same time, 75% of large hides, 96% of small hides, 98% wool and all the cotton, ambary, horsehair, bristles, guts, furs - totally exported from Kazakhstan. Then there was so weak industry that now it is hard to believe. In 1924 year, from the companies of the Supreme Economic Council worked 57, yet 22 enterprises have been leased, and 153 - were closed37.
Was extremely underdeveloped transport, which did not allow redistributing on the territory of the republic food if it was necessary. And the transport, which at that time was widely, using animal-drawn draft, itself, demanded a large amount of fodder grain and hay. The development of railways was very low. In 1925 year there were only 3241 km of railways, of which 266.5 km were built during the construction season in 1924 year38.
The poverty of the republic was felt in everything, and it can be felt even now. V. N. Velman's brochure "A national economy of KSSSR and our immediate tasks" was printed on exclusively nasty paper and gathered by five different fonts that speak about extreme deficiency of typographical letters in printing house. Even if the government has experienced such difficulties, what we talk about all the others?
So that economic policy was then the main and most urgent task in Kazakhstan. The economy demanded attention and was far from clear how to solve numerous problems.
The first speeches
It would seem, in such conditions Philip Goloschekin has to with the head to plunge into a thick of economic problems and to be engaged in their decision. Here works was with a surplus.

36S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 199
37V.N. Welman, - National economy of CEB and our immediate tasks. Orenburg, 1924, p. 23
38G.F. Dahshleyger -Turksib - firstborn socialist industrialization (essays about the history of construction Turksib). Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1953, p. 32
However, this did not happen. Already in his first report on the V-th All-Kazakhstan Conference, which opened in the 1 of December, in 1925 in Kyzyl-Orda, i.e. 10 weeks after arriving in Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin said not about the development of economy of the republic, but about the policy of Sovietization village. In fact, he picked up an official position of the Central Committee of RCP (b) which else in 1924 year decided that the Soviet power in the Kazakh auls was not present. Goloshchekin in the conference read a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) the Bolsheviks of Kazakhstan, which was tasked with the creation of Soviet power in auls: "the Central Committee, considering that in KyrRepublic Concils are in especially difficult situation and actually in auls the Councils were not present, considers necessary to take all measures to the valid creation the Soviet the authorities in auls and kishlaks …"39.
However, we can not say that Goloshchekin did not understand the difficulties of the situation in Kazakhstan. He fully understood which is why in his later report he linked the slogan Sovietization of the auls with all the most acute problems in Kazakhstan at the time: "To say that in Kazakhstan there is no Soviet power - not true. There is the Soviet power here but if to raise more widely a question of Sovietization of Kazakhstan, as of the organization of masses, as the issue of form in which occurs if you want, national self-determination, a form in which it is possible to carry out cultural and political growth, the form creating economic release, the form releasing from under operation, we have to tell that we have huge shortcomings” 40.
Slogan of Sovietization of the aul many authors perceived as expression Goloshekin’s plans to arrange a famine in Kazakhstan. The role of this policy in the premises of famine in 1932 year will be discussed later on, but for 1925 year it's hard to agree. Here it is necessary to take into account several factors that prompted Goloshekin to such solution. Firstly, it was his performance after the first appointment on the highest office after the revolution, and he had to justify imposed on him confidence, though the demonstration of loyalty rate of CC Party on this question. Reference to the letter of the Central Committee and the thesis of the Sovietization of the auls this task quite adequate.
Secondly, the analysis of economic problems took a lot of time and greatly complicated by the fact that it was difficult to obtain information and organized statistics did not then in Kazakhstan. In 1925 year, in Orenburg was released handbook "All Kazakhstan for 1925-1926 years," in the introduction to which was clearly stated: "... With a view to publishing the accuracy of materials received any direct and official materials from the most remote organs of whole republic ... based only on direct information from these locations, and not subordinate magazines, which are often incorrect"41.
This is a direct admission that the statistics in KAZASSR then was very bad, especially in the departments. But the author of the handbook "journalist- invalid" A. Bolshakov, was able to collect only the most general reference information about various industries. He has not the data that would characterize the dynamics of the economy of the republic. Many data were outdated, as data on crops, which are brought at his sources for 1923 year. Therefore Goloschekin on the first time of the stay in Kazakhstan simply couldn't receive any clear and reasonable ideas of economy, in particular peasant and cattle breeding. He could not take the necessary data nowhere. And, as we shall see later, there was also no certainty regarding economic development
39-40V. Mikhailov Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 81-82
41All Kazakhstan for 1925-1926 years. Orenburg, 1925, p .. 35
of Kazakhstan and the ways to overcome numerous problems.
In its report Goloshchekin spoke primarily about politics and Sovietization of the aul, and it was great fault, given reduced circumstances. But later, he not only corrected the the theses of first performance, not only held on to them in every way, even in the face of unprecedented economic catastrophe, but have not spent any work that would have helped him get a proper economic policy. The economic leadership of Kazakhstan under his supervision reached use of the forged, exaggerated figures in planning and drawing up tasks on bread and to meat purveyances. Further we will try as far as it available materials will allow analyze this mechanism of self-deception.

Chapter two
To plow or to graze?
In a further statement we should leave for a while Philip Goloschekin and his politician and to go deep into details of the economic provisions in Kazakhstan in the 1920th years and also to track peripetias disputes round a course of further development of the republic. These disputes were very sharp, accompanied by political accusations, but at the same time they show that the question of how to develop Kazakhstan was far from simple, was far from straightforward, and there were various standpoints.
But firstly need to still devote little attention to the traditional types of agriculture in Kazakhstan - the leading sectors of the economy in 1920th years. There are three types: Kazakh cattle breeding, Kazakh irrigated agriculture, as well as a European-style farm (Russian or Ukrainian) with a combination of agriculture and cattle breeding.
Kazakh cattle breeding
The cattle breeding economy at that time was a main type of rural economy in Kazakhstan, not without reason it occupied such huge share into republic economy. It was also the main source of livelihood for the majority of the population of Kazakhstan, and gave a very small proportion of marketable products. Due to the weak development of transport, due to the lack of knocking areas, refrigerators and meat processing plants, and also food industries, animal husbandry almost developed in the direction of commodity production, and was conducted almost the same methods that hundreds of years ago.
In ethnographic materials collected in the second half of XIX -beginning of XX century in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh nomadic herding was very described in detail. But, unfortunately, whole and systematic description of herding appeared only in the 1980-1990's, that is a lot of time after the disaster. In the early twentieth century system nomadic cattle breeding has been studied very badly, and that played a major role in economic catastrophe. «Nomadic economy is still so much terra incognita, that it is difficult to meet with it in literature "- wrote V.A. Ostafyev42.
Nomadic herding in Kazakhstan has developed in very peculiar conditions. The most important geographical factor was that the main pastures were in transition band, which runs between 48 and 50 degrees of north latitude. To the north the climate was much colder, winter continued for 5 months, winter temperatures dropped to -45 degrees and below. Abundance of snow impeded to cattle pasturing. To the south the desert zone in which the climate was hot and droughty: the winter continued about 1 month, small loss of snow and its short detention, in the summer temperature rose to +45 degrees that led to burning out of herbs43. These geographical conditions created radically different requirements for livestock grazing.

42V.A. Massanov -Problems of social and economic history of Kazakhstan on a boundary of XVIII-XIX centuries- Alma-Ata, "Science", 1984, p. 10
43Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 59

Enough to say that for pasturing of sheep required a minimum of 5-7 hectares in the steppes and 12-24 ha of semi-deserts and deserts44. On all territory of Kazakhstan the conditions for a pasture of cattle were unequal, often mosaic. Therefore the cattle should be overtaken from one pasture on another.
Availability of feed and water determine the composition of the herd. To feed a sheep required annual 1314 kg dry weight of feed and 1.5 cubic meters of water. At this, of 288 species of plants only 167 species eaten by sheep45. Because the sheep ate the most plant species and could drink almost any water, even with salinity up to 10 g / l, it is not surprising that sheep were the basis of the herd among Kazakhs. On average sheep were 60%, but the proportion of sheep in Mangishlak reached 85%.In contrast, cattle breeding could eat all 48 species of plants and require fresh water with a salinity of less than 2.5 g / l, then these kinds of cattle averaged 12.3% of the herds. In this the major share of cattle was in northern Kazakhstan, where suitable feed and fresh water were, and where the proportion of the herd reached 30%.
I.E. Massanov identified two types of livestock farming. First characterized by long year-round migrations through wells, share sheep was 60% and wintering in waterless areas. The second was characterized by uniform nomadism with summering to wintering; share of cattle was 25-30%, with long wintering livestock housing46.
Dry climate and low productivity of pastures, made all year round to keep the cattle out at feed, didn't allow passing on the most part of steppes and semi-deserts to settled cattle breeding and agriculture, and forced to move after cattle. This was essence of the nomadic economy, according to S.I. Rudenko, consists of three principles:
1. Cattle breeding as main occupation.
2. The year-round maintenance of cattle on underfoot to forage taking into account heterogeneity of pastures.
3. Active lifestyle of majority of population47.
For successful nomadism had an excellent knowledge of the composition vegetation in specific tracts, its degree of palatability cattle, the time of vegetation, pasture and water availability into account numerous other factors related to weather, to determine the time route and migrations. Modern authors emphasize that not even all aksakals had such thorough knowledge of the nature and climate to ensure successful nomadism. Therefore, as a rule, even the head of the race unquestioningly obey those who have had such experience.
However, the degree of development of the nomadic economy was different for different regions of Kazakhstan. Fully nomadic Kazakhs were Kazakhs of Mangyshlaksk, Temir, Atbasar, Kazalinsk, Irgiz, Turgay counties that were in the arid zone, which feeds on pastures were few and villages were forced to constantly overtake it from one pasture to another.

44-45-46I.E. Massanov -Nomadic Civilization of Kazakhs- (base life migratory habits of society). Almaty "Sotsinvest" - M., "Horizon", 1995, p. 29, 67, 84
47S.I. Rudenko- Question about the form of livestock farming and nomadism. / / Geographical Society of the USSR. Materials on the department of ethnography. Part 1. L., "Science", 1961, p. 3-5
Nomadic routes ran from the well to the well, which was created very much. In 1873 year in Mangyshlak there were 1133 wells48. These wells were long-term, and were often operated till 150-200 years. Not a rarity there were the wells constructed in the XVIII century. But also many wells dried and became useless therefore annually on Mangyshlak nomads dug, according to various data, from 200 to 600 new wells. In deserts many pastures were suitable only in the summer, or on the contrary, only in the winter, like islands on the Aral Sea on which it was possible to graze cattle only in the winter when there it was possible to pass on ice and a code there was a snow. In the summer there it was possible to be lost from lack of drinking water. In a number of places of Kazakhstan of a condition were so different for winter and summer that they compelled to wander for the long distances. For example, Kazakhs of southern Atbasar County each year wandered to a distance of 1,000 km, to the river Chu49. In other places, where conditions were more favorable, migrations occurred at a distance of 10-15 km. Some farms have roamed over a distance of 2500 km, making up to 107 stops a year50.
Most common in beginning of XX century type of Kazakh livestock farming was extensive semi-nomadic economy, which combined nomadism (usually from winter to summer pastures and vice versa, at a distance of 20-50 km), half stall nomadism and content with haying (44 to 96% of households in various counties of the Central and Eastern Kazakhstan) with a long hibernation and irrigated agriculture51. In Semirechye even cultivated alfalfa forage for feeding of livestock52.
However, the main part of cattle contained in semi-nomadic farms on underfoot to a forage also it was overtaken from a pasture on a pasture. There existed two systems of a stage. The first, the most difficult, provided separate pastures for four seasons: winter, spring, and summer, autumn. The second way provided pastures for autumn-winter and spring - summer seasons.
The most difficult was to provide grazing in winter, and wintering were an essential element of a semi-nomadic economy. From them literally depended life of livestock farming. Small auls stood on the wintering, from 5 to 25 households. The number of livestock is strictly limited by capacity of the winter pastures.
On wintering cattle grazed usually separately. On wintering pasture grounds shared on parts, for different cattle. The most distant there were pastures for horses - atarkan where it was driven away herds of horses, usually in 400-500 heads, sometimes to 1500 heads. Horses drove away on 100-200 km from wintering. To wintering sheep pastures – koytebein were closest, in radius no more than 3-4 km from wintering, on which graze kotan sheep, usually about 300-400 heads. Separately allocated pasture for calves - bzauzherі and for dairy mares – biezherі53.
48-49Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 70, 76
50V.A. Massanov -Problems of social and economic history of Kazakhstan on a boundary of XVIII-XIX centuries- Alma-Ata, "Science", 1984, p. 10
51Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 87-89
52Kazakhs. Historical and ethnographic research. Almaty, "Kazakhstan", 1995, p. 32
53Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 79

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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The separate pasture of cattle was broken during jutes when the dense rind of a crust was formed, or during loss of deep snow. At this time the cattle was several times banished on a pasture. At first grazed the horses eating the top parts of plants and breaking a crust by hoofs. Then were grazed cattle and camels, and then - sheep, which fetched lower parts of the plants. It was a way of grazing livestock in extreme conditions and it usually not used54.
In the early spring nomadic farms were removed from wintering and left on forage search, dispersing on the steppe separate yurtas. It was the period of intensive nomadism with short-term stops. In the same time copulation, castration, cattle branding were carried out, and also milking began and preparation of dairy products. On late spring farms passed to the summer pastures55.
Summer pastures, which rich in grass and water, were intervened a lot of cattle and on summer pasture nomads could stand in large auls, with long stops and transients that were called in basically need watering of livestock. On summer pasture sometimes gathered to several hundred yurts. At the same time toi and kurultay held, which could gather up to several tens of thousands of people.
In the fall nomads chose pastures closer to wintering, and quickly moved to the winter pastures to manage to come to them to the first snowfalls. In old times often the signal in movement on wintering was given by the khan, but at the beginning of the XX century time of the beginning of migrations for wintering defined by most skilled aksakals.
This cycle of migrations were subordinated all other work and perform the products. On the spring, summer and autumn pastures conducted milking cattle, dairy products were procured: uyz, sary Su (serum),kurt (cheese), azhygan kozhe (milk soup), kymyz, koyrtpak (drink from sour mix and fresh milk) koryktyk, koyu sut (thick milk). These products are formed the basis of the summer diet of Kazakhs. In the same time cheese for the winter was smoked. There was a face of cattle and meat smoking for the winter in the fall. In the spring before a migration of the on summer quarters, and migration in the autumn before the winter, there was a hairstyle of sheep, and felt was made of wool. In the summer also necessary subjects in economy, and yurt details were made.
In other words, the nomadic economy has its own rhythm and schedule of economic works, which was kept rigorously. Starting new work has always been accompanied by special holidays. Derogation from this graph has always been fraught with loss of cattle, and resorted to this only in exceptional circumstances, in the past, at military lesions.
In some counties, mostly in the North and North-East Kazakhstan and in Altai, in the beginning of XX century Kazakhs began to shift to settled economy, strongly reminiscent of Russian economy, with developed haying and farming. Livestock kept in stalls with supplementary feeding hay and auls themselves became sedentary. Kazakhs in these areas build permanent huts, barns and corrals for livestock. In these regions before everything subsidence of Kazakhs began.

54I.E. Massanov -Nomadic Civilization of Kazakhs- (base life migratory habits of society). Almaty "Sotsinvest" - M., "Horizon", 1995, p. 100
55I.E. Massanov -Nomadic Civilization of Kazakhs- (base life migratory habits of society). Almaty "Sotsinvest" - M., "Horizon", 1995, p. 103
On process of subsidence of Kazakhs at the beginning of the XX century earth confiscation by the Russian authorities had also great impact in advantage of Cossacks and immigrants. Withdrawal of lands accepted the very large-scale character. Total were seized 17.7 million acres of land (242.8 million of tithes land) 56. Sharp reduction of the area of pastures was compelled by many Kazakh to pass auls to settled economy, to adopt mowing, stall the cattle breeding and also to be engaged in agriculture.
Kazakh agriculture
Contrary to popular perception, the Kazakhs have long been familiar with agriculture, but it acquired a great importance since the end of XVIII century. Region of greatest development of the Kazakh agriculture covered the rivers Syr Darya, Chu, Talas, and Tau mountains with numerous watercourses suitable for Sai-streams irrigated agriculture, rivers Zhanadari and Kuvandari, Black Irtysh river valleys, in Zaysan Lake, in the plain, on the western and northern slopes of Tarbagatay, in Turgay river basins, Irgiz, Oph, Ural, Hobday, Emba57. Uniform agricultural belt of the Kazakhs not developed, but focuses of agriculture were almost in all parts of Kazakhstan, except Mangishlak and Ustiurt.
The most characteristic feature of the Kazakh agriculture was that Kazakhs always sought to keep only irrigated agriculture. Even in those areas where it was possible to run the economy of the European type, Kazakhs still tried to water the fields, at least once a year before sowing. In Ust-Kamenogorsk district Kazakhs treated not the best land, and only suitable for irrigation device. "The Kazakh economy was known different types of irrigated agriculture, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated of its forms"58.
Most primitive forms: field irrigation by melt water - sualma-egіn, irrigation by building dams - bogey, hand scoop - atpa. Complex forms of irrigation: water allocation from the main channels - togan, chigirns irrigation of different types - shygyr and system karizes which existed in the area of settlement Myrt-Tobe (Sauran) from the XVI century.
In the southern counties existed powerful system of canals which irrigate a large area. So togan Aulie-Ata had an extent of 9.8 miles and watered 212t ithes, togan Chiil in Petrovsk district watered 7,000 acres. Kazakhs were known very complex waterworks. So togan Karabura in Aulie-Ata district was laid in a strongly cross country, and included a tunnel and several aqueducts through channels, gullies and logs59. Only in Shymkent County in 1890 there were 239 irrigation ditches and canals with a total length of more than 3000 miles60.
Shyғyr occupied a large share of irrigated agriculture in the Turgay County across the rivers Turgay and Irgiz. Kazakh shygyr was as a wheel with a diameter of up to 5 meters, which is attached to the rim of a wooden or leather bucket, set in a deep pit, which is connected to the river channel.
56V.F. Shakhmatov -Kazakh nomadic pasture community (education, evolution and expansion). Alma-Ata, "Publisher of the Kazakh SSR," 1964, p. 130
57-59Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 155-161, 164, 181
60I.F. Makarov- Kazakh agriculture in the late XIX - early XX century (expeditionary surveys in 1896-1913 periods). / / Materials on the history of agriculture and the peasantry of the USSR. Collection III. M., "USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House," 1959, p. 393
Original systems of irrigation, such as at Balkhash, were sometimes applied where Kazakhs dug big holes at the rivers out of which brought channels. Also been known method of lake irrigation - koltaban, i.e. seeding at the bottom of the drying up of lakes, common on the Syr Darya and in lower of Talas.
Kazakhs irrigated fields sometimes by flooding when the field broke on sites which were filled at the time, or watered by grooves. Earth is plowed by wheel plow – Saban, sokha - jeragash, or “Tyumen plow" - plough with blade61. Kazakhs are mainly planted the millet - tares, traditional farming culture, but the beginning of XX century in most counties began planting wheat - biday. The harvest mowed down by a sickle - orak, or by scythe- shalgy orak, tied in bundles - Bau and threshed on the threshing floors - kyrmak, which often made on the field or at the gate of the fence arable land. Threshed grain through livestock to advance carefully compacted areas, then semi-refined grain sieved and piled in the grain pits - ura, accommodating from 40 to 200 pounds. All agricultural work began with ceremonies and celebrations.
Ethnographic materials show strong differences Kazakh agriculture from European , as well as in the Kazakh language has Turkic terms for all crops and their varieties ( so millet had three varieties : ak tary, kyzyl tary, shokay ) , agricultural implements and waterworks for agricultural operations. It shows that despite the later development of agriculture among the Kazakhs, it is not was borrowed from Russian. Kazakh agriculture development closely associated with the development of agriculture in ancient Central Asia and South Siberia.
In 1906 year, Kazakhs seeded 417,800 tithes, and in 1916 year - 648 000 tithes62.
Another characteristic feature of the Kazakh agriculture was its combination with nomadic pastoralists. Many nomadic economies had crops that were seeded on the wintering grounds before carting away on summer lands, and harvested after returning. Rich pastoralists also had their arable land on which to work their dependent poor relatives - ortak, whereas themselves bais trekked together with cattle.
Generally considered that the transition to agriculture and settled life were determined inability to lead nomadic economy, loss of livestock and pastures. However, survey found that in the beginning of XX century there was a curious trend: rich pastoralists had large crops, and than more bai had cattle, than more he was plowing. Farms with more than 100 cattle, on average 30-32 acres treated, whereas without cattle economy - from 1.5 to 3.5 acres. In the Kostanay county among without cattle farms there were 55.6% of crops, and among households which had 10-50, 50-100, and over 100 head of cattle, had 84,5-87% of plowing63. In general, it is not surprising because the rich economy could easily select horses for agricultural work.
Income from agriculture was only minor, but it increased in depending on the availability of cattle. Farm with 10 heads of cattle receive an annual income of 11.5 rubles, whereas farm with a herd of 10-20 heads - 43.5 rubles. In such farms, cattle could not be separated from agriculture.
61Kazakhs economy on a boundary of XIX-XX centuries. - Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 205-215
62-63I.F. Makarov- Kazakh agriculture in the late XIX - early XX century (expeditionary surveys in 1896-1913 periods). / / Materials on the history of agriculture and the peasantry of the USSR. Collection III. M., "USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House," 1959, p. 395\414-420

In richer households, agriculture was obviously expressed ancillary character, and at the beginning of XX century rapidly evolved into a commodity economy, the harvest which was for sale, although the main income rich ranchers received from the sale of cattle hides and wool.
To the theme of social relations in the Kazakh auls, methods exploitation, we'll be back later.
European type of farming.
Mass migration of peasants from the European provinces of the Russian Empire, which began in the second half of the XIX century, quickly led to the emergence of a new type in Kazakhstan agriculture - European type, as it was called in the economic literature of the 1920s years. It was presented predominantly by Russian farms and Ukrainian immigrants. Despite serious ethnographic differences in general, the migrants were about the same type of farming.
First unauthorized migrants from Tobolsk and Permian peasants came to Kazakhstan in 1866 to Akmola region, and settled near Lake Saumal-Kul, where they began to farm on leased Kazakhs earth64. Officially authorized relocation was opened in 13 of July in 1889 year by the decision of the State Council, opened the resettlement in Akmola region. Immediately behind this resolution, strong crop failure and famine in European provinces created a powerful stream of migrants in Kazakhstan65. In the period 1897 - 1916 years, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan moved 1.3 million people, most of whom - 56.2% settled in Akmola region66.
Accommodation of settlers made usually on land confiscated from the Kazakhs. This process of colonization supporters considered the most effective. However, in actual practice, many farmers were held in rented Kazakhs land that they rented to rent for 3-4 years. At Kazakhs the Russian peasants rented also hayfields which always were given on one time for to mow down the herbs67.
European type of farming combined the plow farming with sedentary pastoralists. At the beginning of the colonization each farm was allocated 40 acres of land on which a farmer could start farmland, pastures and hayfields. During the active colonization of the average area of land occupied by a single European economy little changed. Together with pastures and hayfields, per European economy in 1927 had an average of 56.8 hectares, while the average Kazakh economy occupied an area of 244.8 hectares68.
At the end of the XIX century in the medium of Russian peasants began to develop activity in gardening and melon growing, products are sent to sale. In the mountainous areas of the Semipalatinsk region developed beekeeping. In the 1890s, in northern Kazakhstan, in areas adjacent to the rail, began to develop marketable butter manufacturers.
64N.E. Bekmakhanova- Multiethnic population of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the era of capitalism (60-s of the XIX century – 1917 year). "Science", 1986, p. 111
65A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 10
64N.E. Bekmakhanova- Multiethnic population of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the era of capitalism (60-s of the XIX century – 1917 year). "Science", 1986, p. 160
67A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 158
68Status of Agriculture of Kazakh ASSR, the way its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on surveys of Kazakh ASSR expedition MIC CEC of the USSR in 1928). M., 1930, p. 38
However, the main occupation and the purpose for resettlement in Kazakhstan for Russian peasants were plow farming. Migrants through Sabans in which harnessed oxen, develop new lands and sowed on it mainly wheat, which is considered among the Russian peasants most valuable bread. Due to drought conditions in Kazakhstan, for agriculture of the European type was characterized by the strongest fluctuations in yields of 1.5-2 t / ha in the lean years to 32 t / ha in crop years. The average yield was 6.24 t / ha69. Thus, peasants tried to sow wheat, are not considered a rye and millet as valuable bread.
About Russian plowing in Kazakhstan already in pre-revolutionary literature has been much written, and most of the authors considered European economy more advanced than Kazakh. According to known Russian agronomist directly engaged colonization economy in Turgay region, A.A. Kaufman, this is view was based on the fact that wealthy Russian resettlement farms used factory iron plows and agricultural machine, which then was not among the Kazakhs.
But based on his own research, A.A. Kaufman urged not to deceive the external appearance of the European economy: "Meanwhile, if you do not go any further appearance, the economy of Turgay settlers, and especially - wealthy farmers can produce on favorable impression of the observer, may seem capable to progressive development ...”70.
However, according to his observations, the iron plow was used along with saban because using saban plowed virgin soil, and iron plows plowed field on the second or third year. Mowers used for the mowing of steppe feather grass which mows by scythe and the use of other agricultural machines determined the high cost of hired labor71.
But thus all economy of immigrants stood on injurious operation of natural fertility of a virgin soil. Peasants on the whole plowed a virgin soil within 3-4 years while it yielded a good harvest, then threw the plowed-out earth and passed to a new site, "… and only extremely reluctantly came back to the earth, ever earlier already have to plow "72.
In the most part of publications about the Russian resettlement economy in Kazakhstan, this system of land use called fallow-land of shifting, when the plowed-out site was thrown for 6-10 years. However A.A. Kauffman in Turgay area described addition at Russians something like the semi-nomadic arable lands, agriculture when each 3-4 years peasant moved from the plowed-out site on a virgin soil, "everyone plowed up everything that can to open … as knew, something that he didn't plow, will be plowed by somebody else”73. For this reason, Russian peasants plowed virgin soil to the end, did not leave the meadows and pastures, not wanting to leave the fertile land to others. After these "migrations" there were huge wastelands, overgrown with weeds.
Movable by this purpose to find a fertile virgin soil and as soon as possible to remove from it all the most valuable, having spent a minimum of efforts, Russians immigrants quickly left the sites allocated with it, and were accepted to rent the virgin land at Kazakhs, everything is farther and
69Status of Agriculture of Kazakh ASSR, the way its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on surveys of Kazakh ASSR expedition MIC CEC of the USSR in 1928). M., 1930, p. 48
70-71A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 188-189
72A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 13
73A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 192
farther deep into than steppes. Settlements became temporary, peasants left on the farm, and there were even fields where peasants came only for a while agricultural works. In process of movement behind a virgin soil, agriculture got everything more and more semi-nomadic character. By the way, economists of the end of 1920th years in Kazakhstan recognized existence semi-nomadic agriculture.
Prosperous farmers, whose farms supporters of colonization often were at the head of this movement just brought as an example of the advanced, progressive economy. "I will repeat: prevalence of the improved arable tools and machines easier all misleads rather true character of economy of prosperous settlers, and in particular –farmers. But actually, this character remains extremely injurious, and the improved tools and machines are only advanced means for extraction from the soil of her last juice"74. They most of all opposed to allocation of constant plots by it, and always proved the aspiration to resettlement on new sites by inconvenience, lack of the wood or water that, in actual fact, most often it appeared only masking of a pursuit of a virgin soil.
Than the further the Russian peasants got deep into steppes with the semi-nomadic agricultural economy, than the more strongly they were exposed to cultural influence of Kazakhs. So, it is noted that the Russian peasants adopted the Kazakh ways of a pasture of cattle, preparation of local fuel and construction materials, and also constructions of dugouts and mud-brick buildings. Children born in remote hamlets, often do not know a word in Russian, and only owned Kazakh language.
At the beginning of the XX century when the free earth became a little, and semi-nomadic agriculture of the Russian immigrants became impossible, peasants began to pass to more difficult ways of economy: to three fields and a couple, to earth fertilizer, to truck farming and melon growing. Among immigrants roughly social stratification developed, which characteristic for all Russian villages when met the strong farms employing workers and plowing on 200-300 tithes, and there was a layer of poor farms, with a small plowing on 4-5 tithes, fed with wage labor.
In the most difficult situation there were those immigrants who located in the Southern Kazakhstan. They got to areas with the unusual conditions which demanded skills of irrigated agriculture unfamiliar to the Russian peasants, and were here minority (for example, in Syr-Darya area located only 3, 1% of immigrants of 40, 6 thousand people) among the local Kazakh population. The device of them passed very difficult, most peasants often come, and they were compelled to be employed. The most widespread way of earnings there was a mowing: on hiring for Kazakhs or for itself. Often Kazakhs employed the Russian peasants to mow hay on sale to coachmen on a path to Tashkent75. Also immigrants were employed on cotton cleaning, on carrying to Tashkent and even to Samarkand. There have been cases where recent immigrants collected windfalls - winter crops after harvest sprouting of accidentally fallen grain76.
74A.A. Kaufman -Settlers -tenants of Turgay region. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 189
75-76 I. Geyer- In Russian villages of Syr-Darya region (letters from the road). T. II Chimkent district. Tashkent, 1893, p. 40\45

Only with time they managed to adjust the economy on the basis of bogarny agriculture or melon growing. Some Russian peasants adopted simple ways of watering at Kazakhs flooding. But as a whole, the European farms in the Southern Kazakhstan was a little, and even hot supporters of colonization noted huge difficulties of the device of peasants immigrants in this region.
Best of all passed the device of the Russian peasants immigrants in East Kazakhstan, across Bukhtarma. It was the area occupied by fluent Russian peasants and Old Believers still in the middle of the XVIII century. At construction of fortress Bukhtarma in 1761 year the power with surprise found 17 Russian settlements which kept in active contact with Dzungaria, and then with the Ch'ing officials at the border line. In 1792, the escapees of 250 men and 67 women received the highest "forgiveness" and they were adopted Russian citizenship rights of foreigners and are surrounded by tribute77.
These immigrants strong took roots in the southern foothills of Altai, got strong economy. In this area the greatest influence of the European economy on Kazakhs, the learning from Russian economy methods by Kazakhs. "50-60 years ago, no one Kazakh could not work in field that does not know how to handle a scythe and with a sickle ... ", - stated in the results of the survey expedition Bukhtarma Old Believers in 1927. However, due to the hiring of Kazakhs to work: hay and grain, dumped, threshing, surrounding Kazakhs learned agricultural work78.
By the end of the 1920th years the Altai Kazakhs made special group, very strongly differ than other Kazakhs on economy way. They lived in others conditions, more than half a year spent on winterings, near good pastures and the haying grounds, convenient places for an arable land79. The Altai Kazakhs wandered on distance from 5 to 30 miles, some – to 100 miles, driving away cattle even to China80. However, the many families had their own grasslands. In the early of twentieth century, many families began to build permanent resident wintering, construct large sheds and barns for livestock, and the poor, as already mentioned, were engaging in agricultural work of the Old Believers.
The influence of colonization.
The colonial policy of the Russian Empire very strongly influenced on condition of Kazakhstan agriculture after Civil war. Its influence extended mainly on representations of heads of KASSR and economists concerning prospects and ways of development of agriculture, but through this colonial policy had indirect impact on everything sphere without exception.
In pre-revolutionary literature concerning colonization there were most serious disputes. There were supporters of the radical methods providing eviction of Kazakhs to wintering and transfer lands to Russian peasants. There were supporters of more moderate methods generally consisting
77A.V. Starcev- Russian population of South-East Kazakhstan in the second half of the XIX century. / / Actual problems of the history of Siberia. Fifth Scientific Readings in Memory of Professor A.P. Borodovskiy. Barnaul, "Az Buka", 2005.
78Bukhtarma Old Believers. Materials of Commission expeditionary study. Kazakhstan series. MY. 17. L., 1930, p. 44
79Cossacks. Collection of articles of Cossaks anthropological detachment expedition of the USSR. Research in 1927. Sat III. L., "USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House," 1930, p. 3
80A.V. Konovalov -Southern Altai Kazakhs (the problem of formation of ethnic groups) Alma-Ata, "Science", 1986, p. 18
in reduction of the areas of pastures and a settlement of peasants on these "empty lands". But in general, even before the revolution formed colonial consensus, the content of which was reduced to a few points.
Firstly, almost all economists and leaders thought the nomadic economy as backward, and sedentary farming - advanced. The most advanced and progressive was considered European-type of that farming with plow agriculture improved farm implement, with the stall cattle breeding, and hay preparation. As a concession the management agreed to recognize the Kazakh cattle breeding, but only on condition of his settled life.
In literature and the numerous performances devoted to a problem of subsidence of Kazakhs, it wasn't adduced at all rational arguments in favor of this statement, and it was supported, generally unfounded statements. It can be explained with only long tradition going through education and pre-revolutionary literature. One of the first projects of the translation of nomads on settled life was made in the XVIII century by P. I. Rychkov for bashkirs. Long time the Russian authorities fluctuated concerning Kazakhs. For example, the Orenburg department forbade Kazakhs to be engaged in agriculture, and the Siberian department, on the contrary, encouraged81. But in the second half of the XIX century the pursuit to sedentarization of nomads conquered and become a commonplace in the literature.
Secondly, highway development of agriculture in Kazakhstan is recognized by all almost plow farming. This policy has received its maximum development in the 1950s, during the «virgin lands ", and in the 1920s, economists expressed in another language. A frequently used term at the time was plow capacity that is, the area of land a quality that permits plowing. Share of plowed area in relation to the total area of plow capacity recognized as a criterion for the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan.
Thirdly, an essential aspect of consensus was the desire to colonize the steppes. Policy of colonization, as the documents show, was conducted before the revolution was carried out before and during collectivization, as will be shown below, and even later, during the "virgin lands" in the 1950s. Another thing is that at different times of colonization rhetoric had varying degrees of severity. Before the revolution, about the need to colonize spoke quite openly: "Everybody understand that the cash nomadic camps does not need as much space unsustainable as it was registered in the Kyrgyz Republic; everyone was clear that the" nomadic "land applied only because they do not remain" settled "...”82. In the 1920th years of the power of the slogan of colonization openly didn't hang out, and about actions for colonization “plow capacity” it was possible to know only from programs of development of agriculture and economic plans.
Fourthly, the consensus is not given any independent place for the Kazakh economy, especially for nomadic pastoralism. Not supposed to its development. According to most economists, the Kazakh economy has to be redone decisively towards approximation to the "reference" to the European economy. Before revolution radical offers to put Kazakhs before a choice: to pass to economy of the European type or to die out. However, more moderate point of view according to which the Russian peasants have to set an example to Kazakhs who have to follow won.
81A. Bykov -Sedentarization problems in Russia's policy in Kazakhstan in XVIII - early XIX century. Author's abstract. Barnaul, 2001, p. 17
82V.Voshchinin Essays of new Turkestan. Lights and shadows of Russian colonization. St. Petersburg. 1914, p. 14
Economists in the 1920th years adhered to the last point of view, believing that the Soviet power, Sovietization of aul and cooperation of peasants will accelerate learning from "standard methods of management. They at all didn't assume and hadn't a presentiment that the most radical way will be realized just, and the Kazakh nomadic cattle breeding will be simply destroyed in process of collectivization.
To be fair it should be noted that this point of colonial consensus met though rare, but very active objections. In Kazakhstan there were economists who tried to develop a way of development of Kazakh economy, on the basis of the principles inherent in it and tendencies.
Colonial origins of consensus and its impact on the development plans of Agriculture, has a completely transparent nature. The overwhelming majority of economists in Kazakhstan, both Russian and Kazakh, was brought up in the traditions of Russian geographical, economic and agricultural schools, and relied almost entirely on prerevolutionary literature, in which colonial ideology of providing a very frankly. Influence of pre-revolutionary works on economic ideas at the beginning and in the mid-twenties also was exclusively great. Own researches appeared only in the late twenties when process of collectivization began to grow, Philip Goloschekin declared collectivization of aul as a main goal, and allowed to turn to nobody from this road.
Together with attendance recognition of colonial consensus in an assessment prospects of development of agriculture in Kazakhstan, in the early of twenties years it made much for elimination of extremes of colonization. It found the brightest expression in redistribution of lands which began in 1917 year, but got the maximum scales in 1921-1922 years. The aim was to empower smallholder redistribution of land to peasants on labor standards, and also return the confiscated Kazakhs land of the 10-verst bands, as well as confiscated land in 1916 after the suppression of uprising. On 19 of April, 1921 year the CEC Kirrespublic decided return land 10-versts bands along the Irtysh River, Ural land and confiscated land in 1916. To the Ural was returned 232,000 tithes, the Irtysh - 111,800 tithes and returned 470,000 acres of land confiscated in 1916 year83. During these years, it was redistributed more than 1 million acres of land84.
Graze!
As it isn't paradoxical would sound today, but up to 1928 in Kazakhstan supporters of development completely prevailed semi-nomadic cattle breeding as a primary branch of agriculture republics.
One of the most active supporters of this path was an agronomist MG Sirius, who had extensive experience in the experimental farm of Turgay on Temirsk experimental station and agriculture research in arid regions of the republic. This experience led him to believe that the greater part of farming areas is either impossible or uneconomic even consumer form.
Semi-nomadic pastoralism, unlike agriculture, did not require large investments, flow of labor, good hydration, and needed, in fact, only in natural forage resources and labor force.
83S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 128
84G.F. Dahshleyger, K Nurpeisov., History of the peasantry of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. 1. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1985, p. 144
According to estimates of M.G. Sirius, in Kazakhstan there were 250 million tithes forage land from which it was possible to collect 7337.5 million tons of crude feed, of which 34% were in lakeside meadows. Forage resources of Kazakhstan allowed contain 88-90 million livestock and resources labor allowed contain 56-66 million heads. According to M.G. Sirius, at a natural increase of the population in 2% a year, 20 years later will be enough workforces to hold 72 million head of livestock85.
The supporters of this direction sharply criticized the agricultural course of development of farming in the reassessment of soil fertility and prospects for plowing. It is only at first glance it seemed that Kazakhstan has a lot of free land. In fact, farmers faced enormous difficulties. In 1926 year the magazine "National Economy of Kazakhstan "published an article of an agronomist from Karkarala County P.G. Amosov. The article appeared posthumously, as its author died on 10 of March, 1926 year.
He worked at the county level and knew the features of the economy. According to his words the district provided the needs for bread with barter on cattle or fish, and the bread bulk, to 15 thousand poods was brought from Alma-Ata, from Ili or Kara-Tau. In the county there was an area of irrigation agriculture on river Tokraun which in bumper-crop year gave to 200 thousand bread poods. P. G. Amosov noted: "For Tokraun the strong was established reputation of a granary of the district"86. However, the crop of irrigation lands was low – on the average 100 poods per acre (16 centners from hectare), and the agronomist wrote: "… it is necessary to see this enormous expense of the human work, these great a lot of deprivations and sufferings, which agriculture on Tokrauna is interfaced, in order to understand all painful tragic element of plowman’s position at a poor harvest"87. But output was not particularly "Or to sow on Tokraun under semi-hard labor - or starve"88.
The cattle breeding in dry steppes were steadier and gave a product at the price of smaller efforts: "Neither hopeless mass ruin, nor an impoverishment, nor population extinction, we couldn't ascertain in the steppe"89. In other words, an agronomist made his choice and bowed his sympathies in favor pastoralism.
However, the supervisory agronomist noticed one weakness of nomadic livestock - lack of quality cattle with market requirements. Nomad forced to distill their cattle from pasture to pasture, from watering to watering, most appreciated the endurance rather than the productivity of livestock. Traders had another opinion: "The market appreciates oil, wool, leather, meat, working cattle, but not the endurance”90. This collision of interests generated then the tragedy of nomads as the late economic management demanded from cattle breeding first of all efficiency, and commodity efficiency, and demanded to develop it on the basis of methods of the West European economy: with farmyards, with hay makings, with a silo, grain top dressing and so on.

85M.G. Sirius- About the prospects of pastoralism in Kazakhstan. / / the national economy of Kazakhstan. 1926, № 1, p. 27-30
86P.G. Amosov- Household -economic needs and objectives of Karkarala County. / / The national economy of Kazakhstan, 1926, № 3, p. 67
87-90P.G. Amosov- Household -economic needs and objectives of Karkarala County. / / The national economy of Kazakhstan, 1926, № 3, p. 67-70
P.G. Amosov was categorically against such way, and considered that the main thing, basis of fundamentals of cattle breeding in Kazakhstan has to be maximum use of pastures. Respectively, and the cattle has to be hardy, it is easy to transfer stages, to be content with the rough sterns and to transfer wintering on pastures. The agronomist offered to adapt cattle breeding methods for conditions of steppes, in particular, to refuse farmyards, and also to remove production in the summer as did nomads. If these requirements were accepted, accident to Kazakhstan didn't threaten. It is a pity that P. G. Amosov died so early. His death strongly weakened positions of supporters of development of semi-nomadic cattle breeding.
Positions of supporters of this way of Kazakhstan agriculture development were how strong then, it is possible to judge at least on that fact that on 2 of March, 1926 year SNK KASSR recognized value beyond Kazakhstan cattle breeding base for economy of the USSR.
In the mid-1920s has been put forward another concept of development of Kazakhstan agriculture, based on intensive development of pastoralism. The author of this concept was E.A. Polochansky who offered a coherent and thoughtful program in great detail, based on the Kazakh economic experience.
Polochansky resolutely opposed idea of elimination of pasturable cattle breeding economy as the priority of agriculture would bring to to sharp reduction of herd: "Such system of a national economy couldn't to support half of those cattle, which in the republic nowadays are available …"91. The main direction of the development of Kazakhstan agriculture he believed it was the development of animal husbandry, which according to his calculations, promised to turn Kazakhstan into a leader in the production of livestock in the USSR.
"Inventories of available pasture area may provide fodder to 75 million different animals, that is 3 times more than only the amount that available now (now 26.5 million) and the rationalization of the pastoralist livestock farming. Kazakhstan could completely cover all Union needs in all types of animal products”92.
He proposed a reconstruction program based on livestock preservation of tribal aul converted on the basis of cooperation. In cooperative economic and tribal aul was to get at least 5 families with an average of 10 heads of cattle in terms of bovine, i.e. village should have a flock of 50 heads based on of bovine. In herd should have been an average of 5 cows, 6 oxen, manufacturing bull, 8 calves, camel, 2 horses and 180 sheep93.
Members of cooperative had to refuse maintaining separate farms, in common to carry out land processing, harvesting and maintenance of cattle. To aul the credit of 600 rubles for a family was allocated, which was spent for construction, melioration and irrigation. Income shared on two parts one of which shared on eaters, and from the second half the credit was repaid and the income on a labor contribution was allocated94. According to his calculations, the economy could provide people with food, cattle - feed, receive an average of 1144 rubles of net profit, and after repayment of loans and shares, gave 570 rubles of net income for a family and total the family's budget amounted to 700 rubles. Compared with the yield sole Kazakh economy in the late 1920 years, the project promised a doubling of income of poorer households (327.4 rubles - net
91-94E.A. Polochansky- For a new village-kystau. M., Publisher “Kazakhs representation”, 1926, p. 9\8\28\17

income 499.3 rubles - gross income), and led him to the level of profitability of wealthy Russian peasants95.
In his project was even developed a model house in which each family was allocated the room size of 54 square meters a yard (27.31 m. meters).Aul model for housing project E.A. Polochanskiy clearly become The Kazakh unicameral houses that were built on the wintering grounds.
For winterings Kazakhs had a number of dwellings which were widely used by rather poor cattle-farmers: shoshala, the cespitose house, the cane house (widespread in Balkhash and the Syr Darya), as well as houses from adobe, adobe bricks and mud huts. It was single chamber housing with a small fireplace, indoor lean or gable roof, a very small area and volume. Volume wintering houses was about 24-25 cubic meters, total only 4-5 cubic meters per person. Houses were raw, poorly ventilated, dark, which led to the spread of colds and skin diseases. Low quality of winter dwellings was associated with the mentality of pastoralists: "Most Kazakhs traditionally considered them temporary, secondary housing and special efforts were made to its improvement and decorating"96. In comparison with these dwellings, the project of E.A. Polochanskiy promised to improve their living conditions, because the volume in the living room in house designed by them exceeds 54 cubic meters.
To the house were attached premises for cattle so that turned rectangular building area of 1974 cubic arshins (998.44 cubic meters).
Financial Opportunities of KASSR allowed creating for 15 years 100,000 of these farms, which could contain 8 million sheep. Resilience of economy increased through grain crops and fodder for livestock.
For other ways to the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan, E.A. Polochanskiy was quite categorical: "Otherwise some property of the poor, how many do not add up, yet the result is overall poor ... "97. He sharply opposed construction of communes and collective farms from one poor, and considered that in process of cooperation of cattle breeding have to be involved prosperous layers of the Kazakh cattle-farmers.
Its plan which has been very in details worked was rejected for purely political reasons. Kazkraykom with its policy of Sovietization aul was against any cooperation with bais, and, of course, could not support the plan that engages in cooperative construction wealthy pastoralists. However, from purely technical aspect of business, E.A. Polochanskiy put forward the efficient offer which best of all considered features of the Kazakh cattle breeding, habits and a way of life of Kazakhs. Goloshekin and his associates were not close and nothing like that.
From a position of today obviously that it there was a missed chance of modernizations of the Kazakh cattle breeding economy without its championing it through knee without massive loss of lives and enormous damage for Kazakhstan.
95Status of Agriculture of Kazakhs ASSR, way of its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on a survey Kazakhs ASSR by expedition MIC USSR Central Executive Committee in 1928). M., 1930, p. 92
96V.V. Vostrov, I.V. Zakharov -Kazakh national dwellings. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1989, p. 64
97E.A. Polochansky- For a new village-kystau. M., Publisher “Kazakhs representation”, 1926, p. 21
Plow!
Appointment of Philip Goloshekin in Kazakhstan and the proclamation of his policy of Aul Sovietization, gave a strong incentive for the development among Party and Soviet workers, economists and communists, plans very, very drastic reorganization of agriculture in republic. In the years 1927-1928 there have been several major developments partly based on materials from the survey expedition, partly based on materials of forwarding inspection, partly on the doctrinal prerequisites devoted to a reorganization of the rural farms in Kazakhstan.
In this literature, as a rule, are not specifically addressed issues of general theory of the development of agriculture and animal husbandry in particular, but proposals, it expressed, they can be judged quite definitely. According to a brief account of the dispute between supporters and livestock agriculture, given by M.G. Sirius in one of his articles can be judge about how to develop this discussion.
The general consensus of economists about ranching has been hijacked in 1927 year, on the initiative of Union Resettlement Committee, which proposed to increase the crops in Kazakhstan to 30 million hectares, and empower 30-40 acres of land to the farm. About the proposal of Committee can judge by his later publications. In 1930 year there was the report of the Union Resettlement Committee "State of Kazakhs ASSR Agriculture, ways of its reorganization and relocation prospects," based on the expedition in 1928 year, in which the same was told. Only now it was opinion not one of the Kazakh economists, and the part of state policy: "The main task set by the government– definition of opportunity and ways of use of the surveyed territory for strengthening of grain balance of the Union"98.
Even more large-scale conclusion was drawn that the commodity agricultural economy was possible on the area of 75 million hectares. Kazakhs ASSR area was 2,853,000 square km. Consequently, arable land had to take 26.2% of the territory. The expedition explored the North Kazakhstan (by which is meant the whole northern part of Kazakhstan from the Urals to the Irtysh), in which plow capacity was set at 50% of the area, about 25 million hectares99.
The assessment and conditions which was made by expedition also very and very categorical: "Thus, acquaintance with the extra economic conditions in the surveyed territory showed that, despite considerable distinctions of these conditions, none of the areas to engage in commercial agriculture can not serve as an obstacle "100. Further, it was deciphered that under commercial farming means cultivation of wheat, coupled with intensive animal husbandry.
In all plans for the development of agriculture, as compiled by union and non-national levels, indicated that Kazakhstan along with Siberia, will be in the first five years areas of the development of grain economy based on plowing steppe nomads and sedimentation "Land release", as well as resettlement in Kazakhstan from other regions of USSR.
Determination of intensive animal husbandry in the light of our theme, in these materials of the expedition, is particularly interesting: "For all districts was reduced number of horses and sheep, and partly further increase the number of cattle. Cattle breeding on the composition of the herd takes more intense character ....

98-100Status of Agriculture of Kazakhs ASSR, way of its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on a survey Kazakhs ASSR by expedition MIC USSR Central Executive Committee in 1928). M., 1930, p. 12\30-31\32
In it (the bais’ economy – D.V. means) there were two most extensive branches of cattle breeding -horse breeding, and big specific weight was especially developed had sheep breeding”101. Probably, it is difficult to find more frank definition of that, how exactly were going to reorganize cattle breeding in Kazakhstan. From this definition it is visible that an accurate line was drawn: cultivation of cattle is an intensive cattle breeding, and cultivation of horses and sheep is an extensive cattle breeding. Also the unambiguous choice for the first was also made. Generally, at a rate on a grain farm, at sharp reduction of the area of pastures, the rate on cattle was the inevitable phenomenon.
Finally, as the expedition was conducted by All-Union Committee of colonization, the resettlement plans have been developed in Kazakhstan. In the first five-year planned to resettle 500,000 people, or 90,900 households102. In the first year of the Five-year Plan - 14,500 farms in the second - 18200, in the third - 25, 4 thousand, in the fourth - 32,800 farms. Total possible relocation was determined to be 1.3 million people, or about 300,000 households.
As we see, it was the typical plan of agrarian colonization, providing the actual elimination of nomadic cattle breeding, plowing all some suitable lands, with a resolute emphasis on grain, resettlement of half a million people only during the first five-years periods with continuation in the subsequent five-years periods. The differences from the pre-revolutionary agrarian colonization plans of Kazakhstan, in essence not so much. In 1927 year Smagul Sadvakasov who has declared in the performance at the VI conference of Kazkraykom on 15-23 of November, 1927 year paid attention to this circumstance: "I want to pay your attention on following fact: our republic continues to be considered as the region delivering raw materials. It is a past remnant, a colonial policy of tsarism”103.
It should be noted also that the agronomist A.M. Markevich who participated in creation of the USSR's first machine and tractor station – Shevchenkovsky MTS in USSR, put forward a curious position. On the one hand, he directly didn't speak against resettlement plans to new areas, but with another – put forward on the basis of the practical experience the thesis which beat out the soil from under the plans of resettlement based anyway on the theory of "agrarian resettlement". He considered that mechanization and the rational organization of agriculture in the "overpopulated" areas can give twice-three times more production from the same areas, and is free to support the "excess" population"104.
The following stage of discussion was connected with the report of professor A.N.Chelintsev in Earth Plan of RSFSR according to the report of People's Commissariat for Agriculture KASSR given in the summer of 1927 year. Chelintsev proceeded from the thesis that the nomadic cattle breeding is backward and weak that prospects of development of cattle breeding are connected with cultivation of cattle according to the West European system on the basis of agriculture. He cited data that for a hundred years, from 1820 year to 1916 year, in the Turgay region share of cattle increased from 0.7 to 22.8%, and attributed this to the progressive development of the economy. His verdict was as follows: "Thus, the parallelism between the extension of agriculture, its growth and development of animal husbandry, both quantitative and quality was
101-102Status of Agriculture of Kazakhs ASSR, way of its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on a survey Kazakhs ASSR by expedition MIC USSR Central Executive Committee in 1928). M., 1930, p. 111\146
103S. Sadvakassov -Favorites. -Almaty, "Athan", "Raushan", 1994, p. 67
104A.M. Markevich -Between settlements machine and tractor stations. M., 1929, p. 227
opened, toward increasing its intensity and attenuation typically extensive sectors of the nomadic economy ... In connection with everything told, it would be wrong to represent the agriculture future in Kazakhstan only within a nomadism "105.
This concept had quickly supporters among executives in Kazakhstan, in particular M. Ya. Rodner and A.P. Pototsky, who began to advance this look. In May, 1927 year A.P. Pototsky published article in which put forward A.N. Chelintsev's almost all theses: Kazakhstan in the bigger territory represents the territory of small capacity for agricultural production and population density (Chelintsev has a discrepancy of the area and population density); the Kazakh economy becomes less nomadic and more agricultural, Kazakhs sow 27,8% of rainfed crops in Kazakhstan ( at Chelintsev - increase in the proportion of cattle and the overall growth of crops , including the Kazakhs ) , the growth of crops depends on population density(at Chelintsev – it is impossible to interfere with resettlement and to prove refusal of modern colonization by links to imperial policy); need of capital investments on improvement of soils and an irrigation in Central Kazakhstan (Chelintsev has a priority support of settled areas for the fastest transition to agriculture)106.
The change in discussion occurred at the beginning of 1928, after the VI-th All-Kazakh conferences of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) at which for the first time, under pressure of representatives of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), according condemned nationalist deviation, which was associated with the protection of the interests of Kazakh pastoral farms. In these conditions of sympathy began to incline towards agricultural economy than at once his supporters used. A.P.Pototsky in March 1928 year stated that grain farming can feel hero of the occasion, as it is now to pay attention, but "up to this point with respect to grain farming dominated another tactic, the purpose of which was the full repression and eradication of the predominance of grain farming "107. He stressed that in the North Kazakhstan leadership belongs to grain farming and not pastoralism and encouraged more active management of the supply of machinery district.
However, M.G. Sirius did not stay in debt, and in July 1928 year made big article in which gave an assessment of opportunities of plowing on the principle of suitability for sowing. He's in 1922-1924, together with Met Office KASSR performed the evaluation of rainfall and was one of the first maps of the distribution of precipitation in the country. He considered that at an amount of precipitation more than 300 mm a year probably grain commodity agriculture. At an amount of precipitation of 250-300 mm – consumer agriculture, and at an amount of precipitation less than 250 mm – without irrigation agriculture is impossible108. On the basis of maps distribution of precipitation, the agronomist made an assessment of the area of the lands suitable under crops.
105A.N. Chelintsev -Prospective development of Kazakhstan agriculture. / / National Economy of Kazakhstan. 1928, № 4-5, p. 23-24
106 A.P. Potocky- Kazakhstan national economy and the main trends of its development. / / The national economy of Kazakhstan. 1927, № 5, p. 7-26; A.N. Chelintsev -Prospective development of Kazakhstan agriculture. / / the national economy of Kazakhstan. 1928, № 4-5, p. 3-26
107A.P. Pototsky -About the challenges and opportunities of grain farming in Kazakhstan. / / Folk Kazakhstan Agriculture. 1928, № 2-3, p. 25
108 M.G. Sirius- About the more rational direction of agriculture in northern Kazakhstan. / / The national economy of Kazakhstan. 1928, № 6-7, p. 27

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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In a zone with a precipitation more than 300 mm of such lands appeared 4796 thousand hectares, and in a zone with a precipitation of 250-300 mm – 3025 thousand hectares, and not the continuous massif, and separate spots. In total – 7822 thousand hectares from 79 million hectares of total area of these two zones, that is 9, 8%. Thus he noted that by more exact estimates done by V. I. Lebedev in 1925-1926, the total area of these two zones was reduced to 57, 5 million hectares and, respectively, the areas under crops are reduced109. In his opinion, more detailed meteorological researches will lead only to the further reduction of the suitable areas under crops.
His conclusion was is as follows: "… here to count on expansion the grain farm more than to 7-8 million hectares, not only isn't present the bases, but it is absolutely impossible"110. M.G. Sirius considered that is necessary carefully to study each plot of land to achieve rather fruitful and profitable grain farm in Kazakhstan.
In the same 1928 year party theorists who tried to approach to a problem from Marxist positions and arrangement of class forces in an aul got into discussion also. One of chief economists, who were engaged the Marxist "analysis" of the Kazakh aul, there was G. Togzhanov who has left some publications, including the book "About a Kazakh Aul" published in 1928 year in which views were recorded party economists of that time. How to them the Kazakh aul seemed?
First of all, the Kazakh aul seemed them as the center of backwardness which they explained it as "the social nature", combining elements of the patriarchal and patrimonial, feudal and capitalist relations. They considered that the main figure of an aul Bai who was at the same time the spokesman of the patrimonial relations, the feudal lord and the capitalist. From the point of view of Marxism, it is nonsense, as patrimonial, feudal and capitalist system had absolutely different social structure and, the most important, differed in absolutely different ways of operation and assignments of an additional product. So, the feudal system stood on property of feudal lords, on the earth and noneconomic coercion, and capitalist – on property of capitalists, on means of production and operation of hired labor. The Kazakhs ownership of land was developed very poorly, it was far to the issued institute and it began to develop only at the end of the XIX century, in connection with flow of the Russian peasants who have created the market of land lease. Kazakhs had not extra-economic coercion in the form of dues and corvee. At last, it wasn't perfect such characteristic for feudalism of institute of conditional possession of the earth. As for capitalism, Kazakhs had no stratification on owners of means of production and the proletariat, hiring of labor was developed poorly, and, besides, in connection with the Russian peasants. Various types and ways of operation of the poor relatives in economy had much more nature of mutual aid, than capitalist operation. At last, generation of profit and accumulation of the capital wasn't a main goal of rich men in the Kazakh aul.
By the way, in the 1970s among Soviet political economy was developed a big discussion about what constitutes a means production in a nomadic cattle: cattle or land. They did not succeed to reach a consensus.
Kazakh Aul clearly not incurred in the framework of Marxism created based on the political economy of European countries, but the Kazakh political economy of the 1920s is not in the least embarrassed. Contradictions in the theoretical characterization of the village, they "decided" by
109-110 M.G. Sirius- About the more rational direction of agriculture in northern Kazakhstan. / / The national economy of Kazakhstan. 1928, № 6-7, p.21-23, 27\36
creating political economy "koyyrtpak" mixture of tribal, feudal and the capitalist system, and considered it their greatest accomplishment: "Kazakhs bai economy - economy in transition, combines the features of the capitalist and feudal system of exploitation ... Because most Kazakhs areas before the revolution remained nomadic areas, as they were also characteristic of Kazakhstan, as a colony, and therefore the dominant form in the Steppe remained pre-capitalist forms of exploitation"111.
This "koyyrtpak" based on the fact that all signs of these social formations were declared remnants: "One of the characteristic features of the prerevolutionary Kazakhs aul is the presence of remnants of patriarchal-tribal relations "112. And also: "... the current system of semi-nomadic pastoralism economy is essentially a relic of feudalism, profitable before just for affluent populations ... "113. To party economists it seemed acceptable way to resolve the apparent contradictions in their theoretical constructs, although in terms of Marxist formational theory it was nonsense.
The second important point in their evaluation of the Kazakh economy was in assertion that it is a trade, a little different from the farming European type. In this regard G. Togzhanov spoke very categorically: "Do not be an exaggeration if even say that it is already turns into a commodity economy, and that the Kazakh economy in sedentary and a significant part of the semi-nomadic areas in their structure and orientation differs little or almost no different from the Russian peasant economy "114. Not one he spoke in similar spirit: "The aul endured already the period of a subsistence economy, into an aul take root commodity and capitalist relations. These relations, involving in an orbit of the influence the Kazakh population, gradually destroy a community, as something the economic whole. The community as an economic unit broke up …"115.
Economists roughly were mistaken in an assessment of marketability of Kazakh farms which according to one data made no more than 7-10% of the gross production116. According to other data, total marketability of Kazakh farms made about 40%. According to very detailed data, collected in the beginning of twenties years in the Aktyubinsk province, left that Kazakh farms consumed 57-62% of made production, and sold 38-43% production. And, on different categories of production made in the Kazakh economy, the marketability percent fluctuated in the strongest way. So, marketability on bread made 5-6% (respectively, it was consumed in economy of 95% of the made bread), and on sterns – 3-5%117. The share of marketability developed, generally due to sale of cattle, meat, skin and wool; in what the main contribution to the general marketability of the Kazakh farms in provinces did prosperous and rich farms.
111-112G. Togzhanov -Kazakh colonial aul. Part 1. M., 1934, p. 104\5
113Status of Agriculture of Kazakhs ASSR, way of its reorganization and relocation prospects (based on a survey Kazakhs ASSR by expedition MIC USSR Central Executive Committee in 1928). M., 1930, p. 5
114G. Togzhanov-About the Kazakh aul. Kyzyl-Orda, 1928, p. 5
115M. Rodnin- Kazakhstan on the way to socialist construction. Kyzyl-Orda, 1928, p. 16
116S.A. Neustadt -The socialist transformation of the economy of the Kazakh SSR in 1917-1937 years (from pre-capitalist relations to socialism, by passing capitalism). Alma-Ata, "Kazakh State Publishing ", 1957, p. 225
117Materials to determine the marketability of Kyrgyz households of Aktobe province. Aktobe, 1925, p.45
According to the data collected in the Aktyubinsk province leaves that marketability of the Kazakh economy was provided with sale of nonfood raw materials whereas production of the food was focused on own consumption. So, a share of own cattle in meat consumption in the farms wandering in semi-desert areas and having over 25 heads, steadily it kept at the level of 97-99%. In other words, the Kazakh aul conducted first of all on the consumer economy; also it could release no more than 2-3% of production of meat, 5-6% of bread and 3-5% of forages. Unfortunately, so detailed data on other provinces of Kazakh ASSR it wasn't published, but, obviously, and there was similar picture.
In a marketability assessment as show the given materials on the Aktyubinsk province; always it was necessary to consider a huge difference in a commodity exit of food and nonfood products. From the point of view of production of nonfood raw materials it was possible to consider part of the Kazakh farms as commodity. But business everything consisted in that the economic policy on the eve of and during collectivization always meant marketability in the first and main turn food production, in particular on bread and meat. But in it the Kazakh economy commodity wasn't.
G. Togzhanov's brochure "About a kazakh aul" was issued in Kzyl-Orda in 1928 year, and had strong impact on formation of policy of collectivization. The important thesis located in it for this policy about marketability of the Kazakh economy, such degree that this economy allegedly "the trade and usurious capital" subordinated to itself. Time so, according to party economists the Kazakh aul ripened for "small October" and collectivization.
It should be noted some curious circumstances. First, Togzhanov in publications of different time showed fluctuations in the to assessment of the Kazakh aul: in earlier – as mainly capitalist, subordinated "trade usurious to the capital", in later – as transitional, with the mixed lines from different public formations. It seems that neither it, other party economists come to a certain opinion. However, the special need for them in it wasn't as even such shaky theory quite formed itself the basis for punishment of Bai.
Secondly, G. Togzhanov honestly recognized that he has no data, and to him to support the constructions there is nothing: "Unfortunately, we have at hand materials describing the appearance and occurrence trading and money lending capital in Kazakhs auls ..."118. Further: "Unfortunately, we have no figures proving the fact of replacement of an old way production by new in kazakh economy, in particular in semi-nomadic areas”119. Next: "Pre-revolutionary literature about Cossacks gives very little data on essence of the patrimonial relations and their influence on development of kazakh aul"120. Against such extraordinary honest statements for the second half of the 1920th years, it becomes obvious that except unfounded statements Togzhanov has no anything, and he was not in state to prove his constructions.
However, it at all didn't prevent him to consider himself absolutely right, and from time to time to release to opponents of the remark that they supposedly work "not in a Marxist way", and E.A. Polochanskiy’s brochure Togzhanov called "theoretically illiterate and politically harmful". It reveals little atmosphere that prevailed among the party leadership, made up of the explosive mixture of doctrinal, unsubstantiated allegations, complete lack of evidence and intolerance of
118-119G. Togzhanov-About the Kazakh aul. Kyzyl-Orda, 1928, p. 7\9
120G.Togzhanov -Kazakh colonial aul. Part 1. M., 1934, p. 5
other opinions. Togzhanov still looks good on the background of Philip Goloshekin and Uraz Isayev, who said almost the same thing; just do not bother reservations that they lack the "hand" of digital data.
Colonial consensus and made by them political economic " koyyrtpak " brought the party leadership of Kazakhstan to thought that the Kazakh aul ripened for socialist transformations, times there already were shown capitalist tendencies on the basis of commodity economy, and on the road at these transformations costs bais, personifying all backwardness of the Kazakh aul and numerous remnants of all public formations from a primitive-communal system before capitalism.
Gradually gained the upper hand in the debate supporters of not just priority grain cultivation, and its accelerated development, which mainly occurred not among agronomists or employees of Narkomzem KASSR, and from the number of the party leadership. Decisive contribution to strengthening of their positions made the decision taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b ) in August 1928 year , on the forced development of agriculture and the construction of 125 large grain farms , and half of them had to stay exactly in Kazakhstan. Outcome of the discussion was a foregone conclusion, so decisions of the Politburo of the CPSU (B). Kazkraykom relied on the authority of these decisions and went on the offensive on the disputants.
The first step was that for the VII Congress of Soviets in 1929 CEB KD Toktabaev prepared a report "The problem of grain farming in Kazakhstan." The report is based on three theses. First, in Kazakhstan many "Free" land. In 1927, in Northern Kazakhstan swings open 2.8 million hectares, while "plowing capacity of area" was 23 million hectares121. Used 12-13% of the possible, stressed the speaker. In the second, the semi-nomadic Kazakh economy must move to sedentary life. Thirdly, land of Kazakh farms should be conducted in such a way to "... provide a sufficient amount of land management for doing good agricultural and livestock farming, but not should provide more land, as this would encourage develop extensive cattle farming to the detriment of agriculture "122.
As we see the program of forcing of nomads cattle-farmers to refusal from cattle breeding and coercions to agriculture by a certain image land management, it was formulated very and very frankly. Toktabayev set the purpose by 1932 year to increase a plowing to 5, 97 million hectares, and creations of the largest grain state farms. By 1930 year had to be created 7 large grain farms with an area of cropland 124,800 hectares, and by 1933 - 40 state farms with an area of 3.1 million hectares of arable land123. That is, according to his plan, about half of the plowing in Northern Kazakhstan allotted to a grain farm.
But it appeared only an introduction. In August, 1930 year there was an end of all discussion. In magazine “the National Economy of Kazakhstan” left B. Semevsky's article "To criticism of bourgeois theories of economic development of Kazakhstan"124 in which to all debaters distributed "on an earring". Kazkraykom approached to "summing up" dispute considerably, and all its participants were accused of various biases. So, Shvetsov, Sirius and Kremnetsky (supporters of development of cattle breeding) were declared by ideologists of "great Russian
121-123K.D. Toktabaev -The problem of grain farming in Kazakhstan. Kyzyl-Orda, 1929, p 8\17\22
124 B. Semevskiy- Critique of bourgeois theories of economic development of Kazakhstan. / / National Economy of Kazakhstan, 1930, № 7-8
majestic colonizer policy" and "bourgeois ideologists". Pototsky, Donich, David and Shulkov (supporters of development of agriculture) were declared by "new population" and "petty-bourgeois ideologists"125. Party critics acted with positions of need of the radical and fastest socialist agriculture reconstruction and therefore didn't do a special difference between debaters: "All authors given above make one and that mistake: they entirely stand on a strengthening and improvement position existing economic forms, and not only underestimate need of socialist reconstruction of economy, but it is simple it ignore"126. They, in the context of mass collectivization and creation giant state farms, considered themselves completely right. Up their ebullient activities will be let down later, and some of them do not get criticism in the press, and the bullet in the head.
But while the criticism degree of "bourgeois theories" only increased. Already in October of 1930 year Shulkov accused of a perversion of views of Lenin that was for those times very heavy political charge and Donich and at all accused of a bias and in counterrevolution. Such in a way, the general result of discussion in the economic press in Kazakhstan in concerning ways of development of agriculture it was zero to the second half of the 1920th years. Definition of the direction of development of agriculture of the republics it was defined by the directive order of the Politburo of the Central Committee All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), also realized such option of which couldn't even think representatives of both parties.
Who was right?
Today, when consequences of the decisions made then are already known, when the much bigger volume of information, and in particular is saved up, are carried out detailed historical and ethnographic and political economic researches of the Kazakh nomadic economy, it is quite possible to define, who it was right, and to tell, why.
Certainly that the plan realized by Kazkraykom, was wrong, as there can't be correct the plan which realization caused death of hundreds thousands of people. But we now will address to consideration the offered options of development of agriculture of Kazakhstan from a point of sight of cash geographical and economic conditions. We will consider them as if we made the decision.
So, the plan of elimination of nomadic cattle breeding in favor of the large-scale steppe plowing for creation of a grain farm and development "the intensive cattle breeding", cattle based on cultivation.
On the one hand, it is the plan promises a huge amount of grain from crop on the opened virgin soil. At average productivity of 6, 4 c/hectare plowing of 25 million hectares the plowing will yield an average annual harvest of 16 million tons, 75 million hectares – 48 million tons of grain. 14 million hectares according to the initial plan the first five-year period promised an average annual crop of 8, 6 million tons grains.
However, at creation of such large-scale enterprise it is required to carry out some initial calculations. The matter is that agriculture demands regular application of fertilizers, organic and mineral, for restoration of fertility of the soil. Otherwise, in 4-5 years an arable land will cease to yield a good harvest. In 1990 in Kazakhstan on the average on hectare of an arable land 1, 5 tons
125-126 B. Semevskiy- Critique of bourgeois theories of economic development of Kazakhstan. / / National Economy of Kazakhstan, 1930, № 7-8
of organic and 20 kg mineral was brought fertilizers. If we accept these norms, for a plowing according to the plan of the first five-year periods 280 thousand tons of mineral and 21 million tons were required organic fertilizers. Was so much available of KASSR before plowing as much fertilizer? Obviously it was not. In 1928 fertilizers in the USSR produced 117,600 tons. In fairness, we note that the first five-year plan supposed to build two chemical plants: Aktobe Irtysh and a total capacity of 125,000 tons of superphosphate per year127. This would significantly improve the situation would be to fertilize the fields, if these plans were implemented. But in this case, grain farming has experienced a deficit of mineral fertilizers.
In other words, the mass plowing was doomed to that fields not will receive enough of fertilizers, and it is initially possible was to remove only 3-4 good harvests from a virgin soil, and then would follow sharp falling of productivity. At implementation of this plan in 1934 crisis of a grain farm would begin.
The second question –tractors. Possibility of processing of such huge area depended on quantity of tractors. In the USSR in the first five-year period the huge attention was paid to tractors, powerful tractor plants were under construction, MTS system was created. However possibilities of supply agriculture tractors at that time were extremely limited. Collectivization in scales of all USSR was almost broken because of impossibility of fast saturation by equipment again created by MTS and to provide by machines of collective farms to plow the earth. Krasnoputilovskiy factory failed order for 1929/30 year, according to which was to produce 12,000 tractors, Stalingrad Tractor factory became rhythmically work only in 1932 year128. To send a big tractor column to collective farms obviously didn't leave; opportunities were much more modest than plans. By the way, this situation openly admitted plans of collective-farm construction: "On the next five-year period the tractor will be car scarce"129. And so it was, in the sowing campaign in 1931 year throughout the Soviet Union by tractors were processed only 12% of collective farm crops.
In the beginning of 1930s, according to Uraz Isayev, in Kazakhstan, in MTS there were tractors of total capacity of 88,500 horsepower130. It approximately corresponds to 2210 of "International" tractors of 40 h.p. Their number constantly grew due to receiving all new and new tractors. However it was the drop in the ocean even in comparison with the arable area of 1928 year – 2126 hectares on one tractor. More than 21 sq.km areas! If to compare to plans for 1933 year, it was the share of one tractor from 5746 to 6334 hectares. Even in 1940 year, when Kazakhstan had 15480 tractors, all the same 14 million hectares would be difficult to be processed as it was the share of a tractor on 904 hectares. In that time in Kazakhstan the plan of processing of 108 hectares for a tractor was considered as the normal131.
127The five-year plan of economic development and social-cultural construction of Kazakhs ASSR (1928/29 - 1932/33 years). Alma-Ata, "Publisher State Planning Committee of Kazakhs ASSR", 1930, p. 44
128D.N. Verkhoturov- Stalin against the Great Depression. Anti-crisis policy of the USSR. M., "Jauza", 2009, p. 290-291
129Challenges and prospects of collective farms. Draft five-year plan for 1928/29 - 1932/33 years. M., 1929, p. 51
130 W. Isaev About the results of 1931 year and targets of the national economic plan for 1932 year. Alma-Ata - Moscow, 1932, p. 9
131U.D. Isaev -Kazakhstan on the rise. Report of the Government of Kazakhstan in IX Kazakh Congress of Soviets. Alma-Ata, 1935, p. 28
In advanced MTS tractor in the medium processed 220 hectare a year, with all operations132. In small farms average processing by a tractor was even less – 110-130 hectares a year. If all machine draft in Kazakhstan would be organized in MTS, implementation of the plan would require 63, 5 thousand tractors.
Theoretically, the cash horses in Kazakhstan (3.3 million head in 1927 year) could handle about 25-26 million hectares. But it would require enormous amounts of feed, full provision of all this livestock farm implements, and exemplary organization of work. With all this in Kazakhstan was a big deficit. All arable tools provide only 13 % of the population of horses, and a sharp increase number of guns were impossible. In addition, a working cattle and horses require rest could not plow over 8-9 hours a day. Therefore and it was staked on a tractor as the tractor processed the area at 10-15 times more horses and could work almost round the clock.
Therefore the lack of tractors at the huge areas compelled to use horses and oxen, and it led to such phenomenon, as a sowing tightening, and to sharp decrease in productivity and loss of considerable part of a crop. So, in 1933 in Kazakhstan only 18, 4% of crops were 55, 7% - in late are sowed in optimum terms, and. Because of it 20% of crops were lost133.
In a word, at all progress of mechanization of agriculture, Kazakhstan simply had no so many tractors that to plow such area and well to process, in due form agricultural technicians. And it is not only plowing and more harrowing, planting, and weeding. Do not forget also an extremely important fact in Kazakhstan as snow retention in the fields. Plowing of 14 million hectares in 1933 was Manilovism fully divorced from reality. Tractors also require fuel and spend a fair amount of it. The material on Shevchenko MTS provides detailed data on fuel consumption for agricultural work. One MTS processing 50,000 hectare was spending tons of kerosene in 1505, 120 tons of oil and 60 tons of gasoline in year134. Therefore, on processing of 14 million hectares it would be required 421, 4 thousands tons of kerosene, 33, 6 thousand tons of oil and 16, 8 thousand tons of gasoline. It fuel consumption for the “International” tractor which admitted very economic in work. The “Fordzon” tractor spent 1, 5 times more fuels and if processing is conducted by such tractors, it was required 632, 1 thousand tons of kerosene, 50, 4 thousand tons of oil and 25, 2 thousand tons of gasoline.
For the USSR before the first five-year periods to give such amount of kerosene for tractors was absolutely very heavy task. In 1928 year release kerosene for tractors made 237,7 thousand tons, in 1932 year – 1662,8 thousands of tons.
If to summarize everything told above, it is possible to tell that the plan of a plowing of 12, 7-14 million hectares was absolutely unreal, impracticable, completely torn off from reality. It was thoroughbred manilovism. For it there was no enough of tractors, kerosene and fertilizers. Real practice also showed it. In 1932 5,3 million hectares, against 4,2 million in 1928 were opened. Even if there would be no hunger, the draft cattle remained and preliminary work, hardly Kazakhstan was carried out could open more than 6-6, 5 million hectares by 1933.
132 A.M. Markevich- Between settlements machine and tractor stations. M., 1929, p. 91
133J.B. Abylhozhin -The traditional structure of Kazakhstan. Socio-economic aspects of functioning and transformation (1920-1930-ies). Alma-Ata, "Gylym", 1991, p. 209
134A.M. Markevich- Between settlements machine and tractor stations. M., 1929, p. 91
First five-year plan for his backswing - is the average annual plowing in 2001-2005 in the amount of 14-16 million hectares, with an average annual harvest in 14.6 million tons of grain. This level was reached after 70 years, incomparably higher technical level.
Now about the "intensive cattle breeding". Expedition of All-Union resettlement committee in 1928 year investigated the northern half of Kazakhstan. It followed from the main task of expedition, which had to investigate prospects and conditions of a mass plowing and agrarian colonization therefore was interested in those areas, in which the best arable lands of Kazakhstan were concentrated.
On the average, in herd of the Kazakh nomads the sheep made 59, 9%, horses – 13, 5%, cattle – 12,3%135. But as a part of herd in the different regions the strongest distinctions were noted at the beginning of the XX century. Than further to the north-east, than more cattle in the part of the herd. The farther to the southwest, the more herd sheep. So, Mangyshlak had 84.6% were sheep herds. Strong differences were even different districts of the same region.
In Turgay region share of cattle was 20%, in Akmola region - 18%, in the Semipalatinsk region - 13.8%, in Syrdarya - 6.4%136. The reason for this was very simple. Large cattle could eat only 48 species of plants and require fresh water salinity of less than 2.5 g / liter. Desert and semi-desert vegetation and water with a high mineral content it does not fit. Because a high proportion of cattle was in excess of freshwater quality pastures. For example, in Turgaisk area, which until 1920 year included the headwaters of the river Tobol above the modern Kurgan and much of the left bank of the river Ural above Orenburg.
Fodder resources of Kazakhstan were sufficient for the contents large livestock of cattle which M.G. Sirius defined in 88-90 million heads. According to its data productivity of herbage was highest for different herbs and lakeside meadows – 100 poods per acre (about 16 quintals per hectare), and in the desert areas it fell to 3-5 poods per acre (0.8quintals per hectare). Approximate weight for grass and desert semiarid areas estimated M.G. Sirius was 1787.5 million poods, or 286 million quintals. Total food resources they determined to 7337.5 million pounds or 1,174 million quintals.
However, not all this forage could be eaten by cattle. Resources of forages for it made 3750 million poods or 600 million centners. Even if all this herbage completely to prepare on forages, provided that for a pro-forage of one cow it is necessary to prepare about 40 centners of rough forages a year, this herbage can support 15 million heads of cattle. If to take everything into account subtleties of cultivation of highly productive cattle, it the livestock should be cut at least by half, to 7, 5 million heads.
In the mid-1920s cattle in Kazakhstan was less than it could feed a natural herbage, - 2.7 million heads137. They accounted for about 35% of feed resources necessary for the organization highly productive livestock on European models. Resource growth was, but not as big as it may seem.
But the main problem was in, that all these fodder resources to prepare, bring and put on storage. Different herbs and meadow herbs grew on the area about 40 million hectares, and not one massif, and separate spots and the sites scattered on the huge territory. Preparation of hay and
135-136Kazakhs economy at the turn of XIX-XX centuries. Materials for the historical and ethnographic atlas. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1980, p. 102-106
137All Kazakhstan in 1925-1926 years. Orenburg, 1925, p. 84
transportation to farms would demand the additional huge fuel consumption, use of tractors, while machine draft and fuel sharply didn't suffice and for a grain farm.
Therefore the development plan in Kazakhstan in the first five-year period of the large grain farm and "intensive" cattle breeding was insolvent, as for it there were no necessary prerequisites and necessary quantities of material resources. During the first five-year period to get these resources in the necessary quantity also as we see, it was impossible. Needs of Kazakhstan according to the made five-year plan exceeded to annual production of these resources in the USSR. But after all except Kazakhstan were and other large agricultural areas: Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Volga region which also demanded mineral fertilizers, tractors and kerosene. These areas possess much more developed grain farm, were areas of prime collectivization and therefore received tractor, agricultural cars, kerosene and fertilizers first of all. Kazakhstan, given depending on a crop from 3, 3% to 9,7% of preparation of bread in the USSR, couldn't apply for prime deliveries of equipment.
The development plan of the Kazakh cattle breeding, offered by E.A.Polochanskiy, was much better and much more real than plans of large-scale plowing and creation of grain state farms.
As sample for development of the plan it was served obviously by an economic aul, which in the late twenties totaled 8-10 owners138. These owners, having everyone till 60-70 heads, formed a collective farm of optimum number of a livestock which made about 600 heads139. According to estimates by J.B. Abylhozhin, each owner had to have a minimum 60-70 heads of cattle to manage in the aul. Smaller agriculture did not provide all the needs and could not develop and was unstable. Increasing the size of farming could not feed pastures, because of what the rich ranchers were forced to share their herds on auls. Only E.A. Polochanskiy explicitly pro-poor aul, because which set the average herd size in the project just 50 heads in based on of bovine. It is about 200 head of sheep, which is significantly less than optimal farm size. Per houseman - 40 heads is also less than optimal level.
Obviously, it was a tribute of the main political goal of that time in auls – to achieve arrangement and development first of all the poor. Though, judging by statements about Bai, Polochanskiy, probably, understood that the full-fledged cattle breeding economy demands bigger herd. Insufficiency of cattle breeding economy, the author of the project tried to counterbalance agriculture so that it turned out cattle breeding agricultural economy of settled type.
Advantages of the project of Polochanskiy were in the following. First, it obviously relied on the Kazakh economic traditions and experience that it is traced by naked eye. About force of this reason, its project approached under economic conditions of Kazakhstan of the end 1920-much better years, than project of a mass plowing. Secondly, it would be clearer and accepted for the mass of Kazakh cattle-farmers also would promote it is much better for process of collectivization, than the politician Kazkraykom. In the third, it would help to keep a cattle livestock which was available in Kazakhstan on the eve of collectivization that would render the enormous impact on KASSR economy. Fourthly, main part of capital investments were on construction and arrangement of winter roads in quality of constant settlements, and these
138History of State and Law of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. II (1926-1937 years). Alma-Ata, "Academy Publisher of Kazakh SSR ", 1963, p. 29
139J.B. Abylhozhin -The traditional structure of Kazakhstan. Socio-economic aspects of functioning and transformation (1920-1930-ies). Alma-Ata, "Gylym", 1991, p. 209
expenses could be on the first time are considerably reduced by use of the local construction materials and construction receptions. Already at the beginning of the XX century the considerable the part of Kazakhs didn't live any more in yurtas, and lived in houses on winter roads, in the houses. In some districts (for example, in Perovsk) the share of houses made 70% among inhabited constructions140. Almost everywhere houses built of an adobe and syrtsoviy brick, and construction built quickly. Application adobe and a syrtsoviy brick at the beginning collectivization would allow saving large sums.
Records of the Soviet political economy: the hunger and war.
Summing up the results of consideration of projects of development of agriculture Kazakhstan, put forward in the 1920th years, it is necessary to draw a conclusion that ready, worked, and, the most important, realized at cash conditions, the project then wasn't. Economic leadership of Kazakhstan followed the most general installations of collectivization, subsidence and agrarian colonization, thus at all without counting the economic consequences of undertaken actions.
Extreme discrepancy of theoretical creation of party economists, prooflessness of the major provisions attracts attention, and also almost total absence of justification in the form of statistical and actual data. Absolutely unclear, on what were based the same G. Togzhanov's statements about "domination of the trade and usurious capital", or about remnants of a patriarchal and patrimonial system and feudalism in Kazakh aul. The political economic theory of the Kazakh aul created in the late twenties years is unsatisfactory and insolvent, and the main thing, is wrong.
It was the problem not only and not how many party economists in Kazakhstan, how many a problem in general Marxist approach to the analysis agrarian societies in the Asian countries. As it was already spoken, already in the 1970th years in the Soviet political economy couldn't resolve an issue that is means of production in nomadic economy: earth or cattle. Meanwhile, all further political economic analysis depended on it.
The Soviet Marxism couldn't solve these problems. In the 1970th years, on the eve of Saursky revolution in Afghanistan also it was developed the political economic theory of the Afghan society on which depended development of a political and economic course of NDPA, which, as it is well known, it was formed with the most active participation of the Soviet advisers. There the same mistakes were made. Advisers made conclusion about that in agriculture of Afghanistan dominate landowners, and a social order with feudal and even the prefeudal remnants. As we see, there was the same political economic "kоyyрtak", as well as in Kazakhstan in the 1920th years, contradicting to elementary provisions of the Marxist formational theory. The actual data collected by the outstanding expert on the Afghan village A.D. Davydov, these statements disproved. It made in 1993 conclusion: "It is the country of peasants, instead of landowner, or in a basis not landowner, not feudal, and furthermore not prefeudal"141. Peasants owned 68.3% of cultivated land. But in Afghan village dominated trade and rampant usury capital, which by beginning of the 1970s led to a huge debt of farms, their mass devastation, dispossession by 1978 36% of households, and was the main cause of the agrarian crisis in the country.
140 V.V. Vostrov, I.V.Zakharov -Kazakh folk dwelling. Alma-Ata, "Science", 1989, p. 42
141A.D. Davydov -Afghanistan: the war could not be. Peasantry and reform. "Science" - "Eastern Literature", 1993, p. 36
Just as also the Kazakh party economists, at advisers the Afghan communists weren't some reliable data about condition of agriculture and its social structure. A.D. Davydov concludes: "It is difficult to understand how it was possible, to do the so responsible the conclusion affecting radical changes in destinies of the country, being based on absolutely unreliable statistical data"142.
NDPA, having taken the power, followed advice, and began a large-scale agrarian reform. Debts were cancelled and administrative measures from the village expelled the trade and usurious capital, and it wasn't offered to peasants of another source of credit resources. Resolute fight against "feudal land tenure" was carried out, during which the most part of farms underwent confiscations. The norm of land tenure enshrined in the Decree No. 8 made about a third of that it was necessary for a living wage (6 hectares of the irrigation two-fruitful earth against 20 hectares of a living wage), at it sale and land lease was forbidden143. The water reform was carried out which has destroyed traditional system of water use and an irrigation. At last, sharia bills of sale were cancelled. Peasants remained on excessively small plots, without water, guarantees of the property rights and credit resources. The Afghan peasants voted against such politicians’ feet, and since 1980 Afghanistan was left by more than 5 million people, having created strong base of replenishment for groups of the armed opposition.
The final result of these "transformations" is as follows: Afghanistan appeared cast into 25 summer civil war, tested the enormous ruin, and incurred huge victims among the population. Afghans made the most numerous and widespread diaspora in the world. Only in recent years Afghanistan had a restoration opportunity and developments.
There are in a track record at the Soviet political economy two "the outstanding achievements": hunger in Kazakhstan in 1932 and civil war in Afghanistan in 1978-2003. In both cases reasons of the economic and social crises of grandiose scales were wrong and unfounded political economic theories, on the basis of which the major and fatal decisions were made. "Moreover, our historical experience lights up a way, on which so or otherwise development of all mankind" will go, - proclaimed in 1963 "History of state and law of the Soviet Kazakhstan"144. No, thank you, save us from this. Kazakhs and Afghans fully tasted the bitterness of this historical experience.
142-143A.D. Davydov -Afghanistan: the war could not be. Peasantry and reform. "Science" - "Eastern Literature", 1993, p. 89\112
144History of State and Law of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. II (1926-1937 years). Alma-Ata, "Academy Publisher of Kazakh SSR ", 1963, p. 29

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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Aliya
AulSovietization.
At the end of 1925 Philip Goloschekin proclaimed policy of Sovietization of an aul in Kazakhstan. It was the main direction of KDC’s policy before collectivization, which was considered substantially as a preparatory stage of collectivization. Promotion of such purpose in 1925 can cause bewilderment. Because in fact the Soviet power in Kazakhstan established at the end of 1917 – the beginning of 1918. Soviet power established firstly in Orenburg in which the Revolutionary-military committee proclaimed it on14 (27) November, 1917, in three weeks after events in Petrograd. 5 (12) December 1917 - in BukeyevHorde , 16 ( 26) December 1917 - Omsk and soon in Kokchetav and Akmolinsk . Already in 1919 the Soviet power in Kazakhstan is much stronger, and July 10, 1919 People's Commissars of the RSFSR created the Revolutionary Committee of Management Kirghiz region. August 26, 1920, the Revolutionary Committee was abolished and created Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR.What Sovetization after seven years of Soviet power’s establishment? However, as we will see later, there were certain reasons for the proclamation of such slogan.
The Soviet power in aul.
What the Soviet power in a grassroots level of Councils, in particular in nomadic areas represented? The Soviet power at the level of villages and auls was entered by VTsIK’s decree on March 27, 1920 which at the same time abolished by Revolutionary committee. The most local administrative unit was the administrative aul which united 20-30 economic auls, there were 8-10 farms, in radius from 20 to 120 km, sometimes radius reached 200 km. Average quare of an administrative aul in the Semirechensk province reached 70 thousand sq.km, in certain volosts of 200-400 sq.km. In 1926/27 in Kazakhstan were 68,8 thousand auls-kstau. The higher structure consisted of volost Councils, district Councils, provincial Councils, and also in areas of residence of the Kazakh nomadic population was a representative of KAZTsIK.
Huge distances were the main enemy of the Soviet power in Kazakhstan. Even the most compact on the territory administrative auls demanded day of traveling to reach from Council to the most remote aul. In big administrative Councils it was required to go week and more. Huge distances separated administrative auls from higher Councils, and also from the center. It is known that participants of the V-th All-Kazakh party conference which took place in November, 1925, returned to the auls in the second half of December, 1925. The extreme lack of transport which at that time was horses was the second worst enemy of the Soviet power. The communist journalist GabbasTogzhanov in the brochure "Kazakh auls l" left curious notes about the Soviet workers, who faced a difficulties in implementation of the functions assigned to them. Usually, on the practice extended at that time, for each local administrative body was allocated one horse. For the Russian areas with a compact arrangement of the villages, one horse sufficed especially as in many places the territory of Council could be bypassed on foot or to pass on passing carts. Situation in the Kazakh administrative auls sharply differed: "But in the Kazakh aul not so, there each worker has to have a horse". Certainly that was extremely difficult to allocate horses for 5-7 Soviet workers in administrative auls. It led to numerous collateral consequences: "Here they are compelled to look for a horse at others – at "acquaintances", to appeal to those Cossacks who have horses, usually – we checked on experience, - they take horses in the most part from Bais and from people, who accused of something, - made offense before the Soviet power".
It is easy to guess that the similar relations put the Soviet workers in the strongest dependence from the aulBais. But it was not all. Owing to dispersion aul on the territory of an administrative aul to bring together all members of council was a rare fortune and a rare event. The people found this way out with easy ease – all powers were handed over to the chairman of the board who individually made all decisions. "In auls, aulcouncil represents only its chairman. Meanwhile in the opinion of masses the chairman – aul council" Registration of a meeting, as a rule, it was not recorded, decisions too, as a rule, did not register. Such situation opened the most ample opportunities for manipulation with the Soviet bodies from Bais. The chairman sometimes needs a horse for trips in aul on spending the night . All these Bai willingly provided to the chairman of aulcouncil in exchange for loyalty that at the right time the chairman of aul council "put in a word". Sooner or later, it is rather early, the chairman was surrounded from all directions by Bais and prosperous owners on whom the worker completely depended, and was compelled to reckon with their opinion and councils. Aul council, initially conceived as the poor authority, was isolated from these poor. In the Kazakh auls there was one more essential difference from the Russian or Ukrainian villages in Kazakhstan. In the last at a dawn of establishment of the Soviet power the Village Councils were on the whole created. In villages in which was till 20-30 the yards, from a log hut it was possible to reach the Village Council on foot and therefore peasants had opportunity to address in the Village Council on these or those questions. There were no any councils in Kazakh aul because of small number of the population, and Council of an administrative aul was at best in 20-30 km. Besides, in the spring Kazakhs acted and left on summer pastures for tens and hundreds kilometers from their aul council. Therefore in Kazakh agricultural aul the population could not see for years the chairman, and lived separately from the Soviet power. .
All issues were resolved by prosperous owners who, if it was necessary, could go to the chairman and reach agreement with him in a “familiar way”. Owing to huge distances, lack of transport and the general poverty of the republic, on the eve of collectivization no communication of the center with auls simply existed. In an aul was not phone, radio, the post message. Even in 1932 collective farms had no telecommunication, 10,2% of the Village Councils, 23,1% of state farms had phone. Inherently, on the eve of collectivization the Soviet power in an aul existed more on paper, than in practice. It openly admitted KDC. Philip Goloschekin spoke in the report on KDC's 2nd Plenum in April, 1926: "In Kazakh aul there is no Soviet power". Even the Village Councils and AulCouncils which nevertheless existed and somehow worked, nevertheless were absolutely uncontrollable because of lack of communication with them. Orders of the central bodies simply didn't reach places, and in the capital of Kazakhstan there was no opportunity to learn how these orders are carried out in practice. In Kazakhstan were, besides the Soviet bodies, also party organizations and the poor organizations. In the Soviet literature on them, and in particular about the poors organizations, it was much written good, and growth and development was noted. We will tell, the union of the poor "Koshchi", had powerful and branched structure: 7 provincial committees, 5 district committees, 27 district committees, 259 volost committees, 1996 aul committees, and also 3434 primary cells. In the union 243 thousand people consisted, 68 which % were the share of poor people. The party organization in Kazakhstan also was great and had widely extensive network from All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) Regional committee to primary cells.
In a regional Communist Party organization 30 thousand people from which 34% were the share of Kazakhs, 46% - on Russians consisted. In the Komsomol organization in 1925 consisted of 50 thousand people of which Kazakhs made only 4 thousand people, or 8,6%.
However, the worst enemies of the Soviet power in Kazakhstan: distances and deficiency of transport, held by a throat both the party organizations, and the poor unions. Here too the same phenomena, as in the aul council prospered: primary organizations actually didn't exist, meetings weren't held, solutions of higher bodies didn't reach and if reached, weren't executed. The reasons for that was a little, but among them it is necessary to allocate a problem of the translation of documents and letters for the Kazakh language. From the very first days formations of KACCP the Kazakh language was recognized as a state language on an equal basis with Russian. In 1923 there was a decree about the translation of office-work into the Kazakh language or for use of two languages. However, despite decrees, in the first years of the Soviet power in Kazakhstan documents and resolutions weren't translated into the Kazakh language, and published in Russian. In governing bodies there was a domination of Russians and Ukrainians ("the European shots" as then spoke). In 1922/23 in the central bodies of Kazakhstan 60% of Russians, 16% of other European nationalities and 24% казахов157 were. We will tell, in 1922 in the party organization of Kazakhstan there were only 6,3% of Kazakhs, and for the 1st regional party conference on June 11-18, 1921 in Orenburg as a part of 163 delegates there arrived only 19 Kazakh delegates. The domination of "the European shots" and the use of Russian created strong estrangement between the mass of indigenous people (not only Kazakh) and the Soviet power, and generated passivity of local bodies. In 1926 to a problem of involvement of Kazakhs to the Soviet and party construction attended seriously. In Kazakhstan the policy of "indigenization" according to which a certain percent of positions Kazakhs or, at least, the workers knowing the Kazakh language had to hold started. On December 29, 1926 there was a resolution of Council of People's Commissars of KASSR on the obligatory translation the resolution to the Kazakh language. At the same time a language course on which in 1926-1927 1505 people were trained opened. In 1928 150 schools of the Kazakh language worked. However, the language problem hurriedly wasn't solved, and number of the workers who to the same extent are well knowing Russian and Kazakh languages, was extremely insignificant. Kazakhs at that time very badly knew Russian, and "the European shots", as a rule, badly or at all didn't know the Kazakh language. At an annual set on a language course in 1500-2000 people, the prepared shots didn't suffice even on replacement of positions of republican and provincial level. In 1929 percent of indigenization brought on the average to 34,4%. But it didn't solve problems: "The percent of indigenization of nomenclature positions, in particular in a district link, was still low, transition to the Kazakh office-work in this link wasn't carried out". Thus, between district and district the language barrier arose management levels in Kazakhstan practically in all Soviet, party and public organizations. To lower the directive or the circular letter already on level of district committees, the translation was required. However, documents sent in District Committee in Russian, and District Committee which had to transfer documents to Volost Committee and Aul Committee in which workers did not know Russian further, translated them. The translation in an ideal had to be parallel, that is completely keep sense of the initial document. In practice in the District Committee translated as were able. Under G. Togzhanov's certificate, the translations of documents which he looked through in some District Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), were exclusively bad quality: "We here could give some "translations" which we have, but at all desire to give them here it is impossible because in spite of the fact that these "translations" became from the Russian text, we can't translate them back into Russian". Similar documents, in which often there were terrible and wild distortions of the text, and sometimes and even absolutely senseless text, were dispatched to VolostCommittee andAulCommitee. Even G. Togzhanov openly criticized such "management" sharp: "But here we establish that fact that often ours District Committee not only do not direct Volost Committee and the aul organizations, but mislead them the with gross spelling mistakes translated circulars and instructions". Volost committee, having received such message, under G. Togzhanov's certificate, I didn't try to understand and specify, and simply I copied it and I sent further, to subordinate bodies. Thus copied document underwent one more stage of changes: "In most cases he copies to improbable distortions and to big admissions, such places which a wolf itself doesn't sort" are passed. It is difficult to imagine that turned out from such "translation" and such "editing" from circulars and KDC's orders. After such "processing" the final document was not similar at all neither on sense, nor according to the contents to the initial. In the aul committees where generally there were semiliterate workers, and did not think to understand contents of documents sent to them: "The last too don't sort. Read both so, and so, but don't understand". It is good still if read. At that time level of literacy was very low, and even in the party organization in Kazakhstan 22% illiterate were. Therefore Aul committee at once documents filed in the folder or it is even simpler, sent in a bag without filing and registration. Especially as pretty often, circulars and orders came with big delay, is frequent in 2-3 months after a deadline of their execution. This exclusively valuable recognition which slightly opens a veil of secrecy over the reasons of "excesses" at collectivization. Not only that against structure of management huge distances and deficiency of transport, so worked also the available system actually didn't work, and made to nobody the necessary papers dispatched with huge delay. The sense of orders which made by KDC, on the road was distorted to unrecognizability. Feedback practically wasn't. On places the Soviet, party and public workers entirely depended from the aulBais and were compelled to listen to their words. In a word, Goloschekin on a tribune and KDC is one, the Kazakh aul masses – absolutely another, and communications between them were weakest. With such control system it was impossible to begin any transformations as anything from the planned it wouldn't be executed precisely as it is conceived and in established periods. Certainly, Goloschekin and his supporters, knew about it. In materials V of All Kazakhstan conference of RCP(b) at which the slogan of "aulSovietization" was proclaimed, there was an analysis of the developed situation: "A modern real ratio of class forces in Kazakhstan is as follows: the proletariat small, sprayed and weak, the Soviet system performs proletarian management only in the center, beginning approximately with districts, in bottoms – the Soviet power sometimes doesn't exist at all at all, or is still very weak …". Even through political phraseology in it recognition of the developed situation is looked through: to district level the power system more or less functions, and below – there the Soviet power or not, or nearly not. In this situation the slogan of "aulSovietization", or "revival of Councils" as the option, first of all pursued the aim to improve a control system and to achieve that it really included local power bodies which at that moment existed more on paper.
Baiis omniscient and omnipotent.
As it was already spoken, the similar structure of local authorities, in fact, put them in dependence on prosperous owners, or Bais as them then called, and opened before the last the most ample opportunities on a manipulation all bodies of the Soviet power: аul Councils, party and Komsomol organizations, committees of the union of the poor. The first inspections which were carried out by KAZTsIK at the end of 1925 before the first elections in Councils, showed that all levers of the power in an aul are in hands of Bais. In the Soviet literature bai takes an important place as one of KDC's main opponents in auls, however his characteristic usually was given very much briefly. We will tell, Goloschekin defined Bais as:
"1. Representative of the old feudal nobility,
2. Wholesale merchant of cattle and cattle-farmer,
3. Representative of aul exploitative economy. "
According to him, in Kazakhstan there were about three thousand bais.
However, almost it was never spoken openly on what the power of prosperous owners in an aul kept. Only in the early nineties there were researches which answered this question with sufficient completeness. Importance of this subject is emphasized that the characteristic of situation and Bai's influence in an aul allows to understand the real social and economic device of an aul on the eve of collectivization. The pioneer of this subject, Zh.B. Abylkhozhin noted extreme scarcity of information: "At such narrowly set subject and target orientation "action" (a power action) whereas "counteraction" (structure reaction) or in general was left outside the analysis was shined mainly, or moved in the habitual schemes working in a context of "patriarchal and patrimonial" subject".
In the 1970-1980th there were the numerous researches executed on the basis of these pre-revolutionary publications and documents in which rather in detail and the Kazakh economy in that look in what it existed at the beginning of the XX century, up to the collectivization beginning was carefully studied. In spite of the fact that sources were often incomplete, nevertheless it was succeeded to understand and investigate the main lines of the Kazakh nomadic aul. The first and main conclusion which was drawn, consisted that the Kazakh cattle breeding economy was deep and organically connected with natural processes, and submitted to their regularities. The nomadic cattle breeding developed in a marginal zone of droughty steppes and semi-deserts, in the area, limited by isohyets 200-400 mm of a precipitation a year. In this zone strong seasonal variability of a vegetable cover, a drain of the rivers and water sources was noted. According to the majority of researchers, formation of nomadic cattle breeding went on the basis of supervision over migrations of wild steppe animals (saigas, jeyrans, pendents, wild horses and camels). Gradually nomads during zagonny hunting beat out a livestock of wild animals. It conducted to release of an ecological niche which was occupied by a livestock. Nomads were compelled to move approximately on the same routes of migration, and to organize a nomadism with herds. In life of the nomad, the knowledge of natural resources of pastures, regularities of change of seasons and seasonal variability of resources of steppes on what definition of time of nomadism, sequence of a pasture of cattle, and, finally, wellbeing of all economy depended, played huge role . "Thereof the problem number one for any nomad cattle-farmer is an acquisition of a limit of knowledge of character of climatic conditions, about features of functioning of habitat", - I.E. Masanov notes. The greater the knowledge of, the more stable was pastoral economy. Knowledge is very much appreciated , carefully protected from strangers , and handed down from father to son. But not only the knowledge of the environment was the most important factor in the development of nomadic pastoral economy. In Such factors include the optimal herd size : " The age-old desire to achieve a reasonable balance between natural water and feed resources and livestock required to constantly adjust the size of the latter. Without complying with the conditions of production and reproduction of the desired product means of production were simply impossible. "
Here we again come back to a question which the Soviet political economy couldn't resolve – that is means of production at nomads cattle-farmers. Modern Kazakhstan researchers consider that the cattle was means of production. With its help nomads turned natural resources of the steppe: herbs and the water, unsuitable for the person, in the products suitable for the person: food products, raw materials for production of necessary things . However, the political economic nature of cattle was much more difficult, than the nature of means of production at the settled people. Scot could act as an instrument of labor (a pasture and a watering), as object of work (milking, copulation, a face), and as the capital (sale, bride wealth payment, misdemeanors and other needs). Social and economic development of the Kazakh aul was built round cattle and a private property on cattle. Who had big herd, that held a high social position. However, the real situation was much more difficult, and this dependence wasn't implemented rectilinearly. The cattle breeding economy had a minimum at which it had stability and could be reproduced. This minimum level is estimated at 60-70 beasts. Therefore, at allocation of sons the father – the owner of herd has to give to the sons not less this level that they could conduct the economy. However in a common law such way of allocation of sons was fixed. The head of the family divided economy into equal parts on number of sons, and also one share to himself and the wife on livelihood.
The economy section seldom passed smoothly, and the common law of Kazakhs in the XIX century evolved towards strengthening of property rights of the head of the family, and deprivation of not separated sons of the right to dispose of property. At the end of the XIX century allocation of sons became a rarity and was carried out only in rich families. The rich cattle-farmers having big herd, complicating a pasture, split up it and transferred to the possession to wives to sons. But in averages and poor farms the head of the family usurped all property rights of family members, and the main way of acquisition of property inheritance became younger generation. This situation was connected with that the herd section on the average economy created risk, and in poor economy in advance predetermined falling of number of herd below a minimum level of number. In this case, both the father, and the son stopped being independent owners. However, in questions of allocation of sons, the common law made a compromise. Even expelling the son from a family, the father was obliged to give him a good horse or a camel, and also to pay bridewealth. The situation sharply changed after revolution. If before revolution cattle-farmers paid the fixed yurt tax, at the Soviet power fixed assets of taxation becameprodnalog (food tax) , at first natural, and then monetary which depended on the herd sizes. Owners had a strong incentive to split up farms to lower the taxation. In the 1920th years there was an intensive crushing of farms: in their 1920 198 thousand, and in 1928 – 809 thousand were. This process generated a huge number of low-power and poor farms, up to emergence the cattless of owners. Under pressure of an agricultural tax which since 1922 was brought in a monetary form, the compelled tovarization of farms which were compelled to sell cattle to collect the sum necessary for payment of a tax began. Cattle sale also reduced a livestock, turning even prosperous farms into the low-power. The property section between sons was not the only cause of falling of a livestock of herd below a minimum level. The jutes which were often leading to a case of considerable part of herd were the traditional enemy of the nomad. The economy could becomepoor also because of cattle stealing. Any disaster, whether it be natural – jute, or social – cattle stealing, led to emergence in auls of the people who don't have means of livelihood: low-cattle farms (kedey), or at all no cattle (zhalshi).
Among Kazakhs there were ways of social self-control in similar cases. One of the most ancient ways of similar self-control was aZhilu– the help to the farms ruined at disaster. Relatives collected for victims cattle, sufficient for maintaining independent economy. Zhilu was protected by strict custom according to which refusal of assistance meant an exception of a sort. Nevertheless, not always the sort came to the rescue, and poor people were compelled to look for to themselves livelihood, being employed in rich farms. In Kazakhstan there was an ancient way of hiring – Saul when bai gave to the poor relatives herd on a pasture, with the right to milk or to cut wool. However, already at the beginning of the XX century Saul turned simply into herd delivery on a pasture for a right of use of milk. At the end of the XIX century, with plowing growth, there was one more way of hiring of labor. Bai employedkedeyor zhalshifor plowing of a field, crops and harvesting. This worker was called “Ortak”. Bai gave ortaksnecessary for economy: to steam of working cattle, 1-2 cows, seeds, hoe and dressing gown.Ortak had to perform all field works, as rule, lived near him. After harvesting and Bai's return, a half of a crop was giventoortak. The poorest were compelled to be employed for economic works: milking, hairstyle, felt production, cooking, worked for food and clothes, and wandered together with a family. Extreme conditions of an era of the Civil war accompanied by jutes and hunger, put the Kazakh cattle breeding in very severe conditions and caused, as a whole, an impoverishment of Kazakhs, emergence of a large number of poor people and beggars. The Middle farms which have kept till 10-15 of beasts, had chance, though small, on restoration of the economy, uniting the herds to level of an optimum livestock. 30-40 owners together quite could make more or less self-sufficient economy and after revolution were sometimes made out as cooperatives or even collective farms. For this reason poor auls could be distinguished by quantity of yurtas. In a poor aul there were 30-40 yurtas, in rich – to ten, on the average 5-6 yurtas. However, during Civil war the impoverishment mentioned considerable part of Kazakhs, and brought them to that level at which they couldn't conduct the economy, be in a cattle breeding community. They were pushed out out of limits of a community and were compelled to look for livelihood where it is necessary. In these conditions, within traditional economy, value and Bai's who has kept cattle and capable herd to reproduction role sharply increased. First, rich farms often were a support for cattle breeding communities. Five farms with herd of 50-60 heads in everyone and bye with herd in 300 heads made optimum economy by the sizes in 600 heads. Secondly, Bai were able to provide with means to livelihood and work if not everything, the majority of poor people and beggars in auls especially as development of seasonal works, in particular work on fishing grounds, on mining or in the industry then were developed exclusively poorly. On this basis social and economic differentiation in an aul in the early twenties promptly developed and became complicated. By results forwarding inspection of Turkestani organizational bureau of Regional committee of RCP(b) of the Kazakh auls in the Aulie-ats district of the Syr-Darya province in 1924 there was the following picture:

# Cattle breeding Husbandry Fixed income
1 Cattle breeder-bai 2-3 Seeding by ortaks Cattle
2 Bai –honorable man Shepherd and farm laborers ortak Cattle
3 Cattle breeder – sasikbai 1-2 shepherds ------ Cattle
4 Cattle breeder middle peasant Usually shepherds Seeding by ortaks Cattle
5 Low power nomad ------ ------ Services, seasonal work
6 One-horse farmers and poors ------ -------- Be ortak
7 One-horse farmers ------- ------ Husbandry
8 Independent farmer -------- Sometimes harvester Husbandry
9 Prosperous farmer Shepherds Ortaks, hired workers Cattle breeding, Husbandry
10 Bai- farmer Shepherds, farm laborers permanent workers Cattle breeding, Husbandry, credit
11 Impoverished pastoralists and farmers ------------- ------- Small services
12 Shepherd and farm laborers -------- -------- Services
13 Underclass, poor ---------- ------- Services

Probably that concrete forms of the organization of economy and attraction of labor in it from among impoverished cattle-farmers and farmers were even more various, were very flexible and adapted to conditions of each concrete district. Unfortunately, the description of these forms is hardly possible now. Bai in auls have, besides economic, other important function. Often they were the only competent people in auls. They had a bigger outlook and, as a rule, were much more informed the Soviet and party workers. In the interests of bai worked atkamnery( horseman) - people who had horses and performed for remuneration errands . With the help of them bai actively conducted political activities. While in Kazakh auls were also preserved traditional courts, which is much faster than the Soviet courts , and enjoyed a high reputation among the Kazakh population. G. Togzhanov recognizes high political skills bais " Aksakal court (court of aldermen) work better than ours , bai - atkamnery - " honorable people " of aulreact to all events ( starting with small things to large ) , taking place in the aulis much faster and more proficiently than our grassroots party and government organizations . " This situation can be explained by several factors. First, Aul Council and all parent organizations were not independent and waited instructions ultimately on KDC who came very late.KDCand Kazakh Central Executive Committee and , in turn, could not deal with local affairs and to delve into the issues arising in each village . Second, neither the Soviet officials nor aul Communists influence and authority is not used, mainly because they could not affect the aullife , whereas the effect of bai was decisive . Bai also able to maintain a traditional Kazakh culture , conduct rituals and holidays that for poor households was often a luxury. These rituals and celebrations were also used to strengthen the influence and subjugate the Soviet and party workers .Invitation to put them in the same dependence on bai.KDC was forced to admit that the Communists and Komsomol members in the village were under the influence of the bai , and were usually religious people . It came even before that , in tests aul Party cells turned out that many Communists joined the party at the urging of bai. For KDC and Kazakh Central Executive Committee and the worst thing was that they did not have the necessary data to assess the political influence on bai Soviet and party organs , " It should be noted that the materials on the election campaign no figures on the number of aul Soviets, under the political influence of the bai. In any documents - Party and Soviet - no such figures , because there was no such statistical records . " In general ,KDC and Kazakh Central Executive Committee and from the first the policy of" AulSovietization " faced with the existence of different socio- economic system that work quickly and efficiently Soviet , and, importantly , often disguised as government bodies .
The elections in Councils of 1925/26.
In winter of 1925/1926 in the USSR including in Kazakhstan, the first wide and open elections in Councils were held. Election campaign started on November 1, 1925 and came to the end on February 28, 1926. It were the first elections of Councils after the announcement of policy of Sovietization of an aul. Problems of campaign were formulated as follows: "In an aul – to begin association of the poor, farm laborers and middling persons … to make aul Councils and kazak Executive committees of volost Councils of working, country and Red Army deputies by the valid defenders of interests of workers of mass of the aul population". The result of these elections was discouraging. The rate on the poor and its class solidarity was completely failed. The poor were weak and disorganized. But the bais fully used the advantages and financial position, in essence, having isolated the poor from election campaign. KDC a little than could help the asset with election campaign, at least because had no opportunity to imagine a real picture of political influence on the Kazakh aul, and, therefore, could not use available resources effectively. Party and Soviet bodies, in effect, worked blindfold. The important role in defeat of communists on elections was played also with that pre-election campaign on them began long before the announcement of the beginning of election campaign, even even before Goloschekin's appointment to Kazakhstan. Bai and atkamner began active propaganda in July-August, 1925, whereas councils and executive committees only in November-December, 1925.
The additional loss to positions of communists was caused by two more factors. First, there was no timely notification about elections, about laws and a voting procedure therefore the Kazakh population learned about them through "uzun-kulak"( gossips), than the most active image used bai. Secondly, at the crucial moment of the campaign beginning communists didn't have almost representatives in auls as they appeared in Kzyl-Orda at the V-th party conference which was carried out just at the very beginning of election campaign. They had to leave auls no later than the middle of October, and returned only in the second half of December, 1925 when was already late. These elections in Councils were called "patrimonial" as the main fight was developed between Bai representing different childbirth later. Business consisted that many administrative auls were created without patrimonial structure of the population. In spite of the fact that Executive committees of volost Councils of working, country and Red Army tried not to unite conflicting kins, nevertheless completely it was not succeeded to exclude a patrimonial factor at level. Fight for places in Councils went with big tension and often reached sharp disputes and collisions. Kazakh Central Executive Committee noted fight of kins in the Aktyubinsk, Ural, Syr-Daryinsky and Semipalatinsk provinces. The aspiration to receive more places in Councils that allowed to influence distribution of taxes, receiving the credits and the seed loan was the reason of intensive patrimonial fight. Strong childbirth sought to take control over Councils to shift taxation to weak childbirth, and to take more than the help allocated to farms. Intensive bribery of voters, the device of a food and cattle distribution was put to use among poor people that those voted for the necessary candidate.
In the Chubartavsk district of the Karkaralinsk district 36 heads of livestock and 1000 rams were distributed. However, it did not give to the parties decisive advantage, and soon dispute ended in a fight. In the Lepsinvolost of the Semipalatinsk district there was the real fight for volost Council. In the big fight lasting for two hours, about 200 people from both parties participated. Some Bai in hard-fought pre-election battle even used slogans of the Soviet power, and represented the interests as a form of class fight for interests of workers. Kazakh Central Executive Committee noted that there were "poor" Bai who enjoyed big authority and the poor support, acting against "rich" Bayev. "Bai acted cunning and carefully – most often collected (bought) votes they led to councils and Executive committees of volost Councils of working, country and Red Army someone from poor people, middling persons and the farm laborers who were from them in big dependence …". Defeated parties often achieved cancellation of elections and carrying out repeated vote. Sometimes this antagonism was tightened, and led to repeated cancellations of elections. In the Zhideli-Sagizskyvolost of the Temirsky district of the Aktyubinsk province elections were cancelled three times. The Temirsky district in general differed big heat of patrimonial fight in which candidates of a sort Nazar won a victory, and representatives of a sort Zhekey organized the poor on writing of complaints. As a result about 2 thousand members of councils were not chosen.
The general result of elections in Councils in 1925/26 was amazing. 14159 people of whom 88,3% were made by prosperous cattle-farmers and farmers, 4,9% - farm laborers, 3,2% - poor people were elected. Among the elite there were only 6,5% of communists and 1,4% of Komsomol members. According to 1926 the percent of communists in the aul council made 4,7% whereas in 1924/25 I made 8%193. The victory on elections, generally was gained by Bai and their candidates. Same I recognized in April, 1926 and Goloschekin: "We have result of elections following – in general Bai's victory, a victory of the patrimonial head". KDC, obviously, I expected to achieve on these elections a situation change in own favor and to carry out proclaimed "revival of Councils". However, these objectives weren't achieved. Results of elections showed, positions of the Soviet power in auls are how weak, the party and Soviet asset is how weak and separated. The Kazakh aul appeared much more tough nut, than it seemed in the beginning. Elections only worsened situation and led to strengthening of political influence of Bai in the Kazakh aul who could achieve performance of a problem of association of poor people and middling persons. The situation extremely unpleasant for Goloschekin when he couldn't control the most part of local Soviet and party bodies was created. Without having influence, it could not make there anything, and any addresses to them were no more than an empty phrase.
Chapter fourth.
"Small October"
The first steps in policy of "aulSovietization" showed an exclusive weakness of the Soviet power in Kazakhstan, and fictitiousness of its presence at the most grassroots levels. In effect, outside its cities also wasn't actually, and the real power there belonged to not so Soviet workers. On elections in Councils in 1925/26 communists suffered defeat and conceded them to Bai or their representatives. Results of elections brought in policy of "aulSovietization" the new line – approach to Bai. Fictitious councils, false communists Goloschekin's Report on KDC's 2nd plenum at the end of April, 1926 fully reflects defeat of communists in elections in Councils. First, aul communists appeared not at situation height. Formally, communists in auls was more, than Bais – 6374 persons. However, Goloschekin was compelled to recognize: "I collected a huge number of documents, and all unanimously say that aul communists on all elections participated in patrimonial fight, on one Bai's party, on other Bai's party. Attempts from representatives – to force to obey to party discipline – had no anywhere, almost, success".
Secondly, in concluding remarks on KDC's plenum, Goloschekin was expressed even more definitely: "You well know that poor people at us false, not real, as well as communists". Also he recognized that KDC has neither means for work with a masses, nor agents, that is cells, in auls. And aul councils he recognized fictitious as they solved nothing. Perhaps, Goloschekin's these statements even show brighter and more figuratively, what severe defeat was suffered by communists and on elections and that in practice all policy which they pursued cost them. The traditional structure of management of auls was in actual fact so effective that generated the real confusion in the ranks of party heads. Then in KaDC the question of creation of "the Soviet atkamner" was seriously discussed, and Goloschekin spoke about it quite definitely: "We are faced by a question – whether we have to do the Soviet atkamner – and to replace, banish a bai’satkamner". It should be noted that further the subject of "the Soviet atkamner" wasn't discussed, but already at re-elections of 1927 a large number of representatives was sent to auls from the center, provinces and districts, and also all is connected a volost and aul asset. All campaigns and collectivizations also are farther was carried out by hands of representatives and "belsendi" - activists. To a certain extent the idea of "the Soviet atkamner" was realized in practice, though without use of this term. With a position of today, it is possible to tell that KDC had an opportunity to use even such results of elections in Councils in own favor. For this KDC could cooperate temporarily with "poor Bai" who built the influence on support of the poor and widely used the Soviet rhetoric. At desire on elections "poor Bais" it was possible to declare a victory a victory of the Soviet power and manifestation of advantages of a socialist system supposedly "time even Bai understand it". Only, judging by that occurred then, Goloschekin, probably, apprehended results of elections not as temporary difficulties, explainable an objective situation and as the personal failure, and I apprehended it very sharply. He began to prepare other policy – policy of approach to Bai who had to achieve the object by blasting economic positions of prosperous farms. He declared it already on the 2nd plenum: "I told that it is necessary to think that proceeding from conditions of our separate life, combining if you want with the USSR, we should think – how to approach to Bai's infringement".
The idea of approach to Bai was far not new for Kazakhstan. In January, 1923 it was discussed at the III-rd All- Kazakhparty conference at which a number of speakers demanded "to strengthen approach to a class of exploiters – Bais and beks". This idea caused sharp objections from SmagulSadvakasov and his adherents who openly subjected it to obstruction. They managed to raise doubts in its realness at the majority of communists, and further theoretical disputes business then didn't go. In the publications devoted to political repressions in Kazakhstan, the question of an origin of views of SmagulSadvakasov and SultanbekHodzhanov on development of the Kazakh aul, and also a source of their persistence with which they protected the views in discussions usually isn't considered and went against the campaign of groundless criticism and defamation organized against them. Meanwhile, they were united by the general moment – both of them were engaged in fight against hunger. Hodzhanov in 1918-1919 was the chairman of committee of the help starving in Turkestan. Sadvakasov was authorized in 1922 on fight against hunger in the Turgaysky district. Obviously, this experience demonstrated it, how difficult the nomadic economy is restored after two waves of hunger, the Soviet bodies, cooperatives and not numerous collective farms are how weak in auls, and that at the current stage of alternative to Bai in an aul isn't present. Most likely, experience of fight against hunger forced them to oppose class fight in an aul. "Class fight, except trouble and torments, will bring nothing to the Kazakh aul", - Sadvakasov spoke in 1923. It is necessary to tell that this point of view quite long time was dominating, and active actions on infringement of interests of Bai up to 1927 in Kazakhstan practically didn't undertake. Moreover, these measures weren't in the most initial version of policy of Sovietization of an aul which was developed in 1925-1926. Basic provisions of this policy found the reflection in Goloschekin's letter to Stalin which the first quoted in the report at the VI-th party conference in November, 1927:
"1 . Change of the social and economic relations of an aul. Here the following actions belong:
a) Land reform which significantly differs from land reform in Central Asia and carries forms of the section of meadows and arable grounds. The unique form before the end of continuous land management,
b) estimated tax on a bais by local (general meeting of an aul) taxation for cultural needs of this aul,
c) agricultural tax, according to the plan which is put through in the USSR, but with the necessary amendment of the special law on concealment …
2 . The organization of elections in an aul:
a) the contingent of deprivation of the rights, proceeding from features of a Kazakh aul,
b) the organization of small sites within an administrative aul of m of providing representation of small (weak) childbirth,
c) carrying out the law on criminal penalty of heads of patrimonial fight and its use in the interests at re-elections,
d) the accounting of all these requirements when developing situation about аaul council".
As we see, in 1925 in KDC 's intentions there was no organization of economic approach to Bai, and estimated measures within policy of Sovietization of an aul offered only additional taxation, and also elimination of patrimonial fight on elections. Defeat on elections in Councils in 1925/26 for the first time put approach to Bai on the agenda.
The second defeat on elections.
Discussion of results of elections of 1925/26 meant that the main errors will be corrected on the following re-elections of Councils which had to take place till May 20, 1927. Re-elections in Councils began on December 15, 1926, it is less than in a year after end of former elections. A lot of things exchanged, and a lot of things became in a new way.
Firstly, for a month the term of election campaign was prolonged, which made 5 months against 4 months on the previous elections. It gave certain advantages to slow Soviet and Party bodies in auls.
Secondly, it was concluded from the previous campaign, when voting was conducted in the winter, and it was extremely difficult for voters, especially in the auls. Because of winter the appearance of the Kazakh voters dreamed to 37,5% against an appearance in 45% on elections of 1924/25 years. This time the vote was appointed to the end of spring while nomads didn't go yet on summer pastures205, wandered near the winterings, and could arrive to a site on warm weather.
Thirdly, the disaggregation of Councils and approach was begun to the voter. At distance between farms auls over 35 versts, were allowed to create aul council on 150 people, in nomadic areas – on 100 people. There were 1100 new councils206, and at the time of election campaign are formed 1926/27 years 145 new Councils were created207.
Fourthly, it much more actively applied disfranchisement of rights and expulsion of disenfranchised county, and even arrests. Then the use of administrative resource was perfectly normal, even justified from a political standpoint.
Fifthly, representatives were sent and began "... sending of responsible workers, who were able to contact with auls cells and taught what to do”208. In particular, poor meetings were held, on which representatives and activists agitated for the candidates.
Sixthly, in the newspapers was launched a strong campaign against the bais and support of auls’ Sovietization. On 14 of February, 1927 year the newspaper "Soviet steppe" wrote: "... in the village we are not allowed to issue of October, but only put it on the agenda." Before the completion of re-elections in Councils of Kazkraykom the party journalist Gabbasa Togzhanova sent to business trip in Semirechye, already known to us according to brochures about the Kazakh auls, for publicizing the process of aul transformation and results of re-elections.
However, and the opposing side - bais also changed their political tactics. In those counties where the communists and the poor have been influenced by the bais, there is certainly actively conducted tribal fighting. But in those volosts where representatives and ranking officers worked, and where communists managed to adjust more or less work, here Bais removed patrimonial interests aside and united against communists.
And in this election has been used the whole election arsenal: "Uzun-kulak", bribery of voters, nomination of figureheads candidates, active atkamnerov agitation, tribal fighting.
205Traditional departure on Zhailau held in mid-to late of May.
206History of State and Law of Soviet Kazakhstan. T. II (1926-1937 years). Alma-Ata, "Academy Publisher Kazakh SSR ", 1963, p. 30
207 Materials to the report about Kazakh regional committee of the CPSU (b) at the VI Regional Party Conference. Kyzyl-Orda, 1927, p. 151
2086th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 116
Goloshchekin in the second time, in his report to the VI-th Party Conference in November 1927, he had to admit high organizational bai dignity even in comparison with selected Party cadres "Bai better and smarter than some of our Commissioners and cells quickly grasps any organization and uses it for themselves."209The fight was a lot of stress and heat of passions. In these re-elections were also a clash comes to shove shooting and wounded210.
By results of elections of 1926/27 year, also according to reports it left very kind picture which collapsed when checking and receiving reports from places. The reached results were illusory, and a situation in auls practically didn't change. Among the first about it began to write Togzhanov, who in article "The Soviet steppe" of July 4, 1927 year he was compelled to write: "In protocols we write that re-election campaign passed well, but this all lie …"211. In one of auls in Semirechye, which was visited by Togzhanov, all six communists of a local party cell went to a mosque, and all the affairs refueled bais and mullahs. There Soviet power was fictitious, and the Communists - dummies.

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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In another aul Togzhanov met and talked with one of the "poor bai ", owner of a large herd of 800 heads of sheep, about a hundred horses, who ruled the aul and urged journalists that he "himself with Nicholas Communist era, stands for the Soviet regime and help the poor. In an article "Soviet steppe" from 28 of August, 1927 year, with the characteristic titled "How not to sovietise" Togzhanov acknowledged that the slogan of the Sovietization "in no way not enforced”212.
That is characteristic, and in later times an assessment of results of re-elections in Councils didn't change: "The Kazakh aul till 1928 year was characterized by political and economic domination of bai-semi-feudal lords, which almost weren't mentioned at all by October revolution”213. In fact, following the elections of 1927 year Kazkraykom defeated in politics Sovietization of the aul, the second in two years after the appointment of Goloshekin.
However, the reaction to this second defeat on elections was other. Failure on elections of 1925/26 year widely was made comments, published the detailed characteristic and very representative statistical this as far as they could be collected from the chaotically organized the Soviet device in Kazakhstan. It was connected with that in Kazkraykom intended to improve seriously work with aul’s cells, to send representatives and to take a revenge on the following elections. Therefore such attention was paid to consideration of results of elections and was even the separate brochure is issued.
The failure on elections of 1926/27 in detail wasn't considered, and actual data according to them it wasn't represented. Even in materials to the report of Kazkraykoma at the VI-th party conference, let out with a mark "Only for members of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)", the section on elections was very short, at all has no statistical data (in a
2096th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 117
210A.P. Kuchkin –The Sovietization of Kazakh aul in 1926-1929 years. M., "USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House," 1962, p. 230
211-212V. Mikhailov -Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 137
213A. Asylbekov - For the Sovietization of aul. Alma-Ata, 1930, p. 5
counterbalance to detailed statistical data on to economy, party and Soviet bodies) also it is filled with statements about bad work of aul communists. Results were such that there was no wish to bring them.
Redivision of the land
However, there was an urgent need to put something in Kazkraykom merit and claim victory of Soviet power in Kazakhstan. 1927 year was anniversary year, when widely and very solemnly 10 anniversary of the Soviet power was celebrated, and there was no wish to meet anniversary official reports about failures of Goloschekin very much. Certainly, Goloschekin as required gave out wished for valid, and on 1 of November, 1927 year when true results of re-elections in Councils were already finally clear, he, that not less, wrote in the article "The Soviet steppe": "For the first time the party carried out a class furrow in an aul and helped the Kazakh steppe inhabitants poor and middle - master Council not as a figurehead or representative of the genus, and as a spokesman for their labor interests.214" But it is unlikely that anyone could seriously believe.
Therefore, in 1927 year, became the main triumphant redistribution of land, which was produced simultaneously with the election campaign.
In Kazakhstan even before Philip Goloschekin's appointment were carried out works on land management and very large-scale repartitions of the land. So, the Kazakhs was returning all 10 versts strip along the Irtysh, before the revolution, land reserved for the Cossacks. In February of 1921 year and in July of 1922 year in southern Kazakhstan, mainly in Dzhetysuyskoy province, then was part of the Turk Republic, it was a large-scale land and water reform, which resulted in large-scale confiscation of land, property and eviction. Within its framework was confiscated 232,800 acres of land215.
Even before Goloschekin's appointment was decided on the large-scale plan of land management for a period of 10 years according to which measurement was carried out and surveying of land for 230 million square tithes, allocated land to lead a semi-nomadic and sedentary Kazakh economy, and also land management when the earth of villages shared between owners with establishment of boundaries was carried out. On 17 of April, 1924 year the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of KASSR issued the decree under which began this land use planning campaign216. During 1925/26 years it has been held inter-village land administration in the area of 15.2 million hectares, and land administration in the area of 0.6 million hectares.
The land question was very sharp and politically tense as it affects the sensitive area of interethnic relationship. On the one hand, the Kazakhs require pre-emption rights allotment of land and sought to regain the lands that were taken away before the revolution - about 40 million acres. On the other hand, had a large the number of immigrants, mostly came after the revolution, which also claimed the land itself, using pressure on authorities argument that they should not be "stepchildren of Soviet power." In local authorities was a fierce struggle for land.

214V. Mikhailov -Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 138
215-216 A. Chupekov -History of the agrarian reforms of Soviet power in Kazakhstan in 1917-1929 years. Alma-Ata, 1961, p. 7
To address these complex issues at the V All-Kazakhstan Party Conference in December 1925 discussed the issue of land management, and during the discussion was elaborated priority land allotment. First of all Kazakhs were endowed, then - settlers who came before 1918 year, unauthorized immigrants who arrived before 31 of August, 1922 year, and last settlers arrived on 31 of August in 1922 year to 7 of August in 1924 year217. Not everyone agreed with plan, in particular, Uraz Jandossov believed that in areas of continuous residence of Russian, land should be given first to Russian settlers. However, the resolution adopted, and allotment of land went mostly according to their order.
The question of a redistribution of land was connected at the same time with several political and economic moments. Firstly, political purposes demanded immediate support of the poor, first of all means of livelihood. Leveling redistribution of the land promised fast results. Secondly, this problem could solve the continuous land management within which with the earth were actively allocated poor farms, but it went too small rates and not in all areas evenly. Redistributive campaign, despite obvious incompleteness of measures, I promised to fill shortcomings temporarily land management. Thirdly, Goloschekin hoped on the basis of a redistribution of land to carry out organizational work among a local asset.
At this idea in Kazkraykom arrived even in the spring of 1926 year, after the first defeat on elections, and on 26 of May, 1926 year there was a decree of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee about leveling redistribution of land. On 6 of June, 1926 year was released on the second, additional decree specifying the first218. Since arable land were planted, and hayfields have been distributed, the execution was postponed its attachments next year.
The redistribution of land started in the early spring 1926 year, as a separate campaign. According to the plan of Kazkraykom, redistribution was to be held in 161 volost, but in reality they were covered 218 volosts. Of 420 volosts which then existed in the Kalmyk ASSR, redistribution covered 52% of territory; they were mostly agricultural areas with the presence of economy.
To the aid of repartition the considerable asset was thrown:
18 employees from the regional center,
71 employees from the provincial bodies,
194 employees from the county authorities
700 employees from the district authorities;
Also 5420 workers of aul level were attracted, that is considerable part of an aul asset of the party (in 1927 – 6465 people of members and candidates), with involvement of Komsomol members and members of the union of Koshchi219.

217-218A.P. Kuchkin- Sovietization of Kazakh aul in 1926-1929 years. M., "USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House," 1962, p. 163\180
219Materials to the report of Kazakh regional committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) at the VI Regional party conference. Kzyl-Horde, 1927, page 20-22
Serious preparation for repartition was not carried out: "Equipment of repartition, as well as the account, was primitive. In a number of areas such ways of measurement, as steps, wheel turns, lassos were applied also, shocks and others"220. In the majority of areas more perfect was applied the technician of measurement of the earth, but nevertheless, needs to be considered results of repartition very approximate. In different sources the data on a redistribution of land differ very significantly, and, both on the area, and on the structure investment (in thousands of hectares):
The data of 1930 year221 The data of 1961 year222
plow hayfields plow hayfields
Poor 810 792 957 1309
Middle peasants 312 445 443 582
Wealthy 108 not defined 126 163
Total 1230 1237 1526 2054

It is hard to say, what data more reliable. It is very probable that A. Chupekov working with archival documents, could have fuller reports and to make more exact picture of a redistribution of land.
However, the social picture of a redistribution of land quite is displayed by them and it is visible that poor farms got lion's part of the earth. Repartition was made on a temporary basis, on eaters in economy. Haying grounds were redistributed every year, and an arable land –one time in 9 years.
In Kazkraykom results of a redistribution of land were considered as one of victories in class fight in an aul. Goloschekin declared in the report of Kazkraykom at the VI-th party conference: "It against what comrade Sadvokasov shouted on the Second plenum, it is precisely the small October. We actually, in fact, on the basis of land interests clashed with the poor and Bai forced him, helped him take the land from the bai ... "223. In his speech the characteristic reservation that "forced … to take away the land from Bai" slipped. It appeared not just like that as at the time of party conference in the main negative consequences of a redistribution of land which, in effect, didn't bring obvious benefit to the poor already were known.
The matter is that poor farms were so low-power that had no neither arable tools, nor working cattle, a seed material, to sow the arable lands which have been taken away from Bais and also to mow hay on the taken away at Bais mowing224.

220Materials to the report of Kazakh regional committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) at the VI Regional party conference. Kzyl-Horde, 1927, page 21
221A. Asylbekov - For the Sovietization of aul. Alma-Ata, 1930, p.15
222 A. Chupekov -History of the agrarian reforms of Soviet power in Kazakhstan in 1917-1929 years. Alma-Ata, 1961, p.10
2236th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927,p.75
224It should be noted that the prairie grass, in particular, feather, not a scythe to mow down and required the use of horse-drawn mowers, which were only in wealthy households.
Any economic statistics of agriculture of that time showed and said that poor farms have very small plowing and are fed, mainly, with wage labor. Therefore easy cutting of land to poor peasants, in fact, they did not get anywhere, and it spent on a typical form for the time: "Do not close authorized "when the majority of innovations carried out only in the presence of Commissioners, and when they were leaving, the people returned to accustomed to a method of managing.
At the VI-th party conference quite definitely said that bai met a redistribution of land with imperturbable tranquility as it was clear that the poor with the received earth won't be able to make anything. Soon after departure of representatives, violent color rent of an arable land blossomed and haymaking, and as the main lessors poor people acted just. 11-of 12% the poor farms which had no opportunity to process the earth, 70% of the area of a leased arable land and 51% of the area handed over leased hay makings225.
Land redistribution has benefited to a greater extent to middle peasant and prosperous farms that received a strong impetus for the development of through the possible use of the leased land. Over the past with redistribution of land confiscation of bai’s year share of affluent households, with more than 50 heads of cattle in terms of bovine, rose from 0.6% to 1.5%, although in 1924/25 years was only 0.2%226. Redistribution of land has caused a sharp jump in the property bundle of auls.
Thus, the redistribution of land was a victory in the class struggle more on paper and in words than in deeds. Ongoing reforms led quite not to the result, which were calculated: they did not reach the stated goals and led to a strengthening of the wealthy strata of the aul. Kazakhstan before collectivization was not socialism. Ongoing reforms made from poor the small-scale producers, and this impelled property bundle in the aul, and led to the development of "purely capitalist elements".Jeanie's coefficient for KASSR increased at this time, noting development of property inequality: in 1924/25 year it made 0,472, and in 1928 year– 0,594227. One of known experts in economy of Kazakhstan G.F. Dakhshleyger in 1961 made surprising and is extraordinary courageous conclusion concerning agrarian transformations in Kazakhstan: "On the class essence these transformations carried bourgeois-democratic or revolutionary-democratic character"228.
Historical Party Conference
Under these conditions, having choked in "private-elements" of "Lesser October", was held VI-I All-Kazakh conferences VKP (b) which became a turning point in the development of economic policy from post-war reconstruction, through the bourgeois-democratic reforms, to collectivization and economic catastrophe.

225-226 G.F. Dahshleyger- The characterization of the socio-economic relations in the Kazakh aul (1921-1928 years). M., 1961, p. 48\22
227 J.B. Abylhozhin- The traditional structure of Kazakhstan. Socio-economic aspects of functioning and transformation (1920-1930 years). Alma-Ata, "Gylym", 1991, p. 138
228 G.F. Dahshleyger- The characterization of the socio-economic relations in the Kazakh aul (1921-1928 years). M., 1961, p. 45
The course of performances and discussions on it can be tracked very well as it is one of the few party conferences in Kazakhstan, after which the verbatim record and materials to Kazkraykom's report were published. However, even the verbatim record isn't completely exhaustive source. On numerous remarks of actives people clearly that in a conference lobby, in breaks of meetings, went intensive discussions which had impact on party conference work. They, clearly, weren't brought in the shorthand report. Therefore, fight and collision of opinions can be restored only approximately, in that measure in what all this was reflected in the published documents.
In works of the Kazakhstan historians this party conference most often contacts defeat of "national deviators", in particular Smagul Sadvakasov. In particular, Valery Mikhaylov writes: "In November of 1927 year in Kzyl-Orda the Sixth All Kazakhstan party conference, where took place Goloschekin gave a decisive battle to those "national deviators" who else dared to contradict to him"229. In the future, a very brief, statement of progress discussions at this party conference, in conjunction with highly selective quoting speeches, he showed that as if almost the entire Goloshekin report, as well as multi-day sessions were devoted to the persecution and disorder of Sadvakasov.
However, it is impossible to agree with this point of view. Firstly, at the party conference speakers who just have not discussed: from world situation before carrying by women of a veil. Circle of questions was very great, and the majority acting, in particular, if they represented the central management, as a rule, mentioned on 3-4 questions even in the short, 10-minutes of performances in debate according to Kazkraykom's report, not to mention detailed reports.
Secondly, fight against opposition was one of dominating subjects at party conference. But not with "national deviators", and from the inner-party opposition of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinovyev, with which to that moment in party there was a fierce and wearisome fight. The Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) took care about that All-Kazakh party conference showed the correct position, and on it there were representatives of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) – A.A. Andreyev and M. K. Muranov. Andrey Andreyev spoke at evening meeting on 15 of November in 1927 year when opening party conference, and Matvei Muranov – at morning meeting on 16 of November in 1927 year.
During 1925-1927 years in party tops there was a fierce political struggle between two coalitions: Stalin and Bukharin on the one hand, Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev on the other hand. On 18 of November, 1925 year the XIV congress of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) at which Stalin declared policy of industrialization of the USSR and at which there was an organized and fierce disorder of Zinovyev’s supporters opened. In discussion all prominent heads acted practically, Bukharin right after Zinovyev's supporting report to the political report of the Central Committee made the rough polemical speech, "the heavy artillery" in the person of Stalin and Molotov acted. In fight with Zinovyevets N. K. Krupskaya took part even. After Kamenev's congress expelled from Work and Defense Council, Zinovyev lost a post of the secretary of the Leningrad Communist Party organization.
Then in July, in 1926 year the Plenum of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) on which fierce debate between the groups, reached such a pitch took place that in
229V. Mikhailov -Chronicle of great jute. Almaty, "Zhalyn", 1996, p. 138
disputes with opposition Felix Dzerzhinsky died, after the rough and uneasy speech. All summer and fall of 1926 year there was an intense fight at meetings of party cells in which the opposition suffered defeat230.
In the spring and summer of 1927 the foreign policy sharply became aggravated situation, there was a threat of war, and the opposition began again the activity. Trotsky and Zinovyev accused party leadership in bureaucratic regeneration. In October 1927 at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission addressed the issue of fractional activity and it was made final warning, after which they will be expelled from the Party.
The moment was intense, especially as shortly before opening party conferences in Kzyl-Orda, in Moscow on parade on 7 of November in 1927 year there was an unsuccessful attempt to arrange an attempt on Stalin. November, 15 in 1927 year Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided to exclude Trotsky Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party.
So All Kazakh party conference began with Andreyev's report about oppositions in which he noted exclusiveness created in partyprovisions: "Really, that we have with opposition, never have been from the moment of existence of our party, in the history of our party ever such situation have not been which was created by opposition …”231.
Thirdly, Sadvakasov and his views weren't a dominating subject, and in the main were mentioned by the way, though it is quite frequent, in connection with those or other questions of economic, Soviet or party constructions. The organized disorder, like Zinovyev's disorder and his supporters at the XIV congress, weren't. However, the criticism was sharp, and several times Sadvakasov was mentioned by in connection with opposition, as, for example, Uraz Isayev in the performance at evening meeting on 16 of November, in 1927 year. It already was enough to create to Sadvakasov the most serious problems.
Meaning of VI-th of party conference consists in that on it was determined the further direction of policy of Kazkraykom by aul Sovietization. Therefore one of the main issues which was discussed in performances, there was just a land question on which some points of view were stated at once. Judging by Goloschekin's remarks and others acting, the land question was discussed in the most active way in a party conference lobby. It was closely connected with other burning questions: the general direction of policy in an aul, and policy concerning Bai. To these questions the considerable attention was devoted by Goloschekin in the report, and other acting repeatedly concerned them.
The reason of sharp debate on the land question consisted in collision of opinions between the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) and Kazkraykom. At the V All Kazakh party conference the decision about sequence investment with the earth was passed, at first Kazakh population, and then all other categories of immigrants. Part of members of Kazkraykom considered this position wrong also demanded revision of the solution of last party conference. This decision was opposed also by representatives of the Central Committee.

230D.N. Verkhoturov -Stalin's economic revolution. M., "Olma-Press", 2006, p. 237
2316th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 22
At evening meeting on 19 of November in 1927 year Andreyev criticized this decision and Goloschekin, who sequence in land management at that moment supported: "… but it seems that it is the wrong approach and the main mistake is that here a class basis bit slid off, and it is the only basis of the solution of the land question for Bolsheviks, and we have raised the issue of the queue, that is, about the benefits of one part of the population in relation to the other ... I recommend - better walk away from this position, and put the question to the class line, without any queue. It is necessary Russians and Cossacks arrange ground at the same time"232.
A certain correctness was on Andreyev's party as it was valid, the sequence in investment with the earth wasn't policy of Bolsheviks, and was policy of Kazakh bourgeois-democratic reforms and in such look it was stated in the program of Alash party233.
Goloschekin underwent by criticism from the Central Committee and in concluding remarks in debate according to Kazkraykom's report at morning meeting on 20 of November in 1927 year, he was compelled to justify. He very frankly declared that political calculation was the main cause of his support of this decision: "But if, companions, I opposed it, I wouldn't collect any Kazakh vote"234.
Judging by that conclusions concerning Goloschekin then wasn't made, and more criticism he wasn't exposed, up to 1932, obviously, this is his justification was accepted representatives of the Central Committee. However, judging by the content of performances on completion of conference, between Goloschekin, Andreyev and Muranov, probably, lobby interviews in which representatives of the Central Committee demanded took place to submit to the party line and to conduct policy in a key of class approach. Results of this conversation were reflected in Goloschekin's concluding remarks: "But now it is necessary to fight against all fists in general on the basis of association in this fight of farm laborers, poor people and middling persons of all nationalities"235.
Certainly, from the point of view of today when results of economic policy are known, it is possible to tell that then it made sense to go on temporary cooperation at least with part of Bais who stated sympathies and support of the Soviet power and we were ready to cooperate with communists. It would be worth refraining temporarily from sharp steps concerning semi-nomadic and nomadic economy of the steppe and semi-desert regions of Kazakhstan as for a reorganization of these areas on a socialist harmony wasn't enough the developed and tested methods, sufficient material resources. It would allow avoiding destruction of cattle breeding economy during collectivization, sharp reduction of a livestock of cattle and hunger.
But results of this party conference, in fact, cut such opportunity. If before it Goloschekin somehow gave in to requirements of the Kazakh workers, after it he pursued policy in the spirit of requirements of The Central Committee which step by step accepted, in fact, the anti-Kazakh orientation. In this regard the results of this party conference predetermined the further direction
2326th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 234-235
233All Kazakhstan. Reference book. 1931. Alma-Ata, 1931, p. 71
234-2356th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 230-232
of policy of Kazkraykom in an aul, and the VI-th party conference became a prologue to economic accident.
Modern Kazakhstan historians often represent Sadvakasov and his position as alternative to Kazkraykom's policy, almost ascounterbalance to Goloschekin who made every effort that to move away him. Considering the party conference shorthand report, with this point of view it is impossible to agree. Sadvakasov such counterbalance wasn't.
Firstly, Sadvakasov didn't recede from the general party line, and considered that it is necessary to infringe upon interests of prosperous layers of an aul: "Ours class policy, both in an aul, and in the village, we have to conduct on all front, that is through infringement of economic interests as Bai, and rural fist"236. Sadvakasov anywhere, in one performance, not pointed to Bai's significant role in the Kazakh aul, on his value in development of semi-nomadic cattle breeding and, respectively, in a gain cattle livestock. This role was very great, as 5% of bai’s farms have 14,4% of horses, 17,6% of sheep, 10% of cattle owned, 20% of camels237. Sadvakassov did not say that, in fact, in the mid-1920s, welfare of the village was based on bai farms, and did not put forward any plans for temporary cooperation with bais nor their gradual economic displacement due to the development of the socialist sector. From radicals, like Comrade Asylbekov who demanded the expropriation of bai Sadvakasov separated just a half-step.
Secondly, Sadvakasov agreed with the thesis about marketability of Kazakh farms: "I consider that it, certainly, generally true. At our place the Kazakh aul generally is commodity, proceeding from this point of view we have to approach to our practical actions in an aul"238. He anywhere didn't point to low general marketability, in essence, to lack of marketability in production of food products in Kazakh farms. At that time marketability of economy was considered as a sign of readiness of agriculture to socialist transformations, during which, according to communists, capitalist farms were liquidated by confiscation, their property was used for transfer to poor and middle farms, for formations of collective farms and state farms, and the products then straight arrived in the state order. Sadvakasov having agreed with the thesis about marketability of the Kazakh economy, he agreed and with such direction of economic policy.
It is necessary to recognize that Sadvakasov couldn't put forward the economic the policy corresponding to a real situation in the Kazakh aul of that time. He didn't use even published at the right time party conferences of materials and statistical data which were to him are available. To the point, his position didn't differ in anything from positions of Goloschekin and his supporters, in particular, same Togzhanov. He in the same way considered the Kazakh aul generally commodity and demanded carrying out policy of infringement of interests of prosperous farms. On this to the reason Sadvakasov wasn't a counterbalance to Goloschekin's policy.

2366th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 180
237All Kazakhstan. Reference book. 1931. Alma-Ata, 1931, p. 41
2386th All Kazakh Conference of the CPSU (b) 15-23 November 1927 (Verbatim Report). Kyzyl-Orda 1927, p. 180
Most likely, Sadvakasov got into the list of oppositionists in many respects against the will, because Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinovyev very much were actively interested in contradictions between communists in the national republics and autonomies, in every possible way them used in the their interests, and Sadvakasov had old communications with some of supporters of opposition. During fight against opposition in party, the party organization in Kazakhstan it was necessary to overcome heroically any "bias", having shown to representatives of the Central Committee the commitment of the party line.
In general, turn in policy of Sovietization of an aul was issued. If earlier the essence of policy of Sovietization consisted in land reform and restriction of the political rights of bais, now it was formulated as policy "the general association in fight against fists of all nationalities". In this question among acting on party conference of special disagreements didn't arise, and such policy supported as it was already told, and Sadvakasov in spite of the fact that him accused of protection of bai interests.
This new Kazkraykom's course corresponded to the general party policy in the village which in 1927 year everywhere also passed from political and economic restriction of prosperous layers of the village to their infringement and class fight against kulaks.
At that time not one only Kazakhstan began the way to economic accident. The party policy in the village which began to undergo large changes in 1927 year, prepared accident in all main agricultural regions of the USSR: in Ukraine, in the Volga region, in the Urals, in Kazakhstan, in Siberia. The main reason of burst at the beginning of 1930th years of accident there was that the economy in the main agricultural regions of the country kept on prosperous kulak or the bai farms, as them called at that time. They made the most part of the products sold in the market and the state, provided the poor with means of livelihood due to hiring of the worker forces. Their defeat and elimination during collectivization undermined productive forces of the village.
Prosperous farms had to replace state farms and collective farms – the large-scale collective farms equipped with a front line for that time the agricultural machinery and housekeeping methods. State farms were copied from large-scale commodity landowner enterprises, which before revolutions made the main volume of commodity agricultural products. It was, in fact, farm pattern slightly adapted for the Soviet power in which as the landowner state-farm trusts, first of all "Zernotrest" acted. Collective farms represented the modernized and ordered country artels which appeared right after completion of Civil war much. Classical Stalin collective farm represented artel to which the state for payment by natural products provided services in machining of the earth and bought up on a root all crop.
This plan was based on positive experience of state farms which have already arisen before collectivization and collective farms, and it could be successful. Theoretically, they could replace kulak and baysky farms. But practically, as it was already noted, was available necessary resources too little to turn so large-scale transformations of agriculture even in the main agricultural regions of the USSR. Sharply there were no tractors, agricultural cars, kerosene, fertilizers, agricultural stock, the worker and productive cattle (more precisely, the state at all had no cattle, and the question of providing with working cattle of collective farms even seriously wasn't raised). There was the sharpest deficiency of experts: agronomists, veterinarians, machine operators. The USSR during a collectivization time simply wasn't able to construct collective farms and state farms over all country as they were conceived.
As a result left, so, that rate of destruction of productive prosperous farms during collectivization sharply advanced rates state-farm and collective-farm construction. Real productive forces of socialist sector in the village didn't manage to fill defeat from dispossession of kulaks. Instead of widely advertized rapid growth agricultural production sharp recession, in particular in animal husbandry turned out, and the village was strongly weakened as a result collectivization. Situation was aggravated by high plans for the grain-collections, carried out in interests of the industrialization which has taken in 1930-1931 years especially high rates which pretty often turned difficulties of collective farms into disasters.
These were prerequisites of catastrophe. Further a severe drought of 1931 year, destruction of considerable part of a crop by diseases and wreckers239, before which collective farms were absolutely powerless, the primitive agro technology, a case and a cattle face because of an extreme lack of forages, cast agricultural areas in the pernicious hunger which has carried away million lives. The state which has created prerequisites of accident, in completion everything, it was helped not in forces. There were no food funds, there were no means for food purchase abroad – everything left on industrialization. Thus industrialization achieved of such rates and scope that it was impossible to suspend it per day as it would end by general economic crash.
Thus, Kazakhstan walked directly to starvation together with all. But Goloschekin and his supporters managed to aggravate even more becoming ripe economic accident and to turn it into general disaster from which Kazakhstan wasn't counted nearly a half of population, and which consequences completely didn't disappear still. It made a number of mistakes which categorically couldn't be done in the conditions of Kazakhstan, in relation to semi-nomadic and nomadic farms.
Plans of socialist construction in Kazakhstan
Usually Kazakhstan historians consider that only Philip Goloschekin and his supporters were the main responsible for the burst economic accident in Kazakhstan. Quite often, under the influence of clear emotional estimates (it is necessary to remember that consequences of hunger struck on all Kazakh families and it well remembers recent generation), this opinion turns into idea of almost deliberate destruction of Kazakhs.
It is impossible to agree with this point of view completely. Firstly, on the first place among the reasons of economic accident there were the wrong and directly pernicious decisions which made and have been carried out to time of collectivization. Secondly, prerequisites of economic accident in Kazakhstan were created not only at the level of Kazkraykom. Big contribution in it was brought also by allied bodies which in the late twenties developed the development plan of agriculture and construction collective farm in Kazakhstan which was directly imposed as the directive and a sample. Without consideration of these plans the analysis of the reasons of hunger will be obviously incomplete.

239In 1931-1932 years were noted in the main grain areas the strongest defeat of cereals of the heads, the brown rust because of which was lost to 30% of a crop, noted a high contamination of fields by weed vegetation, and also there was a flash of distribution of rodents. Kazakhstan treated the areas which are most struck with rodents in which the quantity of holes reached 10 thousand on hectare.

In the USSR by the beginning of the 1930th years quite detailed and worked development plans of agriculture, state-farm and collective-farm of construction were developed. In the State Planning Committee of the USSR were discussed both the general principles of drawing up this plan, and the concrete directions and region section. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture of RSFSR, in particular, prepared the detailed development plan of agriculture on a five-years period 1928/29 – 1932/33, consisting of 11 separate releases in which all parties of agricultural production were considered. Kazakh ASSR in these plans practically wasn't considered by the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, as People's Commissariat for Agriculture KASSR was divided, that is an independent agency of the autonomous republic, and it made the development plan and reconstruction of the rural farms.
In principle, the analysis of the Soviet agrarian policy during collectivization needed to began with consideration of these plans. However that is amazing, in the big bibliography devoted to collectivization, to them not only it isn't devoted the detailed analysis, but also to them at all it isn't paid sufficient attention. Meanwhile, materials of planning allow understanding logic of the economic management of that time, and motives which directly influenced acceptance of those or other decisions. Studying of motives even obviously wrong and directly criminal decisions has great practical value even for today, and we have no right from it to evade.
The main directions of development of agriculture in the USSR were developed under the leadership of M. M. Wolf who was a chairman of agricultural section of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. His development, made in the late twenties, was the basis for the collectivization’s plan.
The main direction of development of agriculture was thought them so. First of all, the State Planning Committee of the USSR intended to achieve destructions of consumer economy in the village when the most part of production, in particular, food, consumed inner in most making economy, in this case the country yard. Marketability of grain agriculture in the whole of the USSR according to the bakery turnover 1926/27 years does not exceed 30%. Gross harvest of 778 million tons of grain, 69.3% was private consumption, while the export of grain was 3.4% fee and supplies to the towns, army and industry - 8% collection240. The Kazakh economy as it was stated above had still the smaller marketability on food production, about 3-5% of production. Therefore the State Planning Committee of the USSR planned actions for development of the rural economy based on the sharp increase in commodity economy and put a at the complete elimination of farm consumption: "With a mass collectivization home processing immediately disappear, and all agricultural products requiring processing are applied to industrial enterprises”241.
Certainly, the village wasn't ready to achievement of the similar purpose on to the reason of distribution of low-power farms. According to the selective agricultural censuses of 1927, across the USSR had no arable land of 3% farms, crops – 5,5%, working cattle – to 31%, arable stock – to 37%, any means of production – 3%242. Poor farms, making 32,2% of the total number of farms, made all 10,1% of production of agriculture and 12,4% of production of animal
240V.S. Nemchinov -Selected Works. T. 4. Distribution of productive forces. "Science", 1967, p.331
241M.M. Wolf -Reconstruction way of agriculture in the five-year period .. M., 1930, p. 16
242V.S. Nemchinov -Selected Works. T. 4. Distribution of productive forces. "Science", 1967, p.326
husbandry243. Others words, about a third of the population of the village in the USSR couldn't be fed from the economy.
The main part of gross output of agriculture it was made in small-scale commodity enterprises which made 64% of total number, and made 71% of production of agriculture, 76,4% of production of animal husbandry. Therefore the main part of products was made by prosperous farms which at that time in official statistics were called small capitalist, and in party decisions and newspapers – kulak. They made 3,8% of total number of farms, but made 18,9% of production of agriculture and 11,2% of production of animal husbandry244. The similar picture was drawn also by M. M. Wolf. According to his data, 10% of farms owned by 35-45% of means of production, 30% of working cattle at cost, also had 32,5% of crops245. These data show, as far as welfare of the village before collectivization depended on an insignificant layer of prosperous farms. Kulaks, owing to the developed economic situation, were main source of means of livelihood of the rural poor, source of seed loans, commodity bread.
This position was well known in the planning bodies and follows from these data the specific task five-year plan for agricultural development in the USSR – replace the kulaks farms by socialist: "The plan sets as an object throughout the fifth anniversary in a counterbalance to a top prosperous individual farms among which the leading role is played by kulak farms to create the productive massif of the socialist agriculture. To create socialist agriculture which by the fifth anniversary end at least would have such specific weight in commodity grain, and which the top has now – here one of the main installations of the plan"246.
M. M. Wolf reflected views of the Politburo of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) in the work, which formed on September 29, 1927 year the commission on drawing up political directives of party on development of the five-year plan. In 1927 year process of prompt reorganization of the grain market began. This year buildings and a preparatory work on several large began new buildings, plants were intensively restored and reconstructed. The urban population started growing, and bread consumption, which began to grow in a year grew by 20%.At the same time, because of an aggravation of a foreign policy situation and possible threat, crisis of grain-collections when prosperous peasants began to hold bread started and reduced its sale to the state. These factors compelled to reduce grain export which at that time was essential article of foreign trade of the USSR and one of sources of funds for industrialization. In 1926/27 years 2,4 million tons of grain for the sum of 695 million rubles were sold, in 1927/28 years only 356 thousand tons for the sum of 119 million rubles were sold247. Crisis of grain-collections managed to the state losses at a rate of 576 one million rubles, or 27,7% of total amount of export for 1927/28 years 248.
The socialist sector in the village was very weak and made in 1927 year only 60 thousand tons of commodity bread. But its further development seemed to the political management and planners the only way out.
243-244V.S. Nemchinov -Selected Works. T. 4. Distribution of productive forces. "Science", 1967, p.369
245-246M.M. Wolf -Reconstruction way of agriculture in the five-year period .. M., 1930, p. 25-26
247Foreign Trade of the USSR for 1918-1940 years. Statistical Review. M., "Vneshtorgizdat" 1960, p. 94-95
248 D.N. Verkhoturov- Stalin against the Great Depression. Anti-crisis policy of the USSR. M "Jauza", 2009, p.138
By the way, at the beginning of 1928 year in the main grain areas the policy of construction of huge grain state farms roughly started, and till 1929/30 year in them 1167,7 million rubles were enclosed. Commodity production of socialist sector grew by 36 times, made in 1929 year of 2160 thousand tons of commodity bread and exceeded commodity production of country sector which made about 2 million tons249.
These purposes supported with the first progress in creation of large grain state farms in 1928-1929 years, led to fixing line on development of a grain farm. After that other directions of development of agriculture, as a whole, and in a regional section, as at that time spoke, weren't considered any more. Against such policy, the relation to the Kazakh nomadic cattle breeding, as to a priori backward, only amplified and fixed. It is necessary to emphasize that so thought not only Goloschekin. It was the general outlook of all Soviet planners on all levels

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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Aliya
The first progress pushed planners and the management to speeding up of construction of state farms and rates of collectivization. Concerning collective farms, which also had to become one of support of socialist sector in agriculture, the plan of high rates of nationalization was put forward country farms in the main grain areas, development in scales of the USSR by forces of collective farms about 20 million hectares of an arable land also was planned, from them 15 million hectares – the mechanized draft, 5 million hectares – horse draft250.
To be fair It should be noted that planners, in particular M. M. Wolf, in 1929 quite understood vulnerability of similar plans, owing to deficiency of tractors. The chairman of agricultural section of the State Planning Committee of the USSR openly recognized: "Due to the huge growth of collective-farm movement which half a year ago at end of the five-year plan251 nobody expected, discrepancy between growths of the socialized areas and rate of supply of the socialized economy the mechanized draft was created"252. On his estimations left that in the current of two-three years, which is till 1932 year, will be deficiency of tractors. Then, M. M. Wolf, of course, didn't know that plans for production of tractors will be are hopelessly failed, and MTS saturation by equipment will begin only in 1934-1935 years, but already stated fears.
In these conditions, in the State Planning Committee of the USSR didn't develop the plan of an insurance of developing collective farms, and didn't try to replace deficiency temporarily tractors by horses. In this case Kazakhstan as the area of the developed horse breeding could play a huge role as the supplier of horses collective farms as working cattle. For this purpose, however, it would be required temporarily, for some years to refuse collectivization and subsidence of nomads in the Central Kazakhstan (to which all steppe and semi desert zone at that time belonged), and to throw all forces on horse breeding. They could make it at all without being beyond the class policy, having simply laid over bai’s farms an agricultural tax in a natural form.

249History of the socialist economy. T. III. Creating a foundation for a socialist economy in the USSR 1926-1932 years. "Science", 1977, p. 347, 371
250M.M. Wolf -Reconstruction way of agriculture in the five-year period .. M., 1930, p. 43
251It is the approval of the first five-year plan in May 1929 of year, so the book was written in November in 1929 year
252M.M. Wolf -Reconstruction way of agriculture in the five-year period .. M., 1930, p. 13
However, there was the reason that this embodiment is not even considered. The reason was already mentioned above, the colonial consensus that Kazakhstan was considered primarily as an array of "free land" under plowing and resettlement. This concept is literally hung over planners and economists, and they kept moving this particular plan.
MM Wolf was also a supporter of plowing Kazakh steppes and resettlement colonization, and pointed out that the five-year plan is supposed to plow 6.5 million hectares of land. These planning assumptions were, of course, half the modest plans already discussed above Union Resettlement Committee. But they were unreal as demanded 29,500 tractors and 195,600 tons of kerosene. So much technology and fuel to Kazakhstan USSR could not.
Also, what the planners simply cannot imagine other ways to the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan was another reason stubborn commitment to the plan and plowing resettlement colonization that MM Wolf presented with rare candor. The fact that 66 % of the territory allotted to farms "Grain Trust" and 12 % under the collective: "In this area as Kazakhstan socialization cover about ¾ of all newly reclaimed area. This is a completely new type of settlement, yet unknown in the history of the world".
The overall plan of the resettlement colonization was closely associated with the construction of large grain farms and settlers now had for the most part become state farm workers. Basting for state planning, the first five-year period planned resettlement of 1.3 million people who had to learn 4.4 million hectares. The number of immigrants accounted for 34% of Far Eastern region (on the left bank of the Amur River valley), 31 % - to Kazakhstan and 27% - on Siberia. In this regard, the first five-year plan for the development of agriculture was the prototype of a "clearing".
According to the calculations of planners, development of new lands had to give a huge grain harvest. Thus, the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR assumed that the total collection of breads in Kazakhstan for the first five years will be 6,169,800 quintals, including collective 3,430,800 quintals.
These data show that the plan plowing Kazakh steppes flowed from political objectives and logic reconstruction of agriculture started in the first five years. Planners believed that plowing takes place, it will give a huge grain harvests and solve food difficulties in the USSR. Unreliability these plans because of the acute shortage of material and technical resources, they apparently did not seriously considered. There was also a detailed analysis of the climatic conditions of the regions, which was designed for the development of land under cultivation vast areas. Generally, for the 1930s is characterized by pronounced consumer attitude towards nature, the resources of which were taken without much thought about the consequences. Thus, already in 1930 proposed a plan parsing the Amudarya and Syrdarya water for irrigation, causing the Aral Sea was dry and disappears. Aral district admitted unpromising, and there was even a suggestion of "predatory fishing" Aral fish until the sea is not dried up. In 1932, exactly the same calculation of the project created the Main Turkmenian Canal (SCC), which was to completely strip Aral Incoming Amu Darya water. Consideration that the Aral Sea will lead to environmental disaster, then completely disregarded.
In the same way the situation was with regard to the plowing of the Kazakh steppes. During the preparation of the first five-year plan for such "trifles" as wet ability steppes, soil moisture , irrigation events and snow retention, just did not think, and if they thought that the plans did not account for. When the question is posed even without drought, loss of cattle and consequences "excesses" agriculture in Kazakhstan is being put in crisis conditions.
Of course, the above planning assumptions gives general outline of the development of agriculture in the five-year period , but the specific details involved KASSR state planning planners and specialists in People’s Commissariat for Agriculture KASSR who had run independently work out the details of state plans. It State planning Committee KASSR agricultural development plan of Kazakhstan gained real threat, and formed the immediate background of economic catastrophe.
Basic principles for the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan were formulated as follows: "leading five-year plan principles are:
1) State farm building,
2) The collectivization of farms,
3) Settling of nomadic and semi-poor and middle peasants Kazakhs population
4) Internal territorial resettlement and mainly resettlement outside,
5) Tractorization and mechanization
6) Amelioration and irrigation
7) Industrialization agriculture "
In other words, in general, State Planning of KASSR guided by the same settings as the USSR State Planning Committee, and the main emphasis is on the farms. During five years in Kazakhstan was, according to the calculations of State Planning of KASSR , receive 360 state farms, occupying an area of farmland 45-50 million hectares. Among them were 70 state farms cereal crops on an area of 2.5 million hectares, which had to give 14 million quintals of commodity grain, 270 livestock farms, which should have contained 11 million head of cattle, 20 state farms and industrial crops crop an area of 500 thousand hectares.
Only in the band of the Turkestan- Siberian railway was supposed to create 40 state farms with crops on an area of 898,000 hectares for grain, cotton and technical culture. The proximity to the railway state farms was considered very beneficial to supply state and export of finished marketable products.
However, the principal amount of marketable grain had to give individual and collective-farm sector. During the five-year planned to complete planning on the area of 190 million hectares, including 14 million hectares of crops. Individual sector was estimated State Planning of KASSR triple production from 25 million quintals of gross harvest in 1928/29 year to 73 million quintals in 1933, including 37 million quintals of grain for the market (50.6 % of the gross collection). Collective farm sector also staged large-scale tasks. Collective farms had to quadruple plowing, from 2.3 million to 10 million hectares in 1933, and triple the yield of grain, from 15 to 48 million quintals.
Thus, the scope of the State Planning Commission KASSR strikes. They planned for the five years to master the 26.5 million hectares (individual, collective and state plowing), and get a huge crop - about 97 million quintals of gross grain harvest. Respectively, were planned and blanks: "Considering the five-year plan for agriculture Kazakhstan, USSR People's Commissariat of outlines to be removed from Kazakhstan in other regions of the USSR by the end of the fifth anniversary of grain products - 24 million quintals , of which only one wheat - 22 million quintals , sheep and wool camel - 23 thousand tons of fine leathers - 8.7 million pieces of hides large - 1.5 million pieces of meat - 290 thousand tons of oil - 27 thousand tons, eggs - 180 million units".
That's it saw a future of Kazakhstan's agriculture planners late 1920s. Kazakhstan was supposed to be, as they said, granary, a bit of Ukraine, and to feed the entire country. This plan was huge, even compared to the all-union plans. So, throughout the Soviet Union for the optimal variant of the first five-year plan had to master collective plowing in the amount of 22.6 million hectares. In Kazakhstan, the scale of development of arable land was planned even more. In 1932, upon the gross grain harvest was made on state and collective farms in the Soviet Union -wide 327.1 million quintals. According to the plans the planners, the gross grain harvest in Kazakhstan would be about 30% of this crop.
These comparisons show that in the years 1927-1928, when the plans were made and these were studied in the planning bodies of different levels , planners firmly believed in what they get out of the arid Kazakhstan to make a "second Ukraine". Believe so that unabashedly planned giant, completely unrealistic pace of development of agriculture, especially grain, and completely rule out the possibility of extreme scarcity of material resources.
Here it should be emphasized that all these plans cited provided the most direct and immediate impact on the actions of the party leadership, both at the level of the CPSU (b), and at the level Kazkraykom. Then it was thought that in State Planning and the People's Commissariat KASSR are specialists who are familiar with local conditions, and if they claim that Kazakhstan could plow in 1933 of 26.5 million hectares , then so be it. These estimates are considered reasonable and Kazkraykom demanded their execution.
Similarly, the case connected with the grain procurements. State Planning of KASSR huge crop estimated at 97 million quintals in 1933, and determined the amount of marketable grain, which can be transported from Kazakhstan - 24 million quintals. For the above reason, these estimates are also considered reasonable and Kazkraykom demanded their execution during the grain procurement campaign, which rolled several times in Kazakhstan before the famine. Commonly believed that overly restrictive grain reserves were called in some special sort of party leadership atrocities against the population or "excesses" of grassroots activists, but rational explanation for it is not given. State Planning KASSR materials allow us to give it a rational response to this question - the party leadership of Kazakhstan was confident in the validity of the plan, which constitutes the basis of the grain procurement plans, and did not allow the thought that this plan may be erroneous. This situation has aggravated by the lack of communication with grassroots bodies and the practical impossibility of establishing the actual folding position.
Plan for the development of large areas of arable land under and calculations to get an enormous crop of planners led on to the creation of the destruction plan of Kazakh nomadic pastoral economy. This is just absolutely a stranger Kazakhstan might seem country with "empty land “while, in reality, all the lands were distributed and used for the needs of pastoral. From the review of the Kazakh livestock farming made above, is clearly seen as pasture conditions influenced the herd and welfare ranchers.
In Soviet literature has been said a lot about pre-revolutionary politics agricultural colonization of Kazakhstan, which was accompanied by the withdrawal of the Kazakhs of the best land, the displacement of pastoralists on marginal pastures and even in sand. For general calculations, in Kazakhstan until 1917 to Russian immigrants were seized 30.7 million acres of land, whereas the reference nomadic pastorals were about 212 million tons of tithes. Consistently emphasized that simple nomad before the revolution there was a very bad, in need, and the Kazakh population from the hardships of his life not only increased, but decreased.
However, after the revolution, the economic policy for the nomads, which was directed by the same colonial consensus quickly has adopted the old methods under new names, and continued further infringement land of nomads. Only now the policy of land infringement nomadic and semi population was called so openly, and gradually carried out during continuous land.
Land management was conducted on solid standards that have been set for the three regions of Kazakhstan: agricultural - 52 acres per farm, semi-nomadic - 150 acres for farming and nomadic - 550 tithes on host. This in itself was planning to shy nomadic as bad combined with the use of pastures located at a distance of 20-30 km or more from each other. However, the greatest constraint Kazakh farms occurred in the agricultural area, which established land use regulations that are typical of Russian emigrant economy. According to a survey in 1928, in northern Kazakhstan on Russian economy had an average of 56.8 hectares (52 acres), while the Kazakh - 244.8 hectares. At continuous land management Kazakh economy of the region lost more than 75% of their land , and be barred from conducting nomadic pastoral economy and oppression forced to settle . The materials of the Union Resettlement Committee , it was stated that after settling the Kazakh economy should take just 1.1 to 7.6 hectares of land , and have 9-12 cattle, in terms of bovine farm . This in 1929 was one of the provisions of the Five Year Development Plan KASSR in which North Kazakhstan turned into a solid settled agricultural area in which the granting of Kazakh land holdings was conducted according to the norms settled farms.
This could be considered a manipulation of the figures , if the content of State Planning of KASSR would not be directly specified goal of settling nomadic and semi-nomadic households : " Subsidence 380,000 semi-nomadic and nomadic households ... will release about 60-70 million hectares , which is mainly intended for the construction of large state farms . " Startling revelations! In a later, post-war Soviet literature has such candor been not, and about the purpose of settling the Kazakh economy did not say anything specific. But in the late 1920s , and materials State Planning of KASSR this show , there was a very clear understanding that under the banner of settling nomads being , in fact, Kazakhs eviction from the land, so that you can build a state and collective farms. Farms are less than 45 million hectares of 'liberated' land.
To leave no ambiguity in this matter, let me and other statements about the settling of nomads. Kaminsky commented in his publication "The five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of agriculture", formulated the basic effects of subsidence:
"Economic same effect subsidence is the following:
1) The release of arable land capable of fund
2) The transition from archaic and extensive forms to cultural and intensive forms of agriculture
3) In the areas of subsidence increases crop area to 2.3 million ha
4) Released many depositing materials, leather, wool, cotton and other raw materials for a large textile and leather industry
5) Released a large number of different kinds of meat for increase the supply of large proletarian centers, and finally
6) It will enable state farms and industries to get to 300 thousands of workers, which in turn means the creation of indigenous agricultural and industrial proletariat".
In fact, this systematic robbery is Kazakh herdsmen, with deprivation of their mostly subsistence and possibly lead pastoral economy. Union emigrant quite frankly Committee proclaimed a policy of economic strangulation of the Kazakh economy and creates advantages Russian farms. Thus, the projected Russian economy must have had an average of 6 consumers (consumers against 5 in Kazakh), have from 7.2 to 12.5 hectares (compared to 1.1 - 7.6 hectares in Kazakh), and have from 6 to 14.5 head of cattle in terms of bovine (vs. 9 - 12 goals in Kazakh).
Subsidence, i.e. households with eviction Kazakh land is closely linked not only with the construction of grain farms, but relocating to Kazakhstan , and during such land resettlement fund allocation supposed "Subsidence nomadic and semi- public land fund releases for state farms and resettlement and will contribute to the intensification of agriculture of the European population . "State Planning of KASSR supposed to move throughout the five-year period 65,000 households that were to occupy 630,000 square hectares. In total, it had to be isolated colonization land fund in the amount of 9 million hectares.
It's a bit later reflected in the official five-year plans for Kazakhs ASSR. Thus, in the first embodiment five-year plan for 1928 /29 - 1932/33 years, the area sown in 1933 had increased to 12, 8-14 million hectares against 4.3 million hectares in 1928. In another embodiment, the first five-year plan, it was stated that the planned five-year plan for the resettlement of 489,500 people or 97,900 households, to which it has been allocated 158 million rubles. Under the resettlement stood a huge area - 8.4 million hectares. As you can see, resettlement plans in Kazakhstan is constantly adjusted upward. If the preliminary designs were 65,000 households within five years, then six months later, in the text of the five-year plan, the number rose to nearly 100,000 households.
Here it is the colonial consensus in action. Agricultural development plan in Kazakhstan during the first five-year plan was, in fact, colonial plan, which included the destruction of the nomadic pastoral economy, eviction from the land of the Kazakhs and the device to the "liberated" territories of large grain farms and resettlement farms. Planners did not care in the least that will be able to whether Kazakhs as pastoralists to adapt to rapid changes in the method of farming , whether they are ready to apply the new methods of management, whether if the necessary conditions and resources . This was not in the plans said a single word.
Such a plan, even if the model formulation of management provided an ideal supply of the population in all goods, was drawn up on the brink of genocide in one of his classic definition - national group deprivation of livelihood. Even in ideal conditions, huge damage would be inflicted culture of Kazakh people, which was based on nomadic pastorals. Suffice it to say that one of the names of the holiday in the Kazakh language – “Meyram” originally meant a celebration of the carting their summer pastures. Almost all of Kazakh culture such a plan is doomed to destruction.
But in economic conditions of the early 1930s , when the state had placed enormous burden on the village food supply of cities, buildings and ensure the export of industrialization , but could not give a sufficient amount of material and technical resources , such a plan led only to disaster and death , and no more what else could cause . Large -scale grain farms and plowing, huge crop looked beautiful on paper, but in practice, this plan could not be implemented. And so it happened. During collectivization in Kazakhstan nomadic livestock destroyed very quickly, deprived the population of the means of production and means of subsistence, but failed in an equally short time to create a new economy.
The question was whether the plan of genocide of the Kazakh people, so you can answer. Plan is a genocide in which it would be delivered the purpose of destroying the people, of course, was not. However, agricultural development plan was drafted in such a way that in cash terms the beginning of the 1930s, led, in essence, to the genocide of the Kazakh people, and other possible results had not. Planners made it up, take full responsibility for a disastrous famine, as well as Goloshchekin and his closest associates. They were professionals who had taken the responsibility to offer a radical reorganization of the economy, to feed millions of people in the shortest possible time. They were obliged to take into account all the circumstances and conditions. Opinions such as: "they did not anticipate", "they could not take into account" - they do not excuse anymore since elementary calculation shows totally unrealistic plans put forward.

Chapter 5 Out of control

In 1928, throughout the Soviet Union it has been launched the reorganization of agriculture on socialist lines. Intensively created new large state farms, rapidly expanding economy in the socialization of the individual sector through contracting harvest, created the first machine and tractor stations, as well as development plans were intensive agricultural development in the first five years. Kazakhstan has not remained aloof from this process. 1928 also marked the first campaign in the village.
While for the Party and economic leadership was no longer much doubt that drastic reorganization of the village is not far off, it would start in the near future, no longer existed. Preparing for the socialization of agriculture was carried out in full swing. Execution of plans for the development of agriculture was required to carry out collectivization, subsidence village, and “release" and plow the land, build grain farms. But first needed to undermine the political and economic positions bai eliminate conventional control system aul, which in a short time twice showed its strength and vitality, despite the pressure and authorized.
This destruction of the traditional nomadic village while called "class struggle", "October in the village", although until 1928 the reality of the class struggle in the village almost was not - it was imposed from outside forces Kazkraykom and its authorized through party cells and newspapers. Philip Goloshchekin actually admitted that "class struggle" in the village more in line with policy of Kazkraykom CPSU (b) than the interests of the people in the village: "All our further development in the Sovietization of the village rests on the need for a radical reconstruction of the agro- economic relations in the village, the need to eliminate remnants of semi-feudal relations and big capital - in the first place".
This, in essence, was about breaking all of life, the whole structure of the economy, the usual Kazakhs who raised cattle mainly for their own use, in accordance with their own capabilities and plans with the natural conditions and the state of pastures, cattle and selling part of the products on the market. The plans of reorganization of agriculture was supposed to impose a completely new system Kazakhs economy: sedentary agriculture and animal husbandry, focused mainly on the delivery of the State of bread, meat and wool subordinate plans and directives, which are usually not taken into account local conditions and opportunities. Of course, such a turn was possible only at the cost of large-scale pogrom in the village.
Now it is difficult to establish what exactly counted heads of Kazkraykom starting this mayhem. We only deal with mean information of the very few official documents and slogans, while the estimates and opinions "for the" apparently gone forever. Based on available information, they seriously expected that aul mass in the shortest possible time and peroxide will vigorously support the farm movement and run the economy in a new way. All will be well, and all plans will be made ahead of time. Such a picture is drawn, although , again, it's likely not reflect the true position and placement in Kazkraykom clash of opinions.
With opinion of themselves "aul masses", the situation is simpler, since the pioneers theme famine in Kazakhstan managed to gather quite a large body of memories and stories about collectivization and famine, from which it is clear that the beginning of "socialist reconstruction " no one in the village did not expect , and in general not prepared . Spontaneous resistance began later, in 1929, all of which subsequently grew and grew until he captured many areas and poured into battle with the forces of the OGPU. Judging from the stories, none of aul residents really did not understand the essence of what is happening, no party policy, and therefore perceived as natural disaster collectivization.
Goloshchekin managed to start the process of collectivization and the destruction of the traditional village, but could not manage it. Promoted them flywheel seizures blanks repression spun up until Kazakhstan has erupted disastrous famine.
Grain reserves in 1928
In the spring of 1928 in the USSR held cataclysm toward the collectivization of agriculture. 2-19 December 1927, Moscow hosted the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) , which adopted the important economic decisions : approved guidelines for the first five-year plan , and also adopted a resolution on "Work in the village", which radically changed the policy of the party in the village . By decision of the previous Congress, the development of cooperation envisaged farmers and increasing their cultural level. XV Congress decided to convert small individual peasant farms into large collective. Later, in his speech at the Institute of Red Professors May 28, 1928, Stalin formulated a new policy in the countryside following:
1) The output is primarily to move from a small, backward and scattered peasant farms to united, large, public equipped with machinery, armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing the maximum amount of marketable grain. Output - in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, to public economy in agriculture...
2) Output is, secondly, to expand and strengthen the old state farms, organizing and developing new large state farms...
3) Output is finally to systematically increasing the productivity of small and medium-sized individual farms. "On the basis of these guidelines were developed and built all subsequent plans for the development of agriculture, which we saw in the previous chapter.
At the same congress, Stalin set the task offensive against the kulaks, and did it in a very harsh manner, delimited by Nikolai Bukharin and his supporters. Immediately after the congress, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) held a decision to increase pressure on the knuckle and on the application of Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, which provided bread for speculation imprisonment and confiscation of property. This decision was carried out with the aim of revitalizing the grain procurements in which January 15 - February 6, 1928, Stalin took a personal interest, having toured in the Urals and Siberia.
Goloshekin for this congress was very successful, as he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Apparently, his efforts were rewarded in the fight with the opposition on the VI Vsekazakskoy Party Conference, as other notable successes at the moment it was not. With Congress, he brought new directives on the policy of the party in the village: increased grain procurement and collectivization. This moment was the beginning of a long series of direct campaigns in the country, celebrated recipe for disaster.
Strengthening grain procurement in Kazakhstan started pretty quickly. Already January 17, 1928 in the "Soviet steppe" appeared editorial "Split speculator» in which it was said: "The kulaks and speculators - the worst and most dangerous enemies. In the fight with them there can be no ceremonies. We cannot allow a handful of inveterate enemies of Soviet power to fill his pockets, playing on disrupting grain procurement. "In other words, war was declared. January 23, 1928 the Presidium of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee created boundary "five" Commissioners grain procurement.
What are the grain procurements? Initially, this campaign of state buying grain that the farmer sells in the market for supplying the needs of urban , industrial , military and export. It started with the new financial year, from 1 October this year, and continued until September 30 of the following year, i.e. during the financial year, set at the end of 1921. This order was due to the fact that the volumes and the prices of state purchases of grain set after crop assessment, and she started buying peasants harvest after harvest. Purchase of grain conducted special state organization "Zagotzerno" which had its granaries across the country, at a fixed price.
Farmer often does not sell the entire crop at once, and sold in parts, when needed, in money or in goods. Because of the bulk of the grain procurement was conducted in the winter or spring, i.e. in the middle of the financial year, before planting a new crop.
Besides grain procurement was also quite common contracting, i.e. a contract with a farmer to sell the crop concluded before the harvest, with the issuance of an advance in the amount of a certain amount of crops per hectare, depending on the culture. In Kazakhstan cellular wheat per hectare gave 12.5 ruble advance per hectare for wheat rows - 8 rubles per hectare. The biggest advance was given for rice - 100 rubles per hectare, which was upgraded to 120 rubles for new rice crops. Advance was given partly in cash, partly in kind: seeds, agricultural machinery, and livestock.
But the grain procurement campaign entered the history of the Soviet economy. In 1927/28 he started the grain procurement crisis associated with the failure of foreign policy and the initial rumors about the beginning of the war with the imperialist powers. Peasants en masse refused to sell bread, deciding to wait lifting prices. War has always been a profitable time to market as an urgent need for bread prices to rise sharply, created a lucrative market for peasant bread direct exchange of goods, and the value of things, as it was during the Civil War. Of course, everybody remembers the brutal wartime measures and requisition, but at the same time, speculators made up for the loss of peasant crackdown by the authorities.
Despite the fact that the party accused of disrupting the grain procurement fists, however, data show that the refusal to sell bread was a mass phenomenon. It is to combat this massive failure and was sent to the measures taken by the Politburo of the CPSU (b). They had to intimidate and force farmers to sell grain. After a trip to Siberia, Stalin directive "to all organizations of the CPSU (b)", added the list of measures to transfer 25% Resolution confiscated grain speculators rural poor on the basis of long-term credit. This measure was supposed to split the village and create in it a layer that is interested in support new measures authorities.
In Kazakhstan, the main pressure on grain reserves fell for the end of spring - summer 1928, after the sowing of the crop. In May, the newspaper "Soviet steppe" appeared regular column "shots pests’ blanks" in which each issue printed reports of arrests and seizures of bread, as well as calls to increase pressure and crush without mercy. Succession went searches, arrests, confiscation of bread. Collection plan has been set 4 - 4.5 million quintals of grain.
The plan was not carried out, and in 1927/28, it was harvested 3.4 million quintals of grain. This is almost twice less than in the previous 1926/27, when it was harvested 6.68 million quintals grains. In this case, the total blank of the USSR did not fall to the same extent (1926/27 Year - 10.84 million quintals, 1927/28 Year - 10.27 million quintals). This could be explained by the fact that in 1927 Kazakhstan was a drought and crop failure, for this reason, the plan was 30 % less than last year, and he failed to perform.
However, data on yield and gross yield of grain do not confirm this. In 1927, the average yield of 9 tons per hectare, and the gross yield of 30.2 million quintals. It was the highest yield and the highest since 1913 goda281 collection. Grain procurement plan was to this collection of 12-15 %. Vintage 1926 was much worse - 18.1 million quintals of grain, with an average yield of 5.9 tons per hectare. However, in the same year was made much more intense plan of grain, amounting to 36.9 % of the gross harvest.
This situation can be explained only by the strongest resistance to the state grain procurement, which was provided as in the village, and in government. The reasons for this resistance can be attributed to several factors: the effective control of the local Soviets by wealthy farmers and pastoralists, rumors of impending war, a sharp change in public policy in agriculture, which, moreover, Kazakhstan hardly explain to the population, mainly absence of media. New policy of the Party and the government explained Uzun kulak, and it was recognized in the party press: "We must admit that the question of collectivization has not sufficiently addressed in our press, our campaign and our political work" - recognized "Soviet steppe" February 15, 1928. In the village and the village was seen as the collectivization campaign forced peasants into communes paddock full socialization of the entire property, modeled on the communes of the Civil War.
Against these sentiments clear fierce resistance grain procurement campaign, this was celebrated in 1928. There were going to move any tricks. "Soviet steppe" in June and July 1928 wrote about the rumors about the Famine. Of course, all this was due to speculators and agitation fists, although it is believed that such rumors spread among the peasants and pastoralists with the speed crown fires unassisted. Rumors especially facilitated by the fact that residents of villages and hamlets Party policy hardly explained , and are examples of searches, arrests and seizure of bread were at every turn. New methods of grain procurement were impossible not to compare the methods supply detachments of the Civil War.
As a result, in the grain procurement campaign Kazkraykom suffered another defeat, as even abbreviated plans were not fulfilled, and the share of grain procurement in Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union fell from 6.4% in 1926/27 to 3.3% in 1927/28 year. Not even helped push hard measures, searches, arrests and seizures. Kazakhstan in this respect seriously differ areas from the European regions of the USSR, in the village where everything in sight at all. In Kazakhstan, with its vast spaces and much more sparse population, opportunities to hide the bread was much more.
Simultaneously with this campaign was a campaign of self-taxation, that is an additional tax levy, as stated on the needs of cultural construction. It was planned to collect on 'self 3.73 million rubles, while the actual was collected 5.2 million rubles. It was a huge sum, which amounted to 51.5% of the sum of single agricultural levied in Kazakhstan. It was a measure of the additional pressure on the peasants, of trying to get the grain procurements due to increased half as much tax as well as forcing farmers to sell grain.
In the same 1928 "kulak Bahia" economy also stripped increased taxes collected from them 14.4 million, representing 35% of total agricultural tax. It was a common practice when the communists sought to unequal tax on household of layout, and tried most of it to impose higher taxes. Poor peasants and all were released from the agricultural tax. In 1928/29 were counted 384,000 exempt farms. Scale tax stripping was much more than the confiscation of farms, held in autumn 1928, and it affected 53,900 households.
However, the assessment by the management failure causes the grain procurement campaign was to ensure that they were not previously established conditions for pumping bread: "The main condition is the same, hinder the development of grain procurement, more significantly increased solvency of the population and ease the tax. In fact ... to promote the sale of peasants’ bread, we would have to promptly attend to the creation of an environment that would encourage him to spending their savings. "In other words, the guide complained that did not invest, did not gamble peasant, and he refused to sell his good harvest. Grain reserves were good only in conditions of poverty and needs of the peasant, when the manufacturer of grain needed throughout, and was forced to sell bread. Subsequently, this "error" has been corrected with a large bust.
Experience in policy Sovietization aul years 1925-1928 showed that the Russian and Kazakh Aul village in fiercely resist any attempt to state and party intervention. Kazkraykom was defeated in two consecutive elections to the Soviets, and then in the grain procurement campaign. Political and economic methods Sovietization village proved ineffective, and in 1928 there has been a significant bias towards power and repressive methods Sovietization.
Was there an opportunity to move away from repressive methods Sovietization? Theoretically, it was possible to make a final bid for the construction of the socialist sector in agriculture due to the large state farms, machine and tractor stations , due to contracting and deepening cooperation crop farms , that is, according to that agricultural policy, which was scheduled XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). The private sector, especially in the Kazakh village, some time would be left to him, and would be controlled by the agricultural tax collection and economic rather than repressive bakery and meat procurement.
In principle, the first five-year plan came precisely from such a line: contracting, cooperatives, state farms. By 1932, it would create something like the following situation in agriculture. Powerful and equipped with new appliances socialist economy would provide 45-50 % of total production , while they would have occupied the major part of vacant land (only for farms in Kazakhstan planned to allocate 41.4 million hectares), would have absorbed a bulk of the labor force low-power farms , nothing would be left prosperous farms prospects for development. They could not rent the land, could not attract hired labor, have no access to modern technology, and would carry higher taxes. By the end of five-year bulk of farmers and herdsmen would be clear that it is cheaper to join the socialist sector, and the development of collective farms would have gone much smoother way than it actually took place , preserving the vast majority of the productive forces and assets.
But this theoretical path was crossed at the end of 1927 by a congress on the forced development of the socialist sector in agriculture, mass collectivization of that in later years turned out economic plan in policy directive. Certain reasons such policies were- the beginning of industrialization demanded bread and agricultural raw materials, both for domestic consumption and for export. However, in general, as we have seen from a consideration of plans, this policy is based on strong revaluation possibilities of the state in economic transformation of the countryside.
Descend from the union level to the level of the Autonomous Republic. The above theoretical path was impossible for several reasons. First, it removed by a straight party directive. Second, attempts to compromise with the demands of wealthy ranchers and farmers, mainly Kazakhs have been branded as "national deviationism" and Goloshchekin just could not proclaim a policy without the complete loss of its influence and fasting. Third, Goloshekin and his associates clearly lacked any knowledge about the real state of agriculture in Kazakhstan or abilities planners’ developers to push and defend at the level of the CPSU (b) a "special way" of Kazakhstan in the reconstruction of agriculture. Fourth, as we have seen, attempts Sovietization village in Kazakhstan broke the wall of resistance. Finally played a role and personal ambitions Goloshekin as revolutionary, and he did everything for the aggravation of the situation
If we ignore the state farm way of transforming agriculture and manufacture the bulk grain in state farms, then the status quo prevailing in the mid -1920s, there were big problems. Grain procurement crisis 1927/28 years demonstrated that with increasing yields and farmer welfare makes increasing demands on state trade, in particular, requires the provision of their income products. At the same time, Soviet industry could not produce enough goods for the masses of peasants, and with the beginning of industrialization, trade opportunities through the "city - village" only reduced.
If we consider the situation in the real world, since the end of 1927 in Kazakhstan there was no other possible solution implemented agrarian transformation of socio- economic relations , and rebuilding of the village, except for an open clash and small civil war. Kazakhstan is firmly on the path of disaster.
Confiscation of bays
Failure of grain procurement and another defeat of Kazkraykom in the village and the village became apparent in the summer of 1928, and an aggressive campaign in the press there is little that could change. At this time Goloshchekin already firmly decided to change the methods of work in the village, and go to the repressive actions. For autumn 1928 was planned several campaigns, which together should create strong pressure on the aul masses, especially in a prosperous part of the village.
First, it is zoning. At the end of 1928 there was an administrative reform , in which abandoned cumbersome five unit ( Council parish executive committee , the county executive committee , the provincial executive committee , central executive committee ) , and introduced a four- system (council , district executive committee , the district executive committee , central executive committee ) . Kazakhstan has been divided into 15 districts, from which the entire reform called zoning "transform districts and provinces to districts, subdivided into areas" 289. 9 provinces and 33 counties were changed to 15 counties and 420 townships replaced by the 222 area. Capital on the orders of the Central Executive Committee and SNK RSFSR translated from Kyzyl- Orda to Alma -Ata. Zoning was scheduled for October 1, 1928.
One is the reduction of the administrative apparatus has enabled to reduce 56% of its staff, that opens up tremendous opportunities for cleansing from "nationalist elements". Although the administrative reform was carried out under the flag of the economy and to reduce management costs, it nevertheless gave Goloshchekin opportunity to swipe at resistance to his policies in the ranks of the Soviet apparatus.
This is the aim pursued and the transfer of the capital, which has no apparent reason, but before preparing confiscation bai. Moving took place in autumn 1928, and in the summer of the same year in Almaty was built government buildings and homes for senior officials. The essence of the transfer was to tear the central administrative apparatus of the Kazakh nomadic masses.
Kyzyl -Orda was almost in the center of a vast nomadic areas covered steppes Turgay and Sary-Arka. Darya and Aral Sea region were favorite wintering places, and here on the wintering nomads converge with almost half of the territory of the Autonomous Republic. South was Qoraqalpoghiston while which was part of the Autonomous Republic. On the 2nd session of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee in October 1925 the chairman of Kazakh Central Executive Munbaev told a brief history of the decision to postpone of capital. According to him, this idea first appeared in 1922, when the Ak Mechet’ was still in the.

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

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Aliya
In July 1928 in the SNK( The Council of People's Commissars) RSFSR SNK KASSR made a report on which in 2 August, 1928 was adopted a decision on the development of economy, including the decision to move the capital to Alma-Ata to the end of January, 1929. The decision was justified because of necessity of staffing the Soviet bodies of Kazakhstan with qualified personnel, which at that time was formed only with European nationalities.
Alma- Ata at the time was populated largely with Russian, and was in an agricultural area, away from the main areas of nomadism in both summer and winter. Moving the capital allowed to create a separation of responsible workers, primarily Kazakhs from the Kazakh mass that workers could pursue a policy of Sovietization and collectivization in villages more tightly. In Alma-Ata was formed cozy oasis from which was very convenient to send orders and not to see their results. During the famine most of responsible workers, besides those who went on missions, did not see a horrors of famine , mass death and corpses littered the roads.
However, during the shift the capital, Alma-Ata had a significant disadvantage compared to Kyzyl-Orda - there was no railroad. However, at that time already built Turksib and railway track was laid to Alma-Ata in July 18, 1929.
Secondly, in autumn of 1928 party elections were held, which main aim was to eliminate the leadership of Party organizations henchmen and supporters of bais.
Thirdly, since October 1, 1928 the new company of grain-collections of 1928/29 began. It was carried out with big cruelty and plentiful application of repressive measures, searches, arrests and confiscations. Production was big: 23,9 million rubles, 53,4 thousand beasts, about 100 thousand centners of bread, 258 constructions, apart from blanks. In process of approach of the end of business year, the rhetorician all became tougher, newspapers constantly urged to fight against "kulaks -oncealers". In September, 1929 the Council of People's Commissars Kazakh ASSR adopted the decree about bread delivery to November 1, under the threat of a penalty in a fivefold size of bread subject to delivery.
As a result, this grain procurement campaign were collected grain in three times more than in the previous year - 9 million quintals, though the harvest was average for condition Kazakhstan, much worse harvest in 1927. Average yield of 6.7 tons per hectare and gross yield - 23.1 million quintals. Harvest in the USSR was lower this year than last, but the share of Kazakhstan in the blanks of bread jumped to 9.7%. Grain reserves amounted to 38.9% of gross harvest.
Obviously, these grain-collections became the basis for development of optimistical development plans of agriculture, counting on a plowing of the Kazakh steppes and mass export of grain. Materials of the first five-year plan even contain the concept about, that (present Kuban and Stavropol Territory) to make Ukraine and the North Caucasus areas of production of grain for export, and to make Siberia and Kazakhstan areas of production of grain for internal consumption. According to data on grain-collections of 1928/29 whereas plans were finally imposed in the middle of 1929, the origin of these ideas is clear.
At last, fourthly, Bai's confiscation. If all previous campaigns were created conditions, here confiscation had to impose to an aul new living conditions.
The plan of confiscation was developed in advance and was coordinated with the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) and VTsIK of RSFSR. By Goloschekin's own recognition, in Kazkraykom originally were going to make broad confiscation, covering 1500 farms, thus, on economy 100-150 beasts, depending on the area were left. The Central Committees and VTsIK did not approve this program and put forward considerably more reduced plan – confiscation of 700 farms, with the increased norms of left cattle: 400 heads for nomadic areas, 300 heads for semi-nomadic areas and 150 heads for settled regions. However, P. A. Kuchkin provides absolutely other data relating to norms of left cattle and norms of distribution which he provides in terms of cattle. These data can be tabulated.
Thus, confiscation of cattle and its distribution between cattleless farms, all equalized approximately on level of the middling person who still could conduct nomadic and semi-nomadic economy, but who had to engage to cooperation with other cattle-farmers for achievement of the optimum size of herd.
Laws were beforehand developed and adopted. On July 23, 1928 KAZTsIK addressed with an explanation of policy of confiscation, and the decree of KAZTsIK "About confiscation the bai’s of farms" was accepted and published already on August 27, 1928. Campaign had to capture 119 areas, including 9 nomadic, 85 semi-nomadic and 25 settled areas. For confiscation was formed an army consisting of 1000 Kazakhs sent from the center and 5 thousand members of committees assistance of confiscation in auls was created. In total 29 thousand people took part in confiscations. A weapons were given to parts of representatives.
Confiscation prepared as the real attack on prosperous cattle-farmers. In advance plans were prepared, laws are made and adopted. According to some data, to areas were beforehand sent representatives on investigation. So, in the Merkensk region of modern Zhambyl area, before confiscation commissioner K. Serikbayev wandered with farm laborers on summer pasture where collected data on quantity of cattle in the bai’s farms, and then sent it to Provincial committee. Representatives were in advance prepared and dispatched that confiscation could begin more or less at the same time on all planned areas. Generally, it was real military operation.
Confiscation was carried out very quickly, and to December, 1928 already was generally completed, and at the disposal of KDC's III Plenum by All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) which took place in December 2-7, 1928, already there were data on results of this campaign. However, in various sources of data on confiscation results quite strongly differ.
According to Goloschekin at the VII Kazakh party conference in June, 1930, 608 farms from which 125,7 thousand heads in terms of cattle, 632 units of agricultural tools, 1257 structures, 783 vehicles, 1253 units of other property (carpets, кошм and other were withdrawn were confiscated. With this assessment of quantity of confiscated cattle S. A. Neyshtadt agrees also. According to other data 696 farms from which 144,4 thousand heads in terms of cattle were withdrawn were confiscated. Data with evidence go back to two sources. One – Goloschekin's report on KDC's III Plenum, and another – it is obvious, the specified reference made at the beginning of 1929. In the last data about the campaigns of the confiscation which have arrived within December, 1928 were probably considered.
S. A. Neyshtadt provides data on use of the confiscated herd. From 125704 heads in terms of cattle, 4614 heads were left in the bai’s farms, 841 heads fell before distribution, 4899 heads were paid as an agricultural tax, 1431 heads are transferred to state farms, and 113919 heads were distributed among the poor and the middle of farms.
Despite its scope, however, the confiscation of cattle farms in bai’s farms had virtually no economic impact, nor for individual farms or for the socialist sector. First, it was confiscated about 500,000 head of cattle, that in relation to the total herd in Kazakhstan - 38.9 million head, was only 1.2%. Second, it was created out of 20,626 households and the number of poor laborers cattleless, representing 2.7% of the total Kazakh herders.
G. F. Dakhshleyger noted: "The main result of transformations of 1926-1928 in an aul is a transformation of thousands and thousands poor Kazakh farms, a floor - or completely depending from Bayev, in farms of small producers". Certainly, thousands small-scale making enterprises were really created, but it is impossible to agree with a conclusion that it had considerable impact on aul economy as a whole. Thirdly, about 7 thousand beasts that made 7,6% to available state-farm herd were told to state farms. The only thing in what noticeable success was achieved,it is in creation of collective farms which was formed 293, and creation of 5 new state farms.
As for confiscation of agricultural tools, here in general difficult to find any influence on productive forces in an aul. According to materials of the selective agricultural censuses, only the Kazakh farms had in 1928, about 288 thousand units various agricultural tools. Redistribution during confiscation made only 0,2% of this quantity.
In general, cattle confiscation had no impact on productive forces of an aul, bais did not grow poor (the farms having over 25 beasts in terms of cattle, contained 33,8% of all herd in Kazakhstan, that is about 13,1 million heads in natural calculation), poor people did not grow rich, and the socialist sector did not get an essential reinforcement.
This campaign of confiscation had only a political value, which Kazakh District Committee wanted to achieve and which had impact on a further course of events. Communists needed to show the force in an aul, visually to show that they can make something in an aul, even if and through violence and repressions. Kazakh District Committee did not confuse the low economic result of confiscation as it achieved the political objective. The problem of ruin was promoted much more by already checked methods: bread -and the meat purveyances, the raised agricultural tax, self-taxation.
In effect, confiscation in the bai’s of farms was a first attempt at writing before decisive fight during which the traditional Kazakh aul and traditional cattle breeding were overturned and destroyed. Confiscation of bai’s farms, despite the extremely insignificant economic effect, nevertheless achieved big political result. From this point the initiative in an aul passed from hands Bais to communists. Kazakh District Committee now looked at the further to the politician in optimistic tone, and on Kazakh District Committee’s III Plenum in December, 1928 it was spoken: "Here it is necessary to tell that confiscation is yesterday's day. Now we have a new tasks in the field of social movement". Goloschekin later called this confiscation "October in an aul".
Formation of collective farms
The first collective farms appeared in Kazakhstan in the first years of revolution, during Civil war. Mainly it was the organizations of the poor which thus tried to ensure means of livelihood and the help from the authorities. However, scope of creation of collective farms at that time was very insignificant. In 1921 across republic were 132 communes, 779 labor artels, 28 communities and 47 state farms. In them 63,2 thousand people, including 27,2 thousand of employable . Collective farms were very low-power, on the average were 12 horses, 8 bulls, 2 camels, 15 cows, 24 sheep or goats.
Famine of 1921 struck also to socialist sector the hard blow which has led to sharp reduction of collective farms. There were 96 communes and 456 artles in Kazakhstan in 1924/25. Considering the recovery period when new communes and artels were created, it is clear that in 1921 broke up about a half of collective farms. In the next years the quantity of collective farms grew. In 1925/26 were 105 communes, 854 artels and 99 associations on processing of the earth (TOZ). In 1926/27 – 97 communes, 773 artels and 177 communes. According to KASSR People's Commissariat for Agriculture, in 1925 were 1118 collective farms, including 165 communes, 834 artels and 99 associations.
Apparently to these data, the gain of socialist sector took place, but was unstable. It was explained as weakness of the arising collective farms often incapable of maintaining the steady farms in which low-power farms, and almost total absence of help to socialist sector from outside united generally states. Materials to the VI Kazakh party conference quite frankly admitted that work with collective farms, in effect, was not conducted: "Data on extent of supply of collectives agricultural stock, about existence of working or productive cattle, about number of crops, about national structure, development prospects, etc. – are absent". It was the extremely essential omission, considering a condition of collective farms. So, in the Atbasar district in collective farms there were 95% of horseless and one-horse farms, against 51,2% on the average on the district. Collective farms desperately needed the help.
That is, up to the end of 1927 of Kazakh District Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) at all was not engaged in in socialist sector in agriculture, and almost did not know anything about it, except total of such farms. Communes, artels and associations arose and developed in itself, without any control and the help from the party and Soviet management. Their number gradually fell: in 1925 were 1118 collective farms, in 1926 – 1007, in 1927 – 1072 collective farms.
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that in the mid-1920s, the collective farms were not yet in the center of Agrarian Policy in the USSR, and they are not paid as much attention as later. Kazakhstan had not remained aloof from this influence, and too little attention paid to the collective farms. Even in politics Sovietization village is absolutely no mention of the collective farms, as an instrument of policy. Decisive turn to the collective and state farms took place only in 1928.
On the other hand , as mentioned above, until 1928 the party leadership was occupied land issue , and was clearly not up to the collective farms . As a consequence, the level of collectivization in 1928 in Kazakhstan was extremely low and was as of October 1928 1.65% . By mid- 1928 had been collectivized 21.4 thousand households, which formed to farm in 1881. Collective farm sector has been very weak. On one farm on average accounted for 11 yards, 42 hectares of crops. In Northern Kazakhstan farms were somewhat larger and average farm had 19 yards. However in 1928 the collective crops occupied 2.4% and 0.8% had livestock.
Start to policy of collectivization in Kazakhstan was given in the spring of 1929, during the VII Congress of Councils which took place on April 8-15, 1929.There program of resolute alteration of agriculture of Kazakhstan towards a grain farm that provided mass collectivization in grain areas and subsidence of nomadic farms was proclaimed. Congress adopted such resolution:
"The Congress of the Council state that over the past years, the Government of Kazakhstan did not pay enough attention to grain farming. Underestimation of agriculture was due to the influence of the bourgeois-nationalistic bias. Characteristic features of this deviation are:
1) Assessment of Kazakhstan as a country exclusively cattle,
2) The desire to preserve the existing forms of nomadic and semi-nomadic economy and related conditions of life,
3) Counteraction of any dopriseleniya new farms from outside of Kazakhstan"
At this point have been mostly up plans mass plowing of Kazakh steppe under the creation of large grain farms, driving nomads land and forcing them to settle, mass collectivization in the agricultural regions of Kazakhstan. All three of these areas were an economic nature of the process of collectivization. Congress of Council legitimized this program and put it in action.
From this point there are no ways to the retreat. Alternative ways, such as livestock development programs based on the methods semi-nomadic economy, were finally rejected. Moreover, they were branded as bourgeois-nationalist bias, and saying such ideas have been likened to a political crime.
Mass creation of collective farms in Kazakhstan began in an atmosphere of nervousness and repression that accompanied the grain procurements of 1928/29 , as well as sowing campaign in 1929 . Kazakh District Committee(KDC) finally set the task to break the influence of the Bais in the village , and demanded pressure on the with all the forces . The main method of pressure was forcing grain procurements combined with terror against the "kulaks " and " bai ". These concepts while were rapidly eroded , and often these category fell completely random people , including active supporters of Soviet power , something that did not like the local poor and authorized . On the one hand, KDC, of course , wanted to completely destroy any political influence bai in the village , and therefore strongly stimulated the pressure on them. On the other hand, especially control and communication systems made the process unmanageable. KDC could start a campaign of repression, could send strong directives and print newspapers struggle with loud slogans " kulaks -oncealers" but almost could not affect its progress and results . At the beginning of 1929 universal practice in Kazakhstan there was an impudent and unlimited arbitrariness of representatives and local activists.
In the spring of 1929 to the auls and the village were sent 4812 commissioners who launched a real terror against all who are authorized and activists considered bais and kulaks . They were arrested and put on trial 34 121 people who had been seized grain and cattle. Grain reserves caused a huge blow to pastoralists, who were forced to sell their cattle for a pittance in exchange for bread, and immediately give it to the grain procurements. By 1930, the price of bread rose to dizzying heights: for sheep gave 15 pounds (6 kg ) per cow - 1.5 pounds (24 kg) , the bull - 3 pounds ( 48 kg), for a horse - 4 pounds (64 kg).
In spring of 1929 , the grain procurements stunned people forced to sow grain , began sowing campaign. It was thrown 10045 Commissioners , almost all territorial, district and regional asset. According to others, the number of authorized exceeded 18 thousand people. If include the asset grain procurement campaign (although it is possible that the grain procurements and sowing campaign could engage the same people ), in the auls and the village in the spring - summer of 1929 year had an army - authorized up to about 15-16 thousand people. Accounts for approximately 2-3 authorized local council, whose average population in 1928 was 1,620 people. In the villages also had extensive business alliance " Koshchi " in which consisted of 243 thousand people. Also at the beginning of 1930, there were 20,506 Communists in the villages . In other words, only the most active in the grain procurement and collectivization at the moment there were about 35,000 people, not counting the poor of the " Koshchi" union.
These figures reveal the cause of the transition an initiative in the hands of the Communists. First, by confiscation of bais’ farms many influential bais deprived of their main advantages - horses and cattle with which they conducted their political activities : driving on auls and apportioned the cattle in order to bribe the poor and decline it on its side. After confiscating most bais " settled ", that is equaled in position with the rest mass of nomads , and could no longer be driven directly auls many scattered across the steppe . Second, the terrorist methods of grain procurement Communists intimidated aul basic weight and made her even demonstratively and verbally to join the Soviet regime and its authorized and activists. Thirdly , the number of delegates and activists sharply exceeded number of bais and their assistants . The idea of " Soviet atkamnerov " to some extent realized in practice , and in 1929 commissioners were everywhere.
Few people pay attention to the fact that in the spring of 1929 began mass assembly on one or another political or economic campaigns . Thus, only during the planting season in 1929 was held 11,297 meetings, which were attended by about 500 thousand people. Well, it was a step in the development of media work, which explains the shift away from the idea of " Soviet atkamnerov " expressed by Golschekin in 1926. Apparently, KDC decided that the ride from the village to the aul , better banish people in one place and announce its policy of the Party and the state. Such precise data show that KDC paid great attention to the organization of these public meeting, required to carry them out , and demanded strict accountability. Obviously, holding mass Assembly was the main method of monitoring the effectiveness of grassroots delegates and asset by the central party leadership of the republic. To the rest paid almost no attention.
Local "excesses", or, in other words, absolutely uncontrolled arbitrariness of representatives and activists on places at the beginning only promoted policy of collectivization. By illegible terror and repressions they step by step turned the vast majority inhabitants of an aul in the intimidated, hammered and obedient mass which was ready to fulfill any, even the most absurd requirements of representatives and activists. Certainly, there was also resistance, which in 1929 reached the armed performances. However, it was separate, did not merge in counteracting movement, and had no resources whereas repressions relied on state forces, in particular, on JSPD (Joint State Political Directorate)
In such conditions in Kazakhstan mass collective-farm construction began. That it was conducted at once, together with grain procurement campaign, says that fact that by October 1, 1929 4348 collective farms were created, in which consisted 66 thousand farms. It is slightly less, than in a year the percent of collectivization jumped up three times, from 1,6% to 6%.
Change in the policy of collectivization in Kazakhstan took place in October 1929, and was marked by the appearance in the newspaper "Soviet steppe" constant column "On the front of collective farms," which printed notes on the progress of collectivization .On October 14, 1929 the newspaper said: "Now, every year the working masses will be celebrated on October 14 "The day of harvest and collectivization".
On October 24, 1929 KDC's bureau of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) adopted the resolution "On results and immediate tasks of collective-farm construction" in which were set new problems of collective-farm construction – to provide in 1929-1930 coverage by collective farms of 140 thousand farms and to increase a cultivated area in almost three times. It is significant date. On this day an uncontrollable movement of Kazakhstan to catastrophe is began. Collectivization went without brakes. At this time, at the end of 1929, better known in the history of industrialization as "special quarter" (in 1929 was adopted a decision to ban to celebrate a farming year and to pass to calendar calculation of years, a difference between economic 1928/29 and calendar of 1930 considered as "special quarter"), in auls mass campaign for collectivization preparation began. On December, 1929 – February, 1930 were 19476 meetings of the rural and aul’s poor across all Kazakhstan in which were 1, 46 million people.
The outcome of this massive campaign exceeded even higher KDC’s plans. If at the end of October 1929 it was planned to reach 140,000 households already on 1 January of 1930 covered 278,000 households, which formed 6457 farms. Percentage of collectivization rose to 22.5%.
Such collective-farm sector was required to be organized. For this purpose during of 1929 a number of charters of various collective were developed, which were approved by KASSR People's Commissariat for Agriculture on January 9, 1930. There are some of them:
- The association charter on joint mowing,
- The association charter on horse breeding,
- The association charter on improvement of breed of sheep breeding,
- The association charter on cultivation of fodder herbs,
- Charter of meliorative association,
- Charter of well association
Collectivization of cattle breeding farms was supposed to carry out to that moment not on the basis of agricultural artels or collective farms, but on basis of associations. The main difference of association from collective farm that the property and means of production were not socialized, but copartners conducted the joint, socialized economy, especially in agricultural, that was basic calculation. The Soviet historians of economy recognized that the Kazakh aul was not ready to collectivization under the charter of agricultural artel: "In particular, in the Kazakh auls were required more simple forms and other rates, than in grain areas of the republic and in other areas of the USSR, big preliminary preparation" , - authors of the work "Sketches of History of a National Economy of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic" wrote.
This policy held on not for long. The party leadership of Kazakhstan very quickly rejected careful approach to collectivization of Kazakh aul. The organization of associations of various type was initially considered as a temporary measure, as a concession to cattle-farmers who were not ready to formation of settled agricultural artels. It was supposed that soon associations will be transformed to collective farms that in terminology of that time was called as transfer of associations on charters of agricultural artels. The farther, the more care was rejected and branded as "bourgeois – nationalistic bias". In December, 1929 KDC's plenum made the decision to carry out collectivization to the cattle breeding areas the same rates, as well as in grain areas and also to use more difficult forms of collective-farm association. Decisions of People's Commissariat for Agriculture of KACCP reflected the previous stage of collectivization policy of the Kazakh aul whereas KDC was already torn to continuous collective-farm collectivization of the Kazakh farms.
The party management was so inspired with results of campaign for collectivization in 1929 that seriously counted on further rapid growth of number of collective farms, involvement all new and new farms in collective farms, also intended until the end of the first five-years period in a number of the regions of Kazakhstan to carry out continuous collectivization. At the beginning of 1930 a large-scale development plans of collectivization in Kazakhstan were already developed. It was supposed that within the five-year development plan of agriculture the percent of collectivization on Northern Kazakhstan (the main grain areas) will be brought to 95% in 1933, across the Southern Kazakhstan (cotton, melon and gardening areas) to 70%, across the Central Kazakhstan (the main cattle breeding areas) – to 33%.
However, such rates also were in every possible way urged on. On February 13, 1930 KDC adopted the resolution "About Statement of Party and Mass Work in Areas of Continuous Collectivization and about Immediate Tasks of Collective-farm Cells" which already contained directives of continuous collectivization in a number of the grain regions of Kazakhstan, and also installation on transition to fuller nationalization of property of collective farmers, that is movements to communes. In one and a half years, in December, 1931, the average percent of collectivization in agricultural areas made 80,4%, and in the stock-raising – 68,9%, including in nomadic regions of 38,1%.
Thus, at the end of 1929 creation of collective farms already came off real opportunities of the organization in them that type of economy which were going to create in agriculture – large socialized commodity economy. The similar economy could be created only on the basis of tractor draft and use of agricultural cars, and both grain, and cattle breeding sectors. In grain farms from tractors timely processing of the land, crops that created conditions for a good harvest depended. In cattle breeding farms which were transferred to settled life, preparation depended on tractors and mowers forages and gain of a livestock of cattle. Without good harvest and a gain of a livestock of cattle there was nothing to hope for high marketability of farms.
For so large-scale plans of collectivization sharply there was no machine draft. In 1929 in Kazakhstan worked only 778 tractors. In 1930 in 5 created MTS there were 1700 tractors of the general 3,5 thousand h.p. In 1930 Kazakhstan expected to receive only 3 thousand tractors, but these plans did not come true completely. From calculation of the average square at a tractor – 108 hectares, available tractors it was possible to process about 270 thousand hectares. Possibilities of use of tractors in agriculture of Kazakhstan were extremely limited at this time. In 1931 the mechanized draft plowed 340 thousand hectares. Processing of all other area laid down for traditional ways, in particular, on horse draft.
Thus, delivered to Kazakhstan tractors were necessary to distribute between state farms, machine-tractor and machine- haying stations. At any calculation left that machine draft was too little to provide all requirements of the created socialist sector in agriculture. At the same time, without tractors, the collective farm could exist only in the form of association on land processing when each his member has the farm, but the association performs field works in common. To the real commodity collective farm to it was very far.
In such conditions was necessary to force not as much as possible, and on the contrary, to keep rates of collectivization in order to created collective farms received machine draft in enough also could pass on the basis of machining of the land to more difficult forms of nationalization. Realistic cost accounting demanded to choose smaller number of strong collective farms, than a large number of the collective farms created by administrative methods and existing more on paper, than in practice. However, as we see, Goloschekin rejected cost accounting in to pursuit of high percent of collectivization.
Settling of nomadic farms.
In the same time the policy of settling of the Kazakh nomadic farms roughly started. As we saw, in agriculture development plans in Kazakhstan, subsidence set before itself the accurate purpose – to drive Kazakhs from lands and to use the "freed" land under construction of large grain state farms and under resettlement of country farms from the European parts of the USSR.
Between nomadic , semi-nomadic and sedentary farming was not an insurmountable edge. Nomads could reduce nomadic routes and become a semi-nomads, who leaves only summer quarters nearby wintering . Seminomads could go to agriculture and settle in one place. Kazakh mass movement in this direction, from nomadic to settled farming was between two processes: land and oppressionreduction in livestock farming. However, land tightness and loss of the pasture had crucial importance, making normal nomadic cattle impossible.
After the revolution, the process of settling nomads was in all possible ways, among which a land management was the main. It had such rules allotment of land that nomadic farmers had no opportunity even to lead a semi-nomadic economy and they were forced to settle. Until 1927 Kazakhstan has settled about 140 thousand households.
On the eve of collectivization, nomadic farming in Kazakhstan remained only in those areas where conditions did not have to settle, such as deserts and semi-deserts. Such areas are generally excluded from active politics to transform agriculture. Nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism also continued to persist where there had been no continuous land management, and where traditional system of land preserved.
Modern historians point out that the preparation to settle nomadic households, in fact, was not carried out: «... the detailed design of the system measures for the implementation of such nature revolutionary activities as a transition from a nomadic to a settled lifestyle, decisions of KDC, District Committee party was not conducted. For almost 50 years a Republican Party history books concealed this information. «Meanwhile, in 1927-1928 in publications traced attempts to create something like a business plan performing settling of Kazakh population, especially living in the arid steppe, semi-desert and desert areas of Kazakhstan.
Initially it was thought that to master these areas by an intensive farming is not possible, and should seek to expand the food base livestock and grain development of the consumer economy. This view was expressed in 1927 by A.P. Potocki - one of the ardent supporters of the development of grain farming in Kazakhstan. He pointed out that development semidesert of Central Kazakhstan under the agricultural economy requires huge expenses to increase productivity of these lands.
This view was expressed even when among economists in Kazakhstan dominated the idea of priority development of animal husbandry. But in early 1928, when the advantage was to lean toward supporters of grain farming, there were other ideas. Thus, in May 1928 A.N. Donych already put the question this way: "But we must also prove whether at this stage of development to use these spaces (meaning desert and semi-desert areas - author). "
The problem of the nomadic economy disintegrated while two sections. Firstly, it was believed that in northern Kazakhstan nomadic pastoralism not should be general, and there shall be held fullest settling. Secondly, if the nomadic economy is unstable because of massive loss of livestock, the pastoralists need to rid by "cultivation": "If the massive loss of livestock not beyond of our influence, it is necessary to “cultivate" economy and so save of massive loss of livestock”
Jute became the pretext by which some economists have called for intervention in the structure and evolution of nomadic and semi- pastoral economy. But A.N. Donych went further and developed an entire program of perestroika Kazakh village , including a reorganization of the economy (the introduction of hay farming and consumer ) , the development of fisheries, cooperatives farms , the introduction of new types of houses , foundations and changes in household habits ( clothes, hearth, furniture , food and hygiene ) . Strikingly, how unceremoniously, without knowledge of the Kazakh customs and traditions, without assess their feasibility; this economist put forward plan alterations of whole nation.
From his entire program only three moments were really used: mowing development, development of consumer agriculture, and new housing construction and organization of settlements. In 1929 a book "The new settlements of Kazakhstan", with standard plans of settlements, was published.
However, economists generally understand the main threats forcing settling. Thus, A.N. Donych warned against forced "settling" and the pursuit of settling the number of farms. His warnings were not heeded, and it soon began a policy of forced settling.
There were warnings against " the intensification of farming "by which is meant plowing growth and increase of cattle in the herd , to the detriment of sheep breeding , horse breeding and camel . It was believed that increasing the proportion of cattle - it is a way to increase marketability " marketability of beef cattle depends on the degree of security cattle population. " However , P.S. Shulkov showed that the increase in the proportion of cattle in relation to Kazakh nomadic economy means exactly the opposite trend -reduction of the commodity economy and the increase in the consumer side, accompanied by a fall in the total livestock herd.
However, the recommendations are not listened to. In 1929 the forced collectivization started, which was seen as a settling of its organic phase. Kazakh semi-nomadic and nomadic economy forced to settling, and then on the basis of settling collective farms form and partially farms. In other words, the Kazakhs not only deprived of habitual economy, so also drove in completely new and unfamiliar forms of agriculture, which, moreover, were still insufficient worked.
In middle of 1929, when a victorious euphoria of collectivization already gained pace, was nominated an ambitious plan of settling the Kazakh farming of Central Kazakhstan. I.I. Maslov proposed an ambitious program for irrigation in the region, at 772,000 square hectares, which he proposed a settling of 104488 households ( from 224824 farms) , endowing them with 6 hectares of irrigated land per household . From this piece of land Kazakh had to provide their needs , feed livestock, as well as take a variety of products to the state. In this proposal, in fact, appeared prototype of the same solution that later led Afghanistan to civil war.
In this case, it is striking that the author of this sentence understood that in such case would have to sacrifice animals. According to his calculations, at settling from 11.9 million head of cattle, which in 1927 were in Central Kazakhstan will be 6.3 million head of cattle and livestock security will fall from 53.5 heads to 28.1 heads per farm. That means that in terms of settling on irrigated lands were laid reduction in livestock numbers by almost half. And it under ideal conditions of the project!
Formulating such a conclusion, the author of the settling project even not embarrassed and after these calculations began to talk about the huge growth prospects of commodity production and the cultivation of grain in the newly established settled areas, and changing blanks leather and wool to dairy products.
However, it was only part of the argument, as Maslov recognized the inability of wide drainage and irrigation of semi- deserts in Central Kazakhstan. Part of the territory may be used for agricultural needs, and "all other territory of the Central Kazakhstan should be left out of economic use. "This proposal immediately met with harsh criticism.
The concept of settling was clearly borrowed from pre-revolutionary experience, and provided a compelling Kazakhs to settling and engage in farming land by the strongest constraint, essentially by confiscating from them the main part of pastures.
As well as before revolution, reduction of the areas of used pastures conducted to reduction of a livestock of cattle in the middle and the poor’s economy, to emergence of crops, transition of part of the Kazakh farms to agricultural economy. But if before revolution it was a gradual process, during collectivization it was very quickly, almost for some years, captured the most part of the regions of Kazakhstan.
Such settling was arranged as a natural and objective process, which cited examples of the existence Kazakh agriculture and settling of poor and cattless farms. Like, as a "natural process", it can be a little nudge. As a result, by the time of the five-year plan, the policy on nomadic economy determined.
Concerning nomadic pastoralism in Northern Kazakhstan: "Undoubtedly, such type of economy making a barrier to increase in population density, it is relic of past". That is, the economic management arrived at idea of elimination of nomadic pastoralism in Northern Kazakhstan. Other economists agreed with this thought also.
Concerning other nomadic pastoralism regions of Kazakhstan: "… tasks of the government of Kazakstan concerning these areas consist in creation the conditions providing steady forms of this economy in disaster management – in particular, with jute". Main measures of ensuring stability of cattle breeding economy: consumer agriculture, mowing, irrigation of meadows, veterinary help.
From the point of view of the existing plans of settling, it becomes clear why to detailed project of settling was not paid attention.. The main thing was - "to rid" land and nobody cared how Kazakhs settled in the new place, since almost the entire leadership was in accordance with the fact that the Kazakhs had to sacrifice mass plowing steppes, particularly in northern Kazakhstan, which was considered "settled agricultural area".
If in 1927-1928 has discussed the socio-economic measures of arrangement, then to collectivization it increasingly left the field of view of the economic and party leadership. "Social Aspects of settling left on the second and third plans. From notes of Chairman of the TRC of republic U. Isayev, head of policy for settling, it is evident that he did not have proper clarity on many aspects of problem ". Here we must say that the leadership KDC did not see any problem and did not think about it.
Final lines in policy of settling were brought by mass collectivization and the directive of plenum of KDC in December, 1929 on carrying out collectivization in cattle breeding areas the same rates, as well as in grain areas. Settling began to be considered not just as a measure of rationalization of cattle breeding, but as one more way of collectivization as settling farms right there were driven in collective farms.
Construction of Sovkhozs ( Soviet farms).
Creation of many sovkhozs was the most important part of transformation of Kazakhstan’s agriculture on a socialist harmony, and huge hopes were rested upon sovkhozs. To the Soviet planners and business executives of the beginning of the 1930th years sovkhozs seemed as agrarian factories on production of grain, so even there was a term "wheaten factories". According to the plan of the first five-years period, in the USSR creation of 125 sovkhozs from which more than a half was created on "free", exactly taken away from nomads, lands in Kazakhstan, and allotted more than 2 million hectares of the most productive lands: arable lands, haymakings, pastures.

Sovkhozs in Kazakhstan appeared in the first years after the revolution. By January 1928 in Kazakhstan there were 34 farm united to gubseltresty(Provincial Agricultural Trust) that is created at the level of provinces. According to the People's Commissariat KASSR in Semipalatinsk gubseltreste have 11 sovkhozs, in Petropavlovsk gubseltreste - 8 , in Syrdarya - 10 , in the Urals - 5 farms. As can be seen, all farms emerged in agricultural regions. In 1928 the People's Commissariat made reorganization of sovkhoz economy, and created Kazakstan’s Sovkhoztrust where included 28 most powerful sovkhozs.
But these farms were tiny and extremely weak farms. So, in the Semipalatinsk’s gubseltrest had several agrobases with a maximum area of crops to 1300 hectares. For example, Narym’s agrobase had only 29 hectares. These small farms during the reorganization were decided to liquidate.
But these small farms had all future disadvantages of large state farms. Firstly, as rule was a huge under-utilization of agricultural land allocated to them. Thus, the farm " Baychunus " in Semipalatinsk district of 1570 hectares of arable land sown in 1928, 947 acres of wheat and 53 acres under oats. Sowing was exceptionally poor, and 98 acres of wheat is not risen , and the remaining area harvest ranged from 10 to 22 pounds per hectare , while the district average collected 32 pounds per hectare. This is not a bad result. So, farm number 1 in the same district of 5939 hectares of arable land planted in 1928 just 409 hectare . It was an overall result. In 1928, all farms had 58,660 hectares of arable land, but only 11,300 were seeded. According to others, from 31,583 hectares of arable land, in 1928 sowed 12139 hectares , or 40.9 %. Inconsistency in the data due to the fact that during 1928 was a process of continuous reorganization of existing and creation of new state farms, move them from one trust to another.
Secondly, the majority of state farms had almost all branches of agriculture in its composition: arable farming, sheep, cattle, pigs, horticulture. And all this, as a rule, is unbalanced and not provided with the necessary resources. So, there have been cases in publications about breeding sheep with a sharp deficit rams, breeding pig farms in the Kazakh areas, in the absence of feed, which were delivered to the farm for 60-70 km.
Thirdly, the true scourge of all state farms was extreme shortage of living space, forcing workers to huddle together for 10-15 people in one small room, and a lack of extreme wear farmyard, stables, warehouses, and unspeakably bad food supply and delayed wages 5-6 months. Farms were not uncommon in which workers were issued only frozen potato and flour mixed with wormwood. Living conditions led to terrible turnover, extremely low discipline, rampant spread of drunkenness and disorderly conduct. In such farms were either poor, who have nowhere to go more or wishing to cash in on the public sector. Reports directly referred to the need cleaning state farm workers.
Fourthly, state farms management puts quantitative growth over quality "Fear of responsibility makes managing all farms to pay attention to the direction of ostentatious economy, to chase to the quantitative growth without paying attention to the quality of work"
In general, farms unsuccessfully started, and immediately showed themselves households, which cannot use their allocated plots of land, to master an arable land allotted to them, to establish a profitable business with the production of quality products. But it turned out to be just the initial problem, which then only exacerbated.
State farm economy in 1928, i. e one year before the mass collectivization already needed the most serious reform and establishing an orderliness. In that condition in which state farms were at this time, they could not play that converting and revolutionizing role which to them assigned. They would deal with their internal problems and learn that wedge of land, which they generously cut.
But economists and farms’ leadership believed that the only correct way to solve all the problems will be consolidation of state farms: "Our challenge is - consolidation of existing state farms, by scores in them surrounding land, or new taps in areas geographically and economically tied to state farms” Amazing! Despite the fact that farms could not master even the land which they already had, management intends to give them more land. Undoubtedly, this formulation of question was made not from the analysis of state farms in Kazakhstan, but from persistent promotion of an idea of large grain state farms, which in 1928 began to be created in the grain-growing areas in the USSR under the Stalinist program transformation of agriculture and in accordance with its CEC and SNK 1 August 1928 on “creation large grain farms”. Then everyone is talking about state farm on grain production "Giant" in the North Caucasus, which took the area of 50 thousand hectares. Apparently, Kazakh leaders wanted to create at the same or even bigger in size, relying on internal efficiency and advantages of large farms that magically show up their results.
Inclusion to race for huge state farms did not keep itself waiting for long. In 1928 in Kazakhstan construction of these huge state farms, or "wheaten factories" began. The first created state farms had the grain direction, and received an allotment about 40 thousand hectares one or two sites, including 30 thousand hectares of an arable land. The first large state farms had approximately such area: Chaglin – 50 thousand hectares, and in the Kustanay district – 40 thousand hectares. These were huge farms. One Chaglin state farm had an arable land more, than all state farms in Kazakhstan still.
At the beginning of 1929, race for state farms- giants in Kazakhstan was given official start. In February of 1929 there was a decision of SNK KASSR, according to which in 1929-1930, under the State Farm was given 3.1 million hectares of land. The minimum size of the farm was 25-30 thousand hectare, plot size - 8-12 thousand hectares.
The detailed plan of state farm on grain production was worked out, which main parameters can be summarized in the table:
1929 1930 1933
State farms on grain production 7 22 60
Number of plots 10 60 245
Total land ( hectares) 295 1100 3100
Arable land 165 610 1700

The plan included all main parties of work of state farms. So, it was planned that all works in state farms will be made by tractors, and the working cattle will be excluded. Productivity on firm wheat had to make 8,3 centners from hectare, on soft wheat – 7,7 centners from hectare. Collecting the grain had to make 1085 thousand tons of gross collecting and 975 thousand tons of commodity collecting, including 730 thousand tons of commodity firm wheat and 225 thousand tons of commodity soft wheat. It was even planned conversion from straw to paper and paperboard , fuel and building materials.
This plan as practice showed, was vulnerable at once from two parties. First, there was no sufficient experience of the organization of a large-scale grain farm. As we saw, not a rarity there were state farms which could not open considerably smaller arable plots and sowed them with unproductive seeds. Therefore the plan for productivity looked in the light of real state-farm experience more than hypothetically. Secondly, extreme it was difficult to provide state farms with tractors. The normal plowing of the arable land taken away under state farms required 15,7 thousand tractors.
At the same time, in 1928 in Kazakhstan there were 672 tractors from which only 59 was in state farms, and on 1929 the demand was made on 645 tractors. Even if all of them would be given to state farms, and in this case in 1929/30 state farms could plowing a little more than 76 thousand hectares on norm. However, real receipt was considerable smaller, than counted. In 1929 in Kazakhstan only 778 tractors worked. The condition of a machine supplying was such that initially doomed state farms on extreme deficiency of tractors, and, as a result, impossibility to plowing so huge areas.
The most striking thing is that at the federal and at the national level this key fact was completely ignored. Moscow demanded plowing and XVI Conference of the CPSU (b), held April 23-29, 1929, required allocating 6 million hectares of state farms, while the Center could not give a tractor for plowing even for 100,000 hectares.
In Kazakhstan all these orders right there carried out, despite of any circumstances. As a result state-farm construction was ahead of schedule. In 1929 30 new state farms were created: 10 grain, 3 commercial crops and 17 stock-raising which occupied 886,8 thousand hectares.
Shortly after state farms on grain production livestock farms were created also combined into trusts ,similar to them. V Plenum of KDC held on 11-16 December, 1929 , launched a large-scale plan to create the livestock farms . In JSC " Ovcevod" (later -Trust ) for 1932 should be at least 100 state farms , with a total numbering 2 million livestock in Kazgosseltrest (Kazakh agricultural trust) - 18 state and 350 thousands of cattle in Kazseltrest - 6 dairy state farms with livestock in 24 thousands of dairy cows. In JSC " Ovcevod" (later - Trust ) was be 3.5 million sheep in Kazseltrest - 815,000 sheep.
At the end of 1929 “Ovcevod” trust’s livestock state farms began to be created. By January 1, 1930 in its system there were 8 state farms which occupied 452 thousand hectares and in which there were 104 thousand of head of sheep. In the same time creation of livestock state farms of “Skotovod” trust began. Soon they will make the most part of state farms in Kazakhstan.
Dizziness with success.
Most likely, that in the decision of a sharp increase in the number of farms covered by the collectivization in the creation of the giant state farms, Goloshekin put his personal motives . He was the first since 1925, felt the real successes of their policies, which seemed to him significant. Over the 1928/29 financial year occurred bey confiscation of farms, which he called "October in the village ", was held grain procurement campaign, gave 9.2 million quintals of breads, including 6.8 million quintals of wheat. This is the highest level of grain procurement, which was achieved for all Soviet regime’ time in Kazakhstan.
In an aul and the village there took place powerful campaign of collectivization which trebled percent of collectivization and created more than 4 thousand collective farms. At last, Goloschekin, obviously, being guided by reports of representatives on a course of a sowing campaign of 1929 for the first time and felt that resistance of an aul is broken and now his politician does not break about a wall of persistent resistance as was earlier. Most likely, it seemed to it that a period of failures and defeats behind. This feeling, probably, also dictated to it all listed above decisions. In these conditions, judging by its decisions, it, and also at it an inner circle, had such phenomenon which Stalin neatly called "dizziness". This feeling of omnipotence and ability to solve problems without exception and questions everywhere to achieve a brilliant success. In this state, the person ceases to study and analyze the real situation , not watching permissible mistakes and miscalculations , ceases to realistically assess their strength. Regional Committee of the bureau's decision on the scope of 140 000 households , ie a doubling of the number of collective farm households , it is as indicated . Also, a " dizzy with success " at Goloshekin was his enthusiasm . In early 1930 he wrote an article in the " Soviet steppe" , which is so talked about the beginning of the sowing campaign in 1930 : " From the front to the front ! We ended up front grain procurement and , without resting , toggles and must switch from the whole Bolshevik energy for a new battle front, the front spring agricultural campaign " This enthusiasm is definitely blinded his eyes. Dizziness of success combined with enthusiasm did not allow him to see the chief in his policies - the process of collectivization and the settling of the Kazakh population is uncontrolled, KDC it almost does not influence in the state and the whole policy of every day more and more detached from the solid business practices, is provided logistical resources, turns into a bare administration and campaigning.
Chapter 6. March to an abyss.
The spring of 1930 was in the first spring and the first sowing campaign which was carried out in the conditions of mass collectivization and creation of huge state farms. It often called "the first Bolshevist sowing" or "in the first collective-farm spring", and it was time of mass and large-scale transformations in agriculture which mentioned practically all regions of Kazakhstan, almost all villages and auls, up to the most remote places.
Since spring of 1930 until the beginning of the destructive famine in early 1932, in agriculture of Kazakhstan passed , one after another, continuous campaign: sowing , harvesting , bakery and provision of cattle campaigns for the staffing of state and farms, go to piecework and so on . It was a genuine march toward the abyss , and each campaign only brings the republic and its people to a terrible catastrophe. In addition, all this happened in the noisy atmosphere of agitation, when every newspaper published loud slogans and appeals , and in any case have offered the thanksgiving party leadership , especially Philip Goloshchekin .
n Soviet literature, this period is almost always portrayed in the same way. Called any date, any judgment , cited facts and figures, some statistical material . But all of this without a system without interconnection, without analyzing the causes and consequences , even without the consolidated chronology of events. Facts and stuff picked up and setting out so as to produce a continuous and progressive growth of agriculture , the victory of the socialist system , as required by the authors . It was a deliberate falsification of pursuing the goal to portray the fall and the collapse of agriculture in Kazakhstan to the biggest economic catastrophe , as the time of prosperity and progress. One of the most prominent was rigged AB Tursunbaev , which manages one of the first of a fully reliable data to build a picture of continuous development and prosperity. He obviously did a good job with the sources , and it has , for example, the earliest references to the literature in postwar famine in Thurgau, in his book " Winning farm system in Kazakhstan" (1957). But these facts were his only examples and illustrations in a typical party rhetoric. In fact , most of the Soviet economic and historical literature was not scientific research and reports on the party was an issue . They do not affect the ideology of research , as many believe , and scientific research in general was not there, and the facts cited as an illustration to some theses th We also have to completely different task - to recover fully as possible , the fragmentary information and individual publications , the process of movement of Kazakhstan to the unprecedented economic catastrophe . Even from the published material as contemporary events , as well as unpublished reports later in the party , that is, in the Soviet literature , you can set milestones this tragic way.
The sowing campaign.
Already the first " collective farm Spring" has shown that the term " spring agricultural campaign " almost always means no business preparation for sowing and colossal sizes a talking more distracting people from the business rather than help it. In 1930 he had to sow 4,155,000 hectares. Seeding campaign and the organization of collective farms was again thrown numerous active . In the spring of 1930 arrived in the villages in 1204 people from the movement " Twenty-five-thousanders ", i.e. working with large factories , which helped the organization of collective farms and , in particular , machine and tractor stations . CPSU (b ) at the time sent in 1470 , to assist the party organizations of Kazakhstan.

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

СообщениеДобавлено: 07 апр 2014, 11:51
Aliya
KDC sent to auls and villages about 5 thousand people from among a party, trade-union and Soviet asset of areas. Total, 7674 persons of one only "twenty-five- thousanders " and various representatives. If these people would put to a plow and a seeder, they quite could plow and sow somewhere about 10 thousand hectares, that is a cultivated area of any small area, like October district of the Aktyubinsk area. But these people on the whole at all didn't touch a plow and a seeder. They had affairs more important. The twenty-five-thousander Knyazev was engaged: "Without knowing the Kazakh language, he managed to pass on the know-how on fingers and gestures of hands". Mainly representatives and twenty-five-thousanders were engaged in carrying out various meetings. In total for a sowing campaign it was carried out 19476 rural and the aul’s meetings in which 1960 thousand people participated.
Immediately before sowing conducting across Kazakhstan from February 15 to March 15, 1930 were held 150 rallies laborers . At these gatherings formed groups of activists and the poor laborers, and were formed by shock brigades for the sowing, was elected 1100 to administrative work, as well as selected 500 people for employment in the collective farms. In general, the work was done a lot, just on the very course of sowing and if it had an impact, the purely negative, distracting workers from important things. However, authorized comrades engaged not only in meetings. Simultaneously with swaying collectivization , preparations for the "first collective farm spring " has a strict policy of infringement and destruction now former prosperous farms , which from day to day more and more lost the right to the name .
" Kulak-Bais farming" ( they hardly could now be called so from an economic perspective and from that time the meaning of the term was purely social and political) , the CEC and SNK on February 1, 1930 have been placed , in fact, under arrest. They were not allowed to move and sell the property without the permission of the district executive committees. In case of violation - confiscation of property . KDC went much further . More January 17, 1930 Bureau Committee of the CPSU ( b) decided to confiscation " bey farms ' livestock leaving consumer minimuma363 . February 19, 1930 CEC and CPC KASSR issued a decree according to which " the kulak bais " farming evicted from areas of complete collectivization , with confiscation of all property , except for the minimum necessary for farming . When KDC was an expanded commission to prepare and bais liquidation of the kulaks , and in all districts established operational trio headed by Secretary of Regional Committee of the CPSU ( b).
On February 1, 1930 in 60 areas of complete collectivization was 19163 " kulak- bais farming ." In February-March in 51 district was abolished 3123 and bey kulak economy. Dekulakization accompanied by large-scale seizures . Thus, only three districts were confiscated property in wealthy households to 24 million, 631 thousand tons of grain and 534,000 head of cattle. Dekulakization was only part of disasters former affluent households . During grain procurements in 1930 " kulak bais farming " forced to hand over all the goods surplus production , leaving only a minimum consumption.
Soon repressions against the bais farms living in East Kazakhstan, in a borderland began. The document from the Central archive of FSB of Russia "Spetssvodka No. 2 of information department of the Authorized Representation of the Joint Public Political Administration on Kazakstanska SSR about the ukochevkakh of the kazaksky population in Kazakstan on materials for November 24, 1930 on December 22, 1930" shows that only in the former Almaty district in border areas there were 1103 persons, 2858 horses, 847 heads of krupnorogaty cattle, 9759 sheep and goats, 411 camels are confiscated. Dispossession of kulaks and confiscation of cattle were the first in a long train of actions as a result of which farms in the most part didn't remain any beast. For the present cattle was much, and confiscation of half a million heads couldn't undermine productive forces of cattle breeding yet. But soon it will be brought to such state that in an aul there will be already nothing to take.
However, already in a sowing campaign of 1930 in the certain regions of Kazakhstan malnutrition and famine took place. In archive of FSB of Russia the document remained: "From the specialreport of the Peter and Paul District department of the Joint Public Political Administration about collectivization and a spring sowing campaign for May 23, 1930 with the description of the facts of hunger and judgments on this soil. On May 24, 1930", published in the Collection of the documents "Famine in the USSR of 1930-1934". In it it is said that individual low-power farms mill and use in food a seed material, including the pickled seeds which were washed out by water. After the flour use from the pickled seeds there were numerous cases of poisoning and swelling.
It comes to the eating of carrion, accidentally encountered prior to slaughter cattle and taking away products. So famine in many places of Kazakhstan began immediately , with the mass collectivization . Fluctuations along the line of complete collectivization . On January 1, 1930 throughout Kazakhstan were collectivized farms 22.5% ( 278,000 households) , and created kolhozov370 6457 . Collective farms were very weak , and on average each of them accounted for 43 farms , but this fact did not stop the party leadership . In early 1930 , the rate of collectivization only increased.
The end of 1929 – the beginning of 1930 was marked by rough collectivization, mass creation of collective farms and involvement of tens of thousands of farms in them. In spite of the fact that the general level of collectivization hardly exceeded the fifth part of all farms, already it seemed that sowing grain in the spring of 1930 (which passed usually at the end of April – the beginning of May), will be carried out by collective farmers, instead of individualists, as earlier. Therefore this time called "the first Bolshevist sowing" or "in the first collective-farm spring". At the beginning of 1930 in Kazakhstan continuous collectivization in the main grain areas began. On February 1, 1930 51 areas to whom it was planned to carry out continuous collectivization were chosen. "As it was already noted, area saturation by agricultural stock and tools is of great importance for collectivization", - A.B. Tursunbayev wrote.
That is, in areas of continuous collectivization first of all were created by MTS and MCC where in a priority order went a tractor and agricultural tools. It gave the Enbekshikazakh District of Almaty area in which MTS was created as an example and 20 tractors are directed. If in 1929 level of collectivization made 13%, by January 15, 1930 it jumped up to 70%. As grain areas, creation of MTS were chosen as areas of continuous collectivization and MCC began with them. At the beginning of 1930 from 6 MTS in Kazakhstan in grain areas there was 5 MTS, and from 72 MCC in the same place was 55 MCC. Subsequently it had serious impact on fast aggravation of situation in nomadic and semi-nomadic areas which or at all had no stations, or were provided with them in the extremely insignificant degree.
However , supply of machines and tools was not the only way of collectivization. Based on the accounting report of KDC VII All Kazakh Party Conference , the most common method was not convinced and demonstrate the benefits of collective farming , but bare coercion wildest forms. However, soon collective’s gust was upset from the center. March 2, 1930 , Stalin wrote his famous letter " Dizzy with success ", and March 14, 1930 the Central Committee of the CPSU ( b) adopted its historic resolution "On combating distortions of the Party line in the collective-farm movement ." The appearance of this letter and the decision was due to the failure of the order for production of tractors placed on Krasnoputilovsk plant in Leningrad in July 1929 to 12,000 tractors. Order was defeated, and the plant has produced all 8935 tractors. At the same time the formation of collective farms for the USSR has reached such proportions that severely strained the capacity to provide all their tractors, agricultural equipment and machinery.
To not break a collectivization course, Stalin was compelled to besiege rate of collectivization, and a little later in the answer to collective farmers set the specific task – to prepare for a sowing campaign. The KDC’s ambassador of such directive too it was compelled to reverse, and to fight against excesses which in turn itself was accompanied by big excesses. The significant contribution to excesses during campaign for fight against excesses was made by Goloschekin who in the spring, at once behind the resolution of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), fell with criticism upon methods of carried-out collectivization: "You possibly read and you read often that such district is declared by the district of continuous collectivization, such area is declared by the area of continuous collectivization. Let me be honest and call it by its name - it is nonsense . " Especially got organizers collective to nomadic and semi- areas : " Can you say that in the nomadic areas have a valid collective ? No, comrades , there are farms only on paper , and we will now disbanded " Goloshchekin , even with his usual mood of unrestrained socialist offensive , had also publicly criticized zeal VII All Kazakh performers at the party conference , held in June 1930 . In this summary report of KDC Goloshchekin floated all his eloquence . After the usual underscore great success and outstanding achievements, Goloshchekin began to criticize the methods of collectivization in the nomadic and semi- areas : " The profound harm livestock brought perversion. Poorly to call them a mistake. Unless not the fact that collectivization in nomadic auls had no prerequisites, was not prepared at all by our forces. Unless not the fact that bye inspired and led to full belief of the middling person and the poor that collectivization is "confiscations" … Ask all these "kollektivizator", what production base collective farms in nomadic economy, except rough compulsions of people, uncomprehending essence of a policy of the party have? " 377. It gave one concrete example of collectivization in the nomadic Talassky area in which collectivization began on March 15, 1930. According to comrade Asylbekov who visited this area, there members of a district committee of party carried out nationalization of cattle and economy reorganization on "a socialist harmony". As this harmony seemed to talassky Bolsheviks, Goloschekin described brightly and colourfully: "Tilt carts of all collective farmers were constructed by lanes … allocated as yurta farmyards, by consolidation and installation of owners in yurtas of other families!"
There were some bases for criticism. Problems with the organization of collective farms were even in agricultural Kazakh areas, for example, in the Kurdaysky region of Almaty area. Almost all Kazakh collective farms of the area socialized only agriculture whereas the cattle remained in personal property of collective farmers. Members of collective farm gathered for 40-50 days of sowing and for 30-40 days of harvesting, in the rest of the time wandered with the cattle. Not plowed lands were leased to collective farmers from Kirgizii379. If such was in the agricultural area, it is easy to imagine what were collective farms in nomadic areas. Generally, the policy of impetuous administration and coercion was condemned. However, on places the same soon began, only in an opposite direction. In April-May, 1930 in Kazakhstan 2461 meetings with an explanation of this resolution were held. After this reorganization of collective farms which in some places led to the real defeat of collective farms began. If in January, 1930 collectivization level on these areas made 72%, in June, 1930 – 27,4%. "In some areas at all didn't remain any collective farm", - A.B. Tursunbayev noticed.
So, no sooner said than done . KDC ordered to disband collective farms, they were immediately dismissed. This defeat of the collective farms must have an extremely negative effect on the mood of the auls and villages and caused serious damage to the further construction of the farms. Participants in these bends solid collectivization steadily began to perceive by constructing collective as it’s not a private matter and not as a means to improve the efficiency of its economy, as well as another administrative undertaking. Anyway , watching as a collective driven first , and then dispersed population , it was hard not to come to a different conclusion . Uzin kulak ( gossip) blew it away in the steppe . Sharp drop in confidence building collective farms resulted in unusually low inflow collective farms in the summer of 1930. From July 1 to August 1, acted in collective farms only 16625. While collectivization underwent these bends its line, the People's Commissariat KASSR made detailed instructions for the collectivization, which covered basic issues of creation of collective farms.
The first that demanded from collective farms is the maximum nationalization of means of production: "Generally these requirements are consolidated to the following:
1 . The maximum nationalization of all means of production belonging to each member of collective farm.
2 . Increase in fund of the indivisible capitals.
3 . The correct statement put in area of the organization of the accounting of means of production.
4 . Rational distribution of the income of collective farm.
5 . Rational use in economy of all fixed current assets and the capitals".
Collective farms were distributed on category according to extent of nationalization of means of production. So, communes represented economy with nationalization of all live and dead stock, all constructions, all cattle and other means of production. Artel as the most mass type of collective farm, I represented economy with nationalization of productive and working cattle, dead stock, the seeds connected with housekeeping of constructions. The association (in Kazakhstan there were associations on land processing –ALP, and associations on the general animal husbandry –AAH) represented economy with nationalization of working cattle, dead stock, seeds and economic constructions. It would seem, everything is defined accurately and clearly. But in concrete reality there were the numerous problems connected with appendices of definitions to concrete farms. Lenin in the performance at the VIII Extraordinary congress of RCP(b) in March, 1919 on which discussion of a country question took place. Lenin in the report of March 23, 1919 subjected to the most severe criticism activity prodorgans and used all the eloquence: "In practice there are such cases as one companion in the commission told. It was surrounded by peasants, and everyone asks: "Define, the middling person I or not? I have two horses and one cow. I have two cows and one horse", etc. And here to this propagandist, who driving around all districts, it is necessary to possess such thermometer that it was possible to deliver it to the peasant and to tell, the middling person it or not … It is necessary to avoid everything that could encourage separate abuses in practice. Careerists, adventurers who are called as communists stuck to us here and there and inflate us. ". Since then passed 10 years, but the problem did not solved. Official definitions and instructions were with great difficulty applied to concrete reality and created extraordinary ample opportunities for abuses. Therefore People's Commissariat for Agriculture, and then and party bodies up to the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) Central Committee, were compelled to be engaged in definition of that, how many the earth, cattle, stock and other the collective farmer can have in personal property. Now meanness of these resolutions shouldn't be surprised, but then it was impossible to give the solution of these problems on responsibility of local bodies and heads because of extraordinary distribution of abuses. In the instruction on collectivization in Kazakhstan of 1930 of detailed instructions yet wasn't, but the principle already formulated: "The allied People's Commissariat for Agriculture in agricultural artel assumes immediate nationalization of only commodity part of productive cattle". The example was given that if the peasant has three cows, one cow is for personal consumption, and other two – for sale in the market, and here two cows have to be socialized. Further the instruction ordered to socialize completely all small and meat-and-milk cattle whereas needs for meat have to be satisfied with decisions of board and general meeting of collective farm after delivery not less than 50% of lethal weight for the state. Also completely all wool is given to the state. The instruction imposed to collective farms the dairy and pig-breeding directions of economy, it contained very detailed recommendations about development of production of the milk, including standards of crops of forage and grain crops on the head. The instruction most of all recommended pig-breeding: "It is especially rational to be engaged in this branch of animal husbandry to again organized agricultural artels and communes, with that calculation that at the expense of mass sale the pork state quickly to increase fund of the indivisible capitals" all financial economy of collective farms was subordinated to Increase in the indivisible capitals. In effect, coercion of collective farms to a huge share of accumulation set before itself the purpose to cover the extremely insufficient capital investments of the state in development of collective farms. Therefore all necessary the collective farm had to, according to kollektivizator, buy and itself to provide with fixed capital. The norm of accumulation was established in 30% of a gross revenue of collective farm, and 60% of this accumulation had to be enlisted in indivisible funds of collective farms. The similar pursuit of indivisible funds is explained by that in the same instruction the plan of creation of collective farms with grounds to 25 and even to 50 thousand hectares was stated. KDC demanded to create in areas of continuous collectivization collective farms on 50 of thousand hectares, with crops not less than 10 thousand hectares. Rate of development of collective farms depended, thus, on work of collective farmers and on earnings distribution. By that moment in Kazakhstan some systems of distribution of the income between collective farmers were used: on eaters (or "edotsky"), on families, on workers, on eaters and workers, on workdays, on work and means of production, on shares and even on requirement.
The distribution system on shares and on workdays, and also the mixed labor and share system was the most widespread. In other words, most of all in such collective farms the one who worked more received and brought more property at the accession to collective farm. KDC rejected share system as saw in it threat of capture of collective farms of fists and Bai. Prosperous farms, bringing bigger property, than bednyatsky, got in collective farm advantage. Since 1930 the party management began to demand universal introduction of price-work system of distribution of the income or piecework. Piecework usually is understood so that who works more, that receives more. However, by consideration of the instruction on collectivization it is visible that some points which changed sense of the term were brought in definition. First: "In this regard the system of price-work compensation is considered the best as it financially interests the worker. The essence of this system is that workers or group them are given a certain task with the indication of number of work and its quality. Non-performance of this task reduces a salary and vice versa, work performance over a task raises it, in proportion to quantity and quality of the done work" . In other words, it not such piecework where each worker carries out feasible for himself work volume, but system of standards on which salary depends on performance.
Secondly, performance standards were determined by each type of work proceeding from 10 hour working days. Thirdly, the minimum and maximum tariffs differed among themselves no more than twice. Piecework in such form already at an instruction stage about collectivization represented the sudorific system which is strongly reminding corvee in which the salary was put depending on norms of developments, and focused on quantitative, instead of quality indicators of work.
The instruction promised that performance standards will be coordinated with local conditions, but in 1931 obligatory performance standards on main types of agricultural works for all Kazakhstan were developed and approved. Fight for the adoption of piecework went with big persistence and variable success. The compensation system, in fact, was the last boundary which separated the peasant’s owners who have entered the general economy, from the state workers, and economic battle at this boundary was very cruel. Collective farmers in every way resisted to piecework introduction, trying to keep either "edotsky" or labor -share systems, and conceded only under pressing from representatives. Transition to such piecework, inherently corvee system, it was accompanied by sharp falling of motivation to work, sharp deterioration of works, a pursuit of quantity, and also to general theft in collective farms. The agriculture in Kazakhstan still kept until de facto applied other forms of compensation. But KDC demanded and insisted on piecework introduction. At the beginning of 1931 collective farms under pressure of representatives of District Committee began to pass to this piecework. The result affected very quickly. "The second collective-farm spring". In the spring of 1931 according to the plan collective farms had to sow 3567,1 thousand hectares. However, real collective-farm crops made 4330 thousand hectares. The general plan of crops on the republic made 5807,3 thousand hectares. Certainly, in the Soviet literature it moved as outstanding achievement, as the certificate of a victory of a collective-farm system, as evident confirmation of advantages of a large-scale enterprise in comparison with the small. However, the real economic situation in Kazakhstan in 1931 forces to doubt justice of this statement strong. Growth of the area of crops really took place. But thus it was bought by the price of the extremely poor quality of works, and processings of fields on the verge of not viability of crops. KDC's aspiration as much as possible to open and seed was the main reason of sharp expansion of crops in "the second collective-farm spring". In March, 1931 plenum of KDC on which it was openly declared took place: "Increase in a cultivated area of edge honor on 2 million hectares is a task worthy Bolsheviks". After carrying out mass collectivization the average size of collective farm in 1931 made 904 hectares of a cultivated area whereas in 1928-1929 I didn't exceed 40-50 hectares.
Peasants faced need to process the poor stock sharply increased cultivated areas. Those collective farms which were in the radius of work of machine and tractor stations and to which an arable land plowed and processed a tractor. But not all was so lucky. In 1930 of MTS plowed only 208,4 thousand hectares of an arable land, sowed 56,5 thousand hectares, harvested from 53,4 thousand гектаров394. Even taking into account creation of new MTS to spring campaign of 1931, tractor draft sufficed only for 8,5% of collective-farm crops. It meant that the vast majority of collective farms should plow and sow the horses, the to tools. In the conditions of sharp deficiency of tractor draft, the pursuit of increase in a cultivated area extremely negatively affected. Collective farms with great difficulty could process the area of crops increased almost in one and a half time. Quality of field works and sowing was extremely low, sowing dragged on, and processing and weeding of crops wasn't conducted almost. Fields were pretty often sowed with the sub-standard, unassorted and not pickled grain that resulted in bad viability, defeat of cereals by diseases, a contamination of field’s weeds. However, it was a disaster not only in Kazakhstan . This was the case throughout the USSR . 1931-1933 years were a time of indiscriminate disaster : the spread of diseases of cereals ( ergot and smut ) , ubiquitous pests. Weeds have been distributed to such an extent that in many fields completely sacrificed cultivated cereals . Scientists and agronomists tried to fight this scourge , but their effort was too little. At the same time the economic leadership of Kazakhstan possessed another great idea - a narrow product line farms , particularly farms. It was decided , obviously, after much debate , that the economy will efficiently and cost effectively if it is to specialize in a single industry , locally relevant . Until KDC was unable to conduct the level of specialization of each farm , but in the spring of 1931 they defeated Kazakhstan on four business areas:
1. Agricultural, with grain farm
2. Agricultural and stock-raising, with commodity field husbandry.
3. Stock-raising and agricultural, with prevalence of animal husbandry of semi-extensive character, with agriculture with commodity surplus.
4. Stock-raising, with extensive and nomadic animal husbandry and subsidiary agriculture
Apparently, the aspiration as much as possible area to specialize on grain agriculture was the main idea of developers of this plan. Even where wheat couldn't be grown up because of shortage of water and a precipitation, specialization on commercial crops was assumed. Behind directives business didn't become, them issued at once after drawing up the general plan of specialization: "Each area receives now firm and clear installation. Leading branches of economy and its direction" are defined. It is easy to imagine that was created in time in collective farms. Peasants, who are always sown wheat or millet, in many places forced to sow dogbane, tobacco or any other industrial crops. The yesterday's nomads who haven't accustomed yet with agriculture, forced to sow wheat. It is easy to understand that experience and skills of people weren't taken into account, and local activists rejected objections by effort of a voice and threats. Like, as decided in Almaty big bosses, so will be.
The specialization which has been carried out to so short term and so clumsy methods, certainly, not only didn't lead to growth of efficiency of collective-farm farms, but also became, no doubt, one of the reasons of sharp falling of quality of works in a sowing campaign of 1931. Owing to all these reasons, after mass collectivization quality of agricultural works strongly fell, and after it average productivity fell. On 8-9 centners from hectare now it was necessary to dream of former crops only. Productivity kept three years in a row at extremely low level. In 1931 – 4,2 centners from hectare, in 1932 – 4,3 centners from hectare, in 1933 – 4,5 centners with гектара398. It all the same that repetition three years in a row of poor harvest years because such productivity corresponded to lean years. In a number of areas and in a number of state farms the crop was even worse, or at all was not. The result of crops of 1931 was terrifying. Sowing began near on April 20, and proceeded till June 10-12. At the end of these crops which terms sometimes reached 50 days, seeds threw into the earth dried up by dry winds, and they didn't give shoots. More than once it was noted that fields of late crops gave shoots only in August, after rains when already there came a harvesting time. On whole a number of areas lost crop about a half because of sowing extension. So, in the Akbulaksky area sowing proceeded 46 days, and was lost 31,5% of a crop, in the Mendygarinsky area sowed 41 days, and lost 51% of a crop, in Maxim-Gorky sowed 47 days and lost 30% of a crop. In the Lengersky area sowed 35 days and lost 55% of a crop. On only 24 grain areas rubbed a crop made not less than 35%. With such results for emergence of hunger it wasn't necessary also droughts. In the spring of 1931 grain turned into the main object of plunders across all Kazakhstan. Goloschekin in April, 1931 personally traveled over 10 areas and met representatives of 7 more areas. Already during this trip he saw that people began to steal and hide in large quantities grain, and was compelled to conclude: "On the other hand, the wrong, unauthorized expenditure of bread on local supply, and I would tell an injurious expenditure of bread from some economic organizations". Certainly, Goloschekin was put party kantselyarity, but for him into words the overall picture of the occurring is clear and clear. Collective farmers, beginning from board, and finishing rank-and-file members, bore home and hid each pood of grain. Often bread divided according to the solution of general meeting. At the same time employees of the procuring and supplying organizations sold grain to needing collective farmers and nomads. But during harvesting and right after it thefts of bread accepted huge scales. For example, in collective farm Unym of the Kurdaysky area Alma-collected from 40 hectares. On November 22, 1931 Philip Goloschekin gave the report at meeting of an asset of the party of the Almaty Communist Party organization in which provided some data on bread thefts in collective farms of regions of the Aktyubinsk area. This report is interesting to that it lists the most widespread ways of theft of bread. Goloschekin provided data on some collective farms of the Temirsky region of area in which thefts were revealed.
So, Stalin farm was stolen for 3,500 pounds, the farm "Jana-Talap" - 4500 pounds, Budenniy farm - 3500 pounds, May 1st farm - 3342 pounds. Totally according to data only five collective Temirskaya district was stolen for 20,842 pounds, or 333.4 tons of grain. The farmers showed extraordinary ingenuity in stealing bread, and showed remarkable art is not just banal theft and theft disguised as "technical losses". Goloshchekin cited the following methods, which were able to identify:
1. At harvesting , reaping scythe mowing machines were set up undersized ears , which remained on the field uncut , not cleaned strips along roads, mezhey and irrigation ditches .
2 Dumped hay have not raked ears .
3. Secretly cut the bread on the vine, sometimes straight in order to reduce crop yield per hectare.
4. Incorrectly adjusted thresher threshing which missed 20% of ears in straw.
5. Not winnow the chaff.
6. Incorrectly adjusted thresher that threshing grain fractions as cereal considered a waste and accepts no granaries .
7. Current without rinsing.
8. In the stacks well milled straw hiding bad milled ears .
9. Collective farms did not show and did not account for some remote currents.
The theft scheme, apparently according to Goloschekin's report, was rather simple. At first work on cleaning and the bread thresh deliberately badly became so that there were big "technological losses". Then, at night collective farmers carefully collected the grain left in the field, in straw and chaff, in sheaves and on currents, and divided it among themselves. Sometimes, if there was an opportunity, milled on the remote currents, and then showed in documents less grain, than really collected and milled. The Temirsky area was the large agricultural area, sowed in 1931 of 65,5 thousand hectares, had 72 collective farms and 4 state farms in the territory. It would seem, problems with bread there shouldn't have been. But in practice in the fall of 1931, during a harvesting time, there were such most serious problems with grain that collective farmers stole it in thousands of poods. It is difficult to imagine, how many all bread was stolen and hidden if such plunders were opened. Across Kazakhstan total volume probably will develop in million poods. In general, at the beginning of 1932, after final summing up 1931, Goloschekin on the III-rd enlarged plenum of Regional committee was compelled to justify and bring down everything on bad weather conditions. According to him, in the Aktyubinsk, Kustanay and Ural areas three years there was a drought. However, together with it Goloschekin had to recognize an extremely bad quality of crops.
State-farm(sovkhoz) giantism.
As it was already spoken, in 1930 in Kazakhstan campaign for creation of huge state farms of several state-farm trusts started at once. At that time in Kazakhstan there were nine trusts: "Graintrust", "Kazkhlopok"(cotton) , "Novlubtrust", "Lektekhsyrye", "Kauchukonos", "Skotovod", "Ovcevod", “Svinovod", "Sadvintrust". Each trust specialized on one of agriculture branches. Mostly specialization is clear from names of trusts, however, some demand the explanation. "Novlubtrust" was engaged in cultivation of a number of commercial fibrous crops, mainly dogbane (apocynum) or bur. " Lektehsyrye" engaged in cultivation of raw materials for the production of medicines . " Kauchukonos" engaged in the cultivation of a number of plants containing rubber, in particular tau sagyz . " Sadvintrust " united fruit farms of southern Kazakhstan . Most state farm trusts included 10 sovkhozs and took a small total area . This was due to the nature of their production, particularly of crops . However, other trusts, in particular, " Grain Trust ", " Skotovod" and " Ovcevod" includes dozens of collective and covers an area of millions of hectares , had hundreds of thousands of cattle .
Initially , the size of grain farms are placed in northern Kazakhstan , was determined to 50,000 hectares of agricultural land , including 35,000 hectares of arable land . However , in early 1930 , these units were discarded in favor of a huge grain farms , some of which had more arable land than other many regions . In April of 1930, B.N. Semevskii already called to create grain farms in northern Kazakhstan to the arable area of 100 thousand hectares , and argued that the treatment of such area is quite possible deal for one farm. Thus, he believed that the tractor 15/30 of Stalingrad tractor factory can treat 350 hectares per season, working Horse - 10 hectares per season. Consequently , 225 tractors can handle 78,800 hectares in 2625 horses - 26.2 thousand hectares. Total turns out 105,000 hectares of arable land . In addition, grain farms need to slaughter 16,800 hectares of hayfields and 67,500 hectares of pasture and forage for grazing cattle working . Just a grain farm must occupy 210.3 thousand hectares. By the end of 1931 - beginning of 1932 in Kazakhstan was established on 23 grain farm , including seven grain farms in Aktobe , 6 grain farms in the Karaganda region . They had 1,943,600 hectares of agricultural land , 1558 State Farm tractors and all seeded 383.2 thousand hectares. State Farm became the largest grain farm in Chaglinsky Beynetkorsk near Karaganda region. In 1931 it had 241,08 thousand hectares of grounds, including 200,6 thousand hectares of an arable land. It was huge economy which on the arable grounds exceeded the area of an arable land of a number of the regions of Kazakhstan. Chaglinsky grain farm on the arable land area conceded in the most Karaganda region to all Shchuchinsky area , and surpassed all Kurgaldzhinsky area. The land of state farm made 34,9% of all arable grounds of the Beynetkorsky area. But thus the state farm sowed only 34 thousand hectares – 16,9% of the boundless fields. The situation on other state farms was not the best. Kiyalinsky graing farm in the same Beynetkorsky area had 123,3 thousand hectares of grounds, including 105 thousand hectares of an arable land, and sowed only 34,9 thousand hectares – 33,2% of the area of an arable land. The it was larger graing farm on the areas, the smaller share of the crops could process.
The main reason of underexploitation of arable grounds consisted that state farms had no sufficient tractor draft.

Sovkhoz Sowing Number of tractors Hectrae/tractor
Kandi-Kumak 24 130 184.6
Golocshekin’s Uchebniy 34.4 89 420.2
Kent-Aral 13 76 171
Talgar 09 27 33.3
Severniy (Northen) 22 72 305.5
October 21.8 85 256.4
Priirtishskiy (near Irtish) 14.9 55 270.9
Krasnovskiy 25.7 152 165.7
Uralsk 20.5 99 207
Kemenevskyi 20 80 250
Rubezhenskyi 19.1 72 265.2
Chaglinskyi 34 150 226.6
Kiyalinskyi 34,9 104 335,5
Chistovskyi 23,3 92 253,2
Vozvishenskyi 17,2 69 249,2
Kolutonskyi 16,6 70 237,1
Darbaza 10,1 69 146,3

This table shows that the average square at one tractor in the grain farms of Kazakhstan made 250-270 hectares. It could fluctuate towards increase in the area at a tractor because of application at agricultural works of working cattle, and could hesitate towards reduction when the state farm had surplus of tractors. The real size of plowing to a great extent depended on quantity of tractors, on their state and regular repair, on the work organization. Having 80 tractors, it was possible to count on a plowing crops of 20 thousand hectares of an arable land. Having 100 tractors – it was possible to expect to open 30 thousand hectares. But any of large grain farms of Kazakhstan then had no enough of tractors to plowing all of them the arable areas. The same Chaglinsky state farm for processing of the fields had to have more than 800 tractors. However, and this average norm, probably, was too big for implementation of high-quality agricultural works.
Anyway, in the state grain yield was slightly better that in collective farms. In 1930 - 5.1 tons per hectare, in 1931 - 1.8 tons per hectare, in 1932 - 5.5 tons per hectare. Noteworthy is the fact that at the time of mass creation and expansion of the areas state grain yields fell to the lowest level , which corresponds to a severe drought . Apparently, in this case natural drought superimposed on the extremely low quality of fieldwork . In general , grain farms never became a way of solving the grain problem, nor a lever , which is entrusted with the task of revolutionary changes in agriculture. Attempt to achieve efficiency gains due to a sharp expansion of cropland has not led to any tangible result . Say Chaglinsky farm , with 200,600 hectares of arable land , can process as much as he had at the time of its arable education. Apparently land not only helped the state farms , but had the opposite effect , only disorganized economy , according to crop yields . But the main part of the land that used to be occupied by nomadic Kazakh economy, was not absorbed by grain farms, but by two farms trusts " Skotovod" and "Ovcevod." These were two major trust that animal husbandry farms combined . " Skotovd" engaged in breeding cattle , and " sheep farmer " - raising sheep . There were other livestock trusts . " Pig Producers ' united hog farms , " Konevodtrust " united state farms specializing in the breeding of horses and camels . However, these cattle trusts did not go to any comparison with a gigantic scale " Skotovod" and " Ovcevod”.
In 1931, in "Skotovod " trust , there were 56 state farms, which occupied an area of 16 million hectares of 41,500 , of which the main area is occupied by pastures. However, the trust had 3751.4 thousand hectares of arable land. At this time, the state farms had 616.2 thousand head of cattle. " Ovcevod" also turned into a rather big squares on trust . He had 9,945,100 hectares of agricultural land , including 1,352.2 million hectares of arable land . It was in 1931 1.179 million head of cattle. State farms of these trusts were really huge in their area . Say, a leader in the area of the farm was Kopal trust "Skotovd", located in Aksu district of Almaty region. He had 783.3 thousand hectares of land. Dimensions of this colossal farm highlights the fact that he held 39.9% of the total area . Slightly inferior to him Kokpekti farm trust " Skotovod", located in the district of East Kokpekty Kazakstan area. It had 731,800 hectares of land and occupied 38.2 % of the total area. In total , an area of over 500,000 hectares of state farms had nine trusts " Skotovod" and " Ovcevod ."
By the end of 1931 in all livestock farms in Kazakhstan , there were 1588.2 thousand heads of cattle. These data were obtained by summing the number of animals specified in each farm, in the description area of Kazakhstan. According to others, the state farms were 1,823,700 head of cattle. What is striking is the discrepancy between the size of farms and the number of livestock , and an enormous range of coefficients land area per animal . The largest , Kopal farm trust " cattleman " had 20,500 head of cattle , which is the head of livestock had 38.2 acres of farmland. Kokpekti farm trust " Skotovod" had 44,700 head of cattle , which is the head of livestock had 16.3 acres of farmland. Already between the two largest cattle farms was a huge difference . When comparing other state farms this scatter is increasing. Goloshekin state farm of " Ovcevod" trust in Pavlodar region East region of Kazakstan had 500.4 thousand hectares of land and 107,500 head of cattle , that is 4.6 hectares per head. Balan -Kul State Farm in " Ovcevod" trust in Esil district of Karaganda region had 400,000 hectares of land and 8,700 head of cattle , that is 45.9 hectares per head. From consideration of data about stock-raising the state farm one becomes obvious – the land and grounds they had much more, than it was required for a cattle pasture even for nomadic cattle breeding. On territories of the most part of state farms, nomadic farms could hold 1,5-2 times more cattle. Even the “Goloschekin” state farm could graze the sheep herds, without resorting at all to hay preparations as it had enough lands to hold sheep on a pasture. But after all the idea of state farms consisted not in taking away the earth and pastures from nomads, and to create the state semi-nomadic farm. State farms were created as large-scale highly productive commodity enterprises with intensive modes of production. Results of mass creation of state farms in 1930-1931 allow to tell what exactly in it the idea of state farms in Kazakhstan suffered full breakdown.
It wasn't succeeded to create any rather commodity, highly productive and intensive economy, without looking on any lands. Comparison shows that in respect of intensity of economy, collective farms often were more effective, than state farms. For example take the Aksuysky region of Almaty area in which was two large cattle farm and 76,5% of collectivization. We will tell if the Kopalsky state farm had 20,5 thousand beasts, and Bayan-Aksusky state farm of” Ovcevod” trust - 20 thousand beasts. Together they occupied 1071,8 thousand hectares of the farmland, or 63,5% of all agricultural area grounds. On a beast there were 26,4 hectares. 51 collective farms of the Aksuysky area had in the socialized sector of 27,1 thousand beasts, thus sowing 56,8 thousand hectares of crops, and occupying 614,6 thousand hectares of the farmland. 20,5 hectares of grounds were the share of a beast, minus the sowed areas.
So in 1930-1931 the livestock state farm and the collective farms taken in scales of the area, were approximately comparable on a level of development of production and efficiency of economy. State farms at all weren't neither socialism outposts, nor a revolutionizing factor in agriculture, carriers of the advanced equipment of production. All these hopes rested upon state farms, in Kazakhstan didn't come true. The reason of a failure of the state-farm program is obvious and lies on a surface – it was impossible to pursue quantity and the areas. It was necessary to create state farms of such scales and in such quantity in what they really could master the level of production which is much surpassing production in country or collective-farm economy.
Mass settling of the Kazakh population, combined with collectivization began spring of 1930. Unlike subsidence of last years, this process began according to the decision of governing bodies, it tried to carry out according to the plan and under the uniform management. On January 8, 1930 at CNK KASSR the standing committee on settling was educated. On March 19, 1930 CHK KACCP accepted the plan for subsidence for 1929/30 which included subsidence of 84340 farms. In total for a five-years period it was planned in 1930 to capture subsidence of 384 thousand farms. SNK USSR and SNK RSFSR counted that no more than 100 thousand farms will be transferred to settled life in Kazakhstan by 1932. But KDC's plans appeared where is more large-scale which were constantly reconsidered towards increase. So, according to the solution of January plenum of KDC in 1932 it was planned until the end of a five-years period to carry out completion of settling and transfer to settled life of all 567 thousand Kazakh nomadicfarminf, including 400 thousand in 1932. Thus, financing of arrangement of settling farms was conducted at the expense of the allied budget, and additional resources for the plans raised the kraykomovskikh simply weren't provided by anybody. Plans of subsidence and collectivization were made quite in the spirit of policy of mass collectivization. "It is necessary to aspire to that collective farms from among the Kazakh settling population to spring agricultural campaign included not less than 100 farms". But it only for semi-nomadic regions of the Central Kazakhstan. For agricultural areas creation of collective farms from 300 settling farms was supposed. Creation of 225 livestock state farms which had to occupy 35 million hectares was supposed, receive 3,5 million beasts, and in state farms have to settle in quality of working 100-150 thousand people. Philip Goloschekin spoke simply and clearly: "Really settling is a collectivization. Settling is an elimination of the bai -semi-feudal lord. Swttling is a destruction of the patrimonial relations". The spirit of it was rigid. However already results of the first year of subsidence were discouraging. On November 9, 1930 in People's Commissariat for Agriculture of KACCP the 1st meeting of workers on subsidence took place. The gathered heads and 28 representatives from the local bodies which were carrying out subsidence, were compelled to state a failure of the first year of subsidence. Comrade Kulumbetov in the performance spoke: "Work on preparation of masses was worse than ever put, often it replaced with administration … The attention only minutes of leisure was paid to subsidence. Forms, reports were formed, telegrams were sent and to it work on subsidence" was generally reduced. The failure of the program of the first year of subsidence was recognized also by comrade Kuramysov. The extraordinary formality of work on subsidence of the Kazakh farms wasn't a secret and later. In one of large summary works of Soviet period about it was spoken quite definitely: "All work on subsidence had formal character. Subsidence was considered not as a complex of economic, political and cultural actions, and only as a population attachment to certain points of subsidence, without possibility of providing settling cattle breeding farms by food supply and water". The program of arrangement of settling farms was strongly underfulfilled. Thus, of the planned 388 points subsidence was equipped only 28 %. Of 413 wells built 326 (78.5 % ) of the 11,985 residential units built only in 2919 (23.3%) , and even managed to build 4,500 homes from harvested materials . Of 920 schools built only 18 , and 300 shops - 12. Common indicators still look good compared to many points of settling, in which almost nothing was built. Cited the example of the Aktobe region in which of 1666 houses were piled up only 26 flimsy mud huts , built of 50 wells only 4. As a result of settling the District Plan was defeated completely, and left not even a zero , and a negative result - 6100 of nomadic households not settled none , and 200 households migrated from region. In general, nothing surprising. The leadership at all levels have something to do : collectivization , then struggle with excesses in collectivization , sowing , and then harvesting campaign. In the autumn of 1930 was a large-scale restructuring of collective management . In addition, it was necessary to write and send dozens of reports and reports on incoming circular letter directives telegrams . So indeed, proved to be a rare subsidence leisure. Special relationship with the farms were to settle in state farms, which was at that time made huge , hundreds of thousands of hectares of land holdings . In the construction of state farms in Kazakhstan can be divided into two stages . The first stage - in 1930 , when the number of state farms has increased dramatically compared with 1929 . This year it was established on 30 farms. In 1930 he passed the first stage of construction of state farms , which appeared as a result of 98 state farms with 207,200 hectares of arable land and 960,000 head of cattle. Number of households increased by 3.2 times . In the second phase , which took place in 1931 , the number of state farms increased to 128 households , but sharply increased the amount of land , arable land, and the number of livestock. So , in 1931, all farms had 31 million hectares of land 393,300 , 6,881,400 hectares of arable land and 1,823,700 head of cattle. It was a time not so much to increase the number of farms as a dramatic expansion of their size. Compared with 1929 the number of state farms has increased by 4.2 times , and the area they grew 35.4 times. In 1931, 10.5% of farms were seeded and cultivated area and had 16.4% of all cattle in Kazakhstan. Of course, in such rate of creation of new state farms, under such enormous size it was impossible to create a sustainable and productive economy, debug normal production technology, to provide agronomic practices crops. In this area, they bring nothing to the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan. But their role is not exhausted . They played a purely negative role in the process of settling , occupying the best land and farmland . The fact that the majority of state farms was established in 1929-1930, even before the mass sedimentation . They cut the best possible arable land, meadows and pastures best . Often found themselves on the lands of state farms and villages of the village, but such development plan intended to evict settlements with state farm land , giving them land in other areas. At the time of mass sedimentation began another process - scores in the state farms to huge land areas that given usually solid or array, or large portions . These lands objectively reduced the number of places where they could settle the nomadic economy. Settling disputes with the state farms farms began in 1930, when the scope of state farms was not as great as later . At the 1st meeting of workers settling in the People's Commissariat KASSR , Kuramysov in his speech quoted the words of one of the local workers ' best lands occupied by farms , where are settle Kazakhs population? ". Kuramysov answered this question in the spirit of a typical party chancery" These comrades did not understand the historical moment in which deposition occurs , do not understand that farms are a factor in accelerating and facilitating the settling ." In KDC really hoped that with the help farms subsidence of the Kazakh population , why Goloshchekin planned settling in state farms only 100-150 thousand people working , or about half a million people of the total population . But the reality was quite different. As already mentioned Kokpekty farm , management , received 700,000 hectares of land (ie , cutting took place in late summer or early autumn of 1930 ) , a thousand households from the entire " all drove off ." When the party district committee pressed the directorate , left the farm economy as workers, allowing them to plow 1-2 acres and keep some livestock. His performance led local worker with the words: " As a result, the local population with the pre-revolutionary state farms and landowners did not know where to move ."
It is seemed that it was practice not only one Kokpektinsky state farm, and such in this or that form was observed everywhere, in the majority of state farms. The majority of state farms, as well as the industrial enterprises, didn't wish to take for work of settling Kazakhs, mainly because the managements made on the whole of Russians or representatives of other European nationalities, considered nomadic Kazakhs not capable to work. Even if took, under pressure of Communist Party committees, at the first opportunity tried to reduce and dismiss. Results of the first year of subsidence were so deplorable that it was necessary to postpone arrangement of settled population in 1930 of farms to next year, and to equip them together with again settling farms. According to documents OGPU KASSR, fall of 1930 the mass migration of nomadic farms from Ural federal district, from where migrated to 10 thousand farms 60% from which made bednyatsky(poor) and serednyatsky (middle) farms was noted. In the document it is directly specified: "… the facts of mass migration out of limits of districts for the reasons of a lack of forages and the food" are noted. These words were underlined with a red pencil. It is possible to believe that the migrates were the settling farms which have thrown fruitless and feedless "settling point". At the end of 1931, despite obvious shortcomings of implementation of the program of subsidence for 1930-1931, even more grandiose plan of subsidence which had to capture 400 thousand farms in 1933 process of transition to settled life in Kazakhstan was complete was put forward. Under it the grandiose program of construction was developed. In the reference book "All Kazakstan. 1932” the summary of the plan of universal settling of the Kazakh population in the Guryev region of West Kazakhstan area remained. In 1931 in the area settled 1000 farms. Universal subsidence was planned for 1932 with the very in details developed plan. There was planned creation of:
- 10 fishing collective farms consisting of 4523 farms, settling in 12 points,
- 19 livestock collective farms consisting of 4020 farms, settling in 19 points,
- 1800 farms went to the industry, settling in 7 points,
- 950 farms went to the state farms, settling in 3 points.
Apparently, in this plan it isn't a question of rationalizing semi-nomadic cattle breeding, to provide its stability from jute or other natural disasters. Farms simply painted on collective farms, state farms, the industrial enterprises, and for subsidence points. Here subsidence in pure form acted as means of coercion to the accession to collective farms. However, these plans weren't fated to be realized. In 1932 settled about 20% of the planned number of farms, the program of construction wasn't executed even for 2-3%. Hunger forced nomads to throw rendered habitable places and to go to Turkmenistan, to Kyrgyzstan, to China. Instead of mass subsidence the mass migration turned out. The general result of the realized program of subsidence was such. Subsidence in 1930 captured 87118 farms, in 1931 – 77503 farms, in 1932 – 77704 farms. Only 242325 farms. In total 3288 points of subsidence were planned. In them it is constructed:
Houses – 24106,
Baths – 108
Farmyards – 990
Inventory sheds – 534
Smithies – 403
Granaries – 470
Stables – 410
Sheep-folds – 243
These results of construction were always presented as success of settling, and as an example of care of the Soviet state about the citizens. However, from comparison of these official results of the construction program to total of settling farms, it is obvious that the success and a pathetic failure of the program of subsidence is available not. Even on the most mass type of constructions – to housing, only 9,9% of requirements were provided. It is more difficult to make an assessment of requirements for economic constructions. But if to recognize that on collective farm it is necessary at least on one type of economic construction, and the typical collective farm included 70-100 farms (73,6 farms on the average on a subsidence point), it was necessary at least on 3320 farmyards, baths, inventory sheds, granaries, stables, sheep-folds. But in reality implementation of the program of construction fluctuated from 2,9% to 0,7% of this minimum requirement. In general, 90% of settling farms didn't receive housing, and 97% of the collective farms created on the basis of subsidence didn't receive necessary economic constructions. What it, if not pathetic failure? Nomads, on the whole, voted feet against such subsidence. In 1930-1931 according to approximate data, migrated about 183 thousand farms. For per year migrated approximately on 90 thousand farms, that is it is more, than settled. Probably that in it social stratification in an aul as the first those farms which had a cattle and horses for the migration and to which was what to lose rose by the migration was traced. Mainly low-power farms which don't have opportunities to start remained and settled. The destiny of the last was very bitter, salts are more bitter.

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

СообщениеДобавлено: 07 апр 2014, 11:55
Aliya
The Aday rebellion.
One of the largest revolts, which connected with subsidence in Kazakhstan during collectivization in march-August of 1931 was Aday rebellion. Usually in historical literature of the reason of this revolt associated with resistance , repressions, cattle confiscations of collectivization. All these reasons, undoubtedly, took place, however they couldn't become the reason of so large revolt which has captured all extensive Aday district, and accompanied by fights with OGPU groups. This revolt had other, extremely good reasons. First, it is strong jute of 1928 which left the majority of adays practically without cattle. After jute in the Aday district only 135 thousand heads of sheep were. It on more than 160 thousand people of the population of the district, that is in the district already at this time was hunger. The flour, hay and fodder which were delivered as the food and fodder aid, went to the Fort Aleksandrovsk, practically did not reach auls. But trade workers used jute for plunder of food aid and sale to her nomads at the fabulous prices. 1800 poods of a flour, at the price of 8 rubles were so sold for pood. Situation was so heavy that a cattle livestock did not restored. Thus preparations of cattle and skin proceeded. However it was only the beginning. In the spring of 1929 the plan of abolition of the Adaysky district transformed to the district was put forward. In July, 1929 the largest aday clans which fought before for the power in the district, united in fight against this plan under the slogan: "The rescue Aday – business of adays! ". However, this movement left nothing. In 1930 there passed one more administratively territorial - reform. Transition from a four-unit control system (an aul – the area – the district – the center) to three-unit (an aul – the area – the center) was made in which one of intermediate links – districts, were abolished. Changes and were made to republic division into districts. 122 areas were formed of 193 areas. Thus, cutting of areas was uneven neither on the area, nor on the population. The Aday district was abolished, and transformed to the Mangystau area, of 18 million hectares. Later it was included in the West Kazakhstan area. After the defeat of attempts to defend the independence of administrative Adaiah, autumn and winter of 1929-1930 , after two meetings in Karabaur and Tebbe , leaders of the movement decided to migrate to Turkmenistan437 . The struggle for power has already lost a practical sense , in the steppes adays famine prevailed , and labor leaders decided to migrate , it is too late . In poor and middle peasants who could not migrate to Turkmenistan, developed a truly revolutionary sentiments , and talked openly about the need to fight against the Soviet government. Troops tried to intimidate a population , " exposing " counterrevolutionary organization ( its composition , as was almost always in such hasty affairs, extremely colorful , here and bais , and traders , and the former Tsarist officials , and even the former Soviet workers Adayskogo County ) . Ismail Utegenov , OGPU arrested in this case , at the end of September 1929 handed handling people, which said: "The people are hungry. And what gives him power? Gives death. Do we need this kind of power? We kind of power that does not think about the people and oppresses it is not needed. Such power must be eliminated . I urge the government not to hand over their belongings hard for their families ". Definitely, on the eve of collectivization in Aday there was already a powerful revolutionary fermentation, and only one more straw was necessary to turn this fermentation into armed revolt. The plan of Aday’s settling which has been put forward in September, 1930 became such straw. From 32155 farms, this plan of subsidence covered 11851 economy, that is 36,8%. In the center all settling farms were painted who as settles. In the industry (generally oil), subsidence of 5718 farms, on fisheries – 1739 farms, to Karaksa – 600 farms, in Alty-Karasa – 500 farms, on river Wil – 1000 farms, on the river Emba and river Chagan – 2000 farms was supposed. Already at a project stage this plan was the extremely risky as assumed subsidence of nomads in unprepared places on the coast of the Caspian Sea, on oil fields (though the industrial enterprises extremely reluctantly accepted nomadic Kazakhs), and also on undeveloped lands where just it was necessary to create irrigating systems and to develop lands.
Prospects of this plan were based on the overestimated estimates of water resources of Aday and possibility of their development. Besides, the local management which and so already wallowed in waste of public funds, property, grain, in squandering of the prepared cattle and raw materials should realize this program of subsidence. Business reached before that party members, the Soviet workers and their relatives created pseudo-artels, obtained under them loans which were plundered by them. Concerning honesty of the local management the population had no doubts. Emergence of this plan of subsidence of adayets showed all doubting that it will be the end, it will be violent subsidence in the waterless district, confiscation and property plunder, death for hunger. In February, 1931 revolt in which everything united, from Bayev to hereditary poor people began. If earlier they had property distinctions, on the eve of revolt between Bai Beibituov, the middling person Karaydarov and the hereditary poor Oynsyrov, heads of one of groups risen, there was no difference – all of them became the extremely poor. Quickly Bakmash of Closets, the head of group approximately from 600-700 people who supported the migration to Turkmenistan and creation of the Aday khanate moved forward.
Near the Kaynar region, leaders of several kins elected Chulanov as khan. He called the population for revolt and opposition. He and several more groups didn't manage to achieve success. On April 21, 1931 OGPU group of Popov and the OGPU Saratov group Voronezh crushed the risen. After revolt defeat nomads were actually robbed by security officers, they selected 2470 beasts. On 222 families of participants of revolt only 1364 heads of adult sheep and 264 heads of young growth were left. "With such quantity of cattle of a family can live simply not, people were doomed in advance to hunger, to extinction" , - M. Omarov wrote. Security officers didn't manage to crush one group risen as on April 12, 1931 200 prisoners in the Fort Aleksandrovsk interrupted prison protection, captured the weapon and broke loose. Revolt received the second breath. Among the party and Soviet management the terrible panic which prompted to the population that there is something out of the common leaving began. Around Aday units were created , the number of which reached 2500-3000 people. The largest detachment located on Ustiurt commanded Myrzagali Tynyshbaev . Troops against the rebels threw 14 divisions , 18 more units were formed from volunteers sovrabotnikov , Communists and Komsomol . Their number reached 1,000. But they were better armed , had 12 easel and 8 machine guns , 13 trucks and two passenger cars , not counting the horses. To help them sent Baku squad OGPU ( 400 people ) , a unit of the 24th regiment of troops OGPU (100 shooters and 70 sabers ) of Gurieva and Saratov squad OGPU (100 people) . Rebels started with that began to rob procurement items , distributing cattle among the nomads , and kill activists and workers who did not manage to escape. In May, the rebels looted the two co-operative paragraph in the Fort Alexandrovsk , hijacked over 5000 head of cattle. In May and June were able to defeat the KGB detachment Myrzagali Tynyshbaev the well Bosaga 24-25 June 1931 . Tynyshbaev himself was killed in battle . However , June 23, 1931 Zhargalbeka Kozhbaeva squad attacked Fort Alexandrovsk . The city was a desirable goal , as it had more than 20,000 sheep , 1,500 camels and horses .
The capture of the city would allow insurgents to resolve issues of supply of groups and to extend the revolt territory. All party and Soviet asset armed with 60 rifles and 40 guns was mobilized for defense of the city. Fight lasted all day, however, its outcome was unsuccessful for insurgents. After unsuccessful storm the group was divided and left deep into steppes and the deserts of Mangyshlak and Ustyurt. In the middle of July, 1931 when pastures on Mangyshlak burn out, insurgents, with a total number about 3500 people, went down to the sea. Judging by the extremely avaricious information, insurgents were crushed in a train of skirmishes and fights with OGPU groups which at the beginning of July began to comb Mangyshlak. Battle with insurgents not always came to an end with a victory of security officers. On July 12, 1931 insurgents crushed group Bridge, from 18 which people five escaped only. However, the most part of fights came to an end with defeat of insurgents, and in August, 1931 revolt was suppressed. In total during Aday revolt, insurgents stole more than 40 thousand sheep, 1211 horses, 900 camels. They plundered procuring points with special exasperation, killing workers, destroying constructions. In 15 large fights and 8 skirmishes insurgents lost 168 people the killed, 22 wounded, 79 were captured, and 1715 people were arrested. Security officers took 137 rifles, 542 guns. It was the very badly armed insurgents, and guns a quarter had rifles hardly. The others were armed with peaks, sabers and other cold weapon. The remains risen which managed to leave security officers, dissipated on deaf corners of Mangyshlak and Ustyurt where they wandered up to the 1960th years, supporting confidential communications through which changed cattle for a flour and goods.
Disappearance of cattle.
All the above allows finally come to one of the main causes of famine in Kazakhstan - to lost cattle. Understand where lost almost 35 million head of cattle, is to understand the main causes of the disastrous famine in Kazakhstan. In this process, the mass extinction of cattle had their premises which we reviewed in detail. Such results led many factors: the mass collectivization, mass settling nomads, disorganization in the economy created by the collective farms and state farms, the best segment of land area under the giant farms, provision of livestock. During the 1929-1930, all these factors have led to steadily reduce herds in Kazakhstan. But in 1931, especially in the second half, the process of extinction of cattle took precipitous character.
For the first time a problem of reduction of herd in the republic KDC recognized at the beginning of 1930, and even created the special commission on analysis of this question. Goloschekin spoke at the VII All Kazakh party conference: "The special commission of comrade Isayev worked for us. It used all possible materials, and eventually came to conclusion that the animal husbandry at us decreased approximately by 30 percent". Till fall of 1929 the livestock of cattle grew, and made 40,3 million beasts at the end of this year. If to accept this assessment, in March, 1930 in Kazakhstan about 27,4 million beasts had to be. Exactly at that time Goloschekin also started the main explanation of the fact of a mass murrain which was widely used both during collectivization, and in all subsequent time, up to our days. On his explanation, the cattle "injuriously" get by bai and kulak, and thus tries to counteract socialist transformations in an aul. This version for a long time remained the main explanation of the reasons of disappearance of cattle, despite its obvious evidential weakness. Supporters of this explanation tried not to notice that more than 35 million beasts are a question of disappearance. If to assume that all this herd was destroyed by kulaks and Bai, it is necessary to recognize that each bais economy destroyed at least 1300 heads. At the same time, the thesis about injurious slaughter of cattle took an important place in promotion, and on March 21, 1930 the Central Election Commission and CNC KSSR even issued the resolution on measures of fight against injurious slaughter of cattle. The explanation for the fact of mass slaughter of cattle, most likely, is that because of the mass subsidence which has begun just in 1930, and because of creation of state farms to which the best lands and pastures were transferred, thousands nomadic farms lost a forage, and were compelled to hammer cattle that it didn't fall from a fodder shortage. 12 million beasts are about 100 thousand farms with an average livestock in 120 beasts. So at the beginning of 1930 the main contribution to a face of cattle made, obviously, just the settling nomadic farms rebuffed in unadapted and shell and core places, deprived of food supply. The huge contribution to destruction of cattle was made by provision of livestock. In January, 1931 there was a resolution of Bureau of Regional committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) on carrying out the provision of livestock. In this resolution it was recommended to implement 70% of the annual plan of preparation of cattle till April 1, 1931, and to ship in January-April of 70 thousand tons of meat for industrial центров448. Besides, bais farms obliged to hand over till February 10, 1931 to 25% of the plan of meat purveyances on agricultural areas, and to 35% of preparations on nomadic and semi-nomadic areas. In this resolution also it was declared: "The regional committee resolutely condemns a tendency of certain areas and workers not to implement the plan and to weaken rates of meat purveyances and shipment under cover of conversations on herd reduction, about need of preservation of productive cattle, about difficulties of adjustment of cattle to slaughter and shipment points. ". Judging by this resolute quote from the resolution, already then numerous objections against the provision of livestock were distributed, and requirements of the accounting of requirements of preservation of productive cattle and increase in its livestock were distributed. However, KDC simply swept aside all these objections. In 1930/1931 448,2 thousand tons of meat were prepared. In 1931 proceeded, obviously, mass slaughter of cattle by the settling farms deprived of a forage and rebuffed on unprepared sites, not having food stocks.
Together settling farms could hammer about 8-9 million beasts. The mass face of cattle was caused at all by "injurious destruction of cattle by Bai", and in some cases strong hunger. The document from Archive of the President of RK "The letter of the chairman of MNK KA Soviet Socialist Republic and KDC's secretary of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) in the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) Central Committee about "critical situation" with a supplying of bread and the food of a number of the regions of Kazakhstan, about the migration in connection with famine. On March 15, 1931" shows that in the spring of 1931 in the territory of being Kustanay, Aktyubinsk and Ural districts in semi-nomadic areas hunger already raged: "… many regional workers testify to existence in these areas, mainly cattle breeding, many cases of swelling because of hunger and even starvation". By calculations of U. Isayev and L. Roshal who have signed this letter, for food aid 33 areas in this part of Kazakhstan needed at least 3250 tons of millet. So the mass face of cattle settling farms for famine and a fodder shortage quite took place to be.
Kazkraykom laid great hopes on livestock farms, which had become an outpost of socialist livestock in Kazakhstan and the main suppliers of livestock commodity production. Livestock farms created generously staffed cattle, and in 1931 the state farms like "Cattleman" and "Sheep Breeders ' there were a total of 1795.2 thousand heads of cattle, or 16% of total republic livestock.
Where farms cattle were taken from? Usually this question is carefully treated party in Soviet publications. However, judgment of Kazkraykom VKP (b) and SKN KASSR "About deploying of socialist livestock" gives the answer. First, animals were transferred from the central authorities in particular, "Meat union". It was a cattle collected on state purchase of cattle. Part of it is slaughtered for meat, some were sent to live form the largest industrial centers in Moscow and Leningrad, and some passed into state farms. Second, the supplier of cattle was Narkomsnab KASSR who mostly purchased cattle from farmers, or other regions of the USSR. Third, the farms themselves bought cattle from settling farms or farmers. In short, the cattle that was in a state farms, was, for the most part cattle, until recently owned pastoral farms.
But this source gradually dwindled. Under the plan, the first half of 1931 in the Trust "Cattleman" planned to transfer 630,000 cattle, and was transferred to 158,5 of cattle (25.2%), in trust "Sheep farmer" planned to transfer 353 thousand heads, and was transferred to 157 thousand heads (44.5%).
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of state farms has been extremely low. Already in May 1931 there was summed up preliminary and very disappointing outcome year state farm management. In Slamihinsk farm trust of "Cattleman" (Talovskiy district of Western Region) in 1931 there was 10,073 head of cattle. Following an audit, in 1930 it fell 544 head, and in early 1931 - 1521 heads, that is, the farm lost about 15% of their livestock. Merkensk farm trust "sheep farmer" (Merkensk District of South Kazakhstan area) in 1931 had 76,500 heads of cattle, but in 1930 it fell in 1476 heads, and in January 1931 – 4037 heads. According to rough estimates, the farm lost 6.5 % of the cattle stock. State farm "Kugok" of trust "sheep farmer" (Lengerov District of South Kazakhstan area), had in 1931, 11,800 head of cattle, and lost 1689 heads in 1930, at the beginning of 1931 was lost 1877 heads - 22.8 % of the cattle stock.
Absolute record for livestock losses was the Aral- Tyube State Farm, which in early 1931 lost 35.6 % of the cattle stock in including 1349 fell heads, 1,444 heads were slaughtered for meat, 5054 heads Rented for slaughter for "Meat Union", 7847 heads of total amount. And all this farm was 22,042 heads of cattle - more than was socialized in cattle many areas. This farm is not listed in the detailed list of state farms, compiled at the end of 1931, and placed in the directory "All Kazakhstan - 1932". Apparently, for such outstanding economic achieve this farm was liquidated.
These data were obtained during inspection party organizations of Kazkraykom state farms, that is why the data is very sketchy and do not cover all farms. But, as we see, the situation was very sad, and many farms not only increased their livestock, but also it simply destroyed. Obviously, many state farm managers understood their task so that they needed some time to hold cattle, and then pass it to the slaughter, after which they will send a new party. Reasons extraordinary loss of cattle were, in general, are simple: there was no stockyards, feed was not. So, trust "cattleman" built only 53 % of the required stockyards and farms trust "sheep farmer" posted their cattle in homesteading . Large farms had only one-third of the required amount of feed, and some farms have stock only 1-2 months. In the farm number 8 scored cattle was so exhausted that I was not suitable food.
It is difficult to say how many cattle fell on the state farms. If we assume that average loss of cattle was about 10%, for the first six months management (Fall 1930 - Spring 1931), lost about farms 180-200 thousand heads of cattle. Until the end of 1931 the scale of losses reached probably 500,000 heads of cattle.
One of the most remarkable moment in the history of the march Kazakhstan to the abyss, was the creation and rapid growth of collective farm trade (CFT). After collectivization, purchased farm of cattle, subsidence, creating state farms and collective farms of commercial farms are the latest step toward disaster.
In the transformation of agriculture in Kazakhstan Goloshchekin was currently obsessed with the Commercial Farm increase the amount and proportion of marketable products. The greater the level of marketability farms, the more products can be harvested and send outside of Kazakhstan, which at the time supplied the meat Moscow and Leningrad. This idea of creating commercial farms held a red thread through all kraykom plans, and have been tried, perhaps all possible methods to achieve this goal. But no mass collectivization, no socialization, no farms were unable to achieve this goal. The last paragraph of this policy was the creation of the collective trade farm.
Despite the mass collectivization, in early 1931 it was clear that the collective basically turned socialized husbandry. Collective arose primarily as a collective partnership treatment cropland, whereas cattle remained in private ownership farmers. For example, in Kurday area with almost continuous collectivization share socialized animals did not reach 12%.
The strongest obstacle to the socialization of livestock was the lack of methods of collective animal husbandry, as well as necessary base. While even large livestock farms did not have enough stockyards, and often placed on cattle yards from the surrounding farmers farms. To reverse this trend began to create a farm that is separate from the collective farm households economy where going socialized livestock , and farmers must jointly caring for animals . The products of these farms were intended primarily for delivery to the state. First started to create dairy farms, and then came all the commercial farms other areas: meat and dairy, sheep-breeding, pig, horse breeding, goat breeding, and others.
Massive creation of collective farms began, obviously, in spring of 1931. By August 1, 1931, there were already 596 dairy, 184 swine, 210 sheep, and 12 goats breeding farm.
In August 1931 there was a dramatic change, which was the last step to disaster. In the summer of 1931 a number of economic executives said that Kazakhstan is headed towards economic disaster and 1932 expected sharp drop in livestock. By estimated number of business executives, purchase of cattle 1931 accounted for 60% removal of cattle.
Employee of KASSR State Planning Committee Toregozhin has amount the balance of cattle in Kazakhstan in 1932, which showed that livestock sharply reduced and the following year in order to remain Kazakhstan 275000 heads, except the offspring. This balance has caused the extremely sharp reaction in Kazkraykom and throughout the second half of 1931 "toregozhin" was criticized in almost all print media.
Critics believed that Toregozhin, relying on financial data accounting, understated number of cattle in their starting numbers. They believed that these data are not true and "…as a result of large shelter animals cannot give tangible indicators of population". They supposedly rests on more high efficiency of socialist economies , their higher marketability , higher carcass weight and lower case, not in the least embarrassed by the fact that these statements is not supported by the incoming areas of data.
However, calculations and other business executives of Toregozhin apparently had great response, and it was agreed by representatives of other economic bodies that made Goloshekin take decisive steps. Resolution of Kazkraykom VKP (b) and SNK KASSR "About deploying livestock socialist "from August 18, 1931, can be viewed as a response to criticism and generally Toregozhin course Kazkraykom . It was given a detailed plan for the development of the socialist sector in livestock for the remainder of 1931 and 1932. Development of state farms was decided to sharp increase in the herd major livestock trust.

Stock Bringing the cattle stock until the end of 1931 to (thousand heads) Transmission in 1932 (thousand heads) Bringing the cattle stock in 1932 until (thousand heads)
“Cattleman” 870 398,6 1406
“Sheep breeder” 1290 1265 2869
Maslotrest 15,6 5,3 27,9
“Pig man” 15,9 10 19

In 1932, "Meat Union" should be sent by 375.3 thousand heads of cattle and calves 342.2 thousands (in Trust "cattleman"), 5280 milk cows (in Maslotrest) 672 thousand heads of sheep (in trust "sheep farmer").
Development of collective farms was taken following rate.
Collective Trade Farms 1931 1932
Dairy 277,9 406
Meaty 95 511
Sheep 970 1123
Pig 32,8 18

In 1932, "Meat Union" was supposed to transfer to commercial farms 40.5 thousands of cows, 114 000 of calves and 800 000 of sheep. Do farmers expected to purchase 145,000 heads of cattle, 260 000 6000 calves and sows.
In fact, in August 1931, despite the obvious failure of such policy is supported by the facts, it was decided to further redistribution whipping cattle farms and collective farms commercial farms.
Already in September 1931, a plan to build the collective farms has been slightly adapted.
Collective Trade Farms (thousand heads) Plan of August 1931 Plan of September 1931
Dairy 277,9 235,3
Meat and dairy 95 75
Veal - 46,6
Sheep 970 1000
Goat breeding - 150
Pig 32,8 32,8
Horse breeding - 4

The total number of cattle in the collective farms was increased and redistributed in favor of the new types of collective farms. According to the elaboration of the plans the sources of cattle for collective farms were deciphered. The decision stated: "socialization productive livestock should be organized in the commercial farms. Based on media work should be ensured maximum socialization cattle located in personal use farmers. It was supposed to socialize 1 million head of cattle, and including up to October 1, 1931 it was supposed to socialize 510,000 head of cattle. 375,000 head of cattle supposed to buy from farmers, 200,000 heads get from "Meat Union" and even purchase 750,000 heads on credit.
Socialize million head of cattle! In fact, it was a plan for the full robbing farmers. Such a directive on the ground could lead only rampant, unfettered by the looting of cattle. Methods have already been mastered and used widely. Only once in the Soviet literature directly indicates the cause of the famine arose - unrestrained administration. Great falsifier of history of Kazakhstan’s farm peasantry A.B. Tursunbaev helped and was great in this - he was able to mention this fact in publication in 1957! Thus: "The Secretary of the Turgay Party Committee gave installation of local organizations - complete collectivization soonest socialization of livestock herders for ... one day. One member of the District Committee gathered cattle of 14 and 15 administrative villages in one place and distributed it into two parts: on the work piece, to a farm, and on socialized herd farm. As a result, Turgay area, where there have been distortions of the Party line in collectivization , there was a sharp reduction in livestock, and that nomadic populations had experience great food difficulties".
Extremely ironed message nameless perpetrators and other specific facts, there came to Soviet reader’s news about terrible catastrophe that befell Turgay. Of course, people who are familiar with the nuances of Soviet rhetoric clearly knew what was behind "Great food difficulties". Undoubtedly, it was worth in to master the methodology of falsification, lie and twist, to convey to the readers at least a grain of truth about the main thing.
All these measures are listed in the regulations were designed to strengthen collective farming and increase the yield of marketable products. So it conceived in theory, but the actual practice led directly to the opposite result. Uraz Isaev on III enlarged plenum of Kazkraykom in February 1932 cited the example of the cattle farm "Enbekshi" in village №10 of Ili district of Almaty region. Kolkhoz was organized in 1930 by 314 yards. However, none knows how many have been in cattle the organization of a collective farm, because since changed fieldworkers and chairmen, and did not keep records. In June, 1931, on the farm it was 1788 heads of cattle. On December 1st left 664 head, of which 236 heads delivered to the state, and the remaining 428 heads disappeared. "Where did they go, where is the cattle? Nobody knows, there is no any documents"- said Uraz Isaev.
In other words, the concrete result was the creation of the kolkhoz farms the exact opposite of the intended. Distilled in a poorly furnished and unequipped farm animals disappeared because of mass mortality caused by starvation and extremely poor care. From the remains of cattle something passed on meat purveyance and balances simply plundered and killed.
Obviously, at the end of 1931 , after the start of the last wave of socialization cattle farms for collective farms in Kazakhstan began everywhere massive plundering and slaughter for food. In fact, at the end of 1931 in Kazakhstan conducted a large-scale redistribution of private livestock farms into collective farms and state farms, which accompanied by mass slaughtering settles farms deprived of pasture and fodder, mass deaths on the farms , plundering and slaughtering food farmers. In these conditions socialized herd still somehow grew in numbers, but this growth was accompanied by the general decline of livestock herds, and particularly rapid reduction in private herds, which disappear at an alarming rate.
In 1931, in the socialized sector, there were 4,634,000 heads of cattle, representing 43.8 % of the total livestock population in the province. Thus, in 1931 Kazakhstan had 10.579 million heads of cattle. By comparison with the 1930 year, the number dropped to 16.9 million heads of cattle.
It is characteristic that the fact of this failure has been issued for the success. Mechanism of manipulation of facts was very simple: only the cattle had been calculated in socialized sector. Compared with the number of cattle in the collective and state farms in 1930, was an obvious growth. Because at the beginning of 1932 was triumphantly declared: socialized livestock herd increased by 148.4 % by 1930. And further: "Successes confirm that way socialist reconstruction of livestock is the only way, which rapidly provides a qualitative improvement Livestock of Kazakhstan and its marketability significant rise”. Book with this victorious reports was signed in print February 26, 1932, when already many areas of Kazakhstan unfolding famine.
In the second half of 1931 from 10.579 million head of cattle, 1795.2 thousand heads were in state farms, 2838.3 thousand heads were in the collective farms, the private possession - 5.945 million heads. Socialization and purchases planned for acquisition only kolkhoz farms is reduced amount to 1.375 million head, up to 4.57 million head or 23.2 %. In the farm had to go every fourth head of private herds. Essentially, this people seized cattle (socialized harvested or purchased - significant difference was no longer), almost entirely ceased to feed their former owners, and all the products from it was the state. Additionally there were state purchase of cattle and procurement for the needs of farms. In farms went about another 400,000 heads of cattle just before the end of 1931. Volume of state purchase of cattle private livestock is difficult to estimate, but it is still about 200-300 thousand heads of cattle.
In short, livestock, which remained in private ownership on the eve of 1932, can be estimated at 3.9-4.1 million heads. At it should be borne in mind that this is also experiencing strong cattle shortage forages and pastures, slaughter of fodder and food.
Such a policy of Kazkraykom was formed all the prerequisites for strong offensive, destructive hunger. Decision of 18 August 1931 was the last step, after which broke out in Kazakhstan disaster. After the 1921 famine in Kazakhstan was about 7.8 million heads of cattle, which was almost all in private hands. That's roughly 10 -11 heads of cattle on the farm.
At the end of 1931 consisted of 725,000 collective farms, or 66% of their total amount. Therefore, at this same time in Kazakhstan there were 1,098,000 households. In late 1931 the privately owned there were about 4 million head, which is almost two times less than after big famine caused by civil war, drought and jute. It is about 3.5 head per farm.
So what happened to the cattle? We can name a few reasons for the disappearance of once numerous herds:
1. About 17 million animals were culled from starvation when settling nomadic households fell during the collectivization stripped from carting, confiscated and so on.
2 . About 5 million heads were socialized and taken to the kolkhoz farms.
3 . About 2.5 million animals were taken for acquisition of farms.
4 . About 5.2 million heads are accounted for state purchase of cattle and sales livestock for taxes and perform grain procurements.
These estimates, of course, very rough, and clarify their unlikely possible.
Kazakhstan could well postpone the settlement of livestock state farms, collective farms and the creation of collectivization of farms, if these campaigns were carried out separately with a time interval, and accompanied by a thoughtless, reckless enhances deposition of nomadic farms. Done main breeding and the main contribution to the extermination of the herd made exactly this subsidence, repeatedly inflated rate that was initiated by Goloshekin. The combination of all these campaigns at one time and plunged in Kazakhstan unprecedented economic catastrophe.
Chapter 7 “People began to starve”
History of the great famine in Kazakhstan is of recreating fragmentary and heterogeneous information that maps, systematized and formed into a single picture. In this study, almost there are no secondary sources; each message will help shed light on the tragic events. Because, of course, had to be read and performances of main culprit of this tragedy - Philip Goloshekin, in specifically, his collection of articles "Kazakhstan on the paths of socialist conversion", published in 1931.
So I was given this book. It is a dark red cover with gold embossed name of the author and title. It is ordinary visual style of official publications of the beginning of the 1930s. I take a book in my hands, and cover it sticks to the fingers, as if soaked in blood of wet ... Contributions of time, books and magazines, preserved the precious traces of the terrible tragedy, signs that suppressed and tried by all means to forget and erase from memory. Dingy typographic font punched in the gray- yellow pages these traces, which we reconstruct the tragic events of that terrible era. It traces those who killed half the population of Kazakhstan. Another part of this tragedy, paintings disastrous famine, the faces of people, things, kept in a memory of witnesses who, sparing words they told them to us. These tracks reveal a terrible picture of the death of hundreds of thousands of people from hunger, disease and exhaustion, the disappearance of entire villages. But the most terrible is that the Kazakh leadership amid all these disasters continued to pursue its policy. Malnourished people were forced to collect grain, plow and sow, to produce marketable products and donate. Kazakhstan in the winter 1931 badly needed food assistance, but instead it was being prepared for the next "kolkhoz spring" with political campaigns and rush work.
No bread!
Low quality of crop in 1931 and extremely low yield affected at the end of 1931. Crop failure quite openly admitted by Goloshekin though he cheated on his drought, but not exclusively poor quality of sowing: "It must be borne in mind that in some poor harvest areas - not as much as 1931, but was previous two years. Consequences of crop failure were felt and had their reflected in all areas.
Situation was difficult. Kazakhstan has declined sharply number of harvested seed. If in 1931 was collected 1.5 million quintals of seed, by sowing in 1932 was able to collect only 450,000 quintals (2.8 million pounds), or 18 % of the required amount. And this is all pressure from the district committees and commissioners. On 1932 Kazkraykom needed to request seed loan of 8 million pounds. For comparison, in 1924, when it is not completely stopped the famine caused by Civil war and drought grandiose, seed loan was only 3 million pounds.
And these seeds were not enough, as the need for seeds was about 15 million pounds. Own taxes and seed loan covers only 10.8 million pounds, 72 % of the demand, and that seed loan, provided that all seed loan reach collective and will be seeded. In addition, food aid has been requested to level of 2.5 million pounds. In other words, grain in Kazakhstan virtually was needed and the republic and in seed and food aid. Scale necessary assistance exceeded the hungry years after Civil War.
Kazakhstan was clearly not capable of commercial exploits. However, Goloshchekin did not take into account all the forces and demanded collective seed filling, while setting a completely inhuman rule:"...seed loans will be dispensed to the extent of filling their seeds". Even from a purely economic point of view, this measure is objectionable because the very meaning of the seed loan just is to allow the seeds to those farms that have not, to they were able to sow the field and return the loan to the crop. This method is often rescued farms in the difficult years, and although it had to write off part of the seed loan issued. In the early 1920s Kazakhstan's leadership believed that the need to give seeds and provide crop, than to allow reduction in acreage. In 1925 it was already obtained by such a harvest, Courtyard surrounds allowed to cover all expenses on seed loan for previous lean years.
Goloshchekin, in fact, turned out of the way of the seed loan assistance collective means in total robbery farmers, in a way shoveling their last grain. A considerable part of the collective farms, which do not seeds could fall asleep, or because of crop failure, or because of what has already eaten yield essentially doomed to destruction. Along with the mass looting farmers in late 1931 in connection with creation kolkhoz farms , taking away various pretexts last productive livestock from their farms, seed epic winter 1931/1932 year was the immediate cause of the famine that swept once all regions of Kazakhstan. Because these seeds farms could not settle with the farmers and in April 1932 was published damning statistics. On March 20, 1932 of 5193 ended collective farm income distribution 3224, 472 or 65.9%.
Behind these dry figures worth the terrible truth. In early winter 1931 the vast majority of collective farms were not given to the collective farmers of grain on their earnings workdays. Calculation walked throughout the winter, and more than third collective farms were not able to pay its members their work. This means that most of the farmers did not have food for the winter and spring, the most difficult times of the year for any peasant economy.
Situation is only exacerbated by the fact that farmers in every way forced to work. Already in late 1931 in a massive collective unfolding forcing people to work in the kolkhoz farms. The decree "On the deployment of socialist livestock" from August 18, 1931 stated: "Kraykolhozsoyuz must finish all directions for the organization and integration of labor, exemplary production norms and piece rates for all livestock sectors in commercial farms not later than 1 November. It is necessary to provide maximum employment of women and young people, increasing productivity by introducing progressive piecework, thereby freeing free work force for seasonal work and increase marketable yield”.
Piecework was originally sweated system, which were aims to maximize the exploitation of labor farmers. But at the end in 1931 it has become a more and more brutal character. In December 1931, when Kazakhstan turned to the preparation another "kolkhoz spring" Goloshchekin clearly signaled that piecework - this operation at the limit of human power: "It is necessary, secondly, to provide elaboration on the collective meetings output norms and piece based on all kinds of farm work. Necessary, production quotas to reflect all those high productivity that have been achieved the best collective farms teams and kolkhoz percussionists in this year! This requires our task Bolshevik struggle for harvest “.
The reason for this extremely cruelty telegram became secretary of the Central VKP (b) IV Stalin and chairman of the SNK VM Molotov the leadership of Kazakhstan and Middle Volga Region on disrupting grain procurement from November 19, 1931, which stated: "The decision of the Central Committee plenum grain procurement breaks you blatantly. CC and SNK turn to you with a question: Do you intend to immediately arrange change in grain procurement, and if not this you have no hope, it is not whether to raise the question of a change of leadership in order to move forward grain procurements? It is easy to understand that after such a reminder of the CPSU (b) Goloshchekin was ready to do anything to not only be shifted from his post.
Heavy forced labor and virtually no food pushed people to exhaustion and death much faster than normal hunger.
State of individualists such detailed data, but there reason to believe that the situation there was even worse, because in 1931 the economy had a large insufficient sowing. Yes, and they were nowhere to sow something as arable land per person farm declined sharply. At the end of 1931 in Kazakhstan there were 421,800 individual farms, but together they had 429,000 hectares, i.e. 1.01 hectare to household. Not the best land, of course, because the best land climbed under state and collective farms. With such area could barely raise grain for half-starved existence, but individual farmers paid their taxes are brought to grain procurement and state purchase cattle. Already in 1931, chose not to individual farmers to plow and sow, and leave if there was a possibility. Apparently, this statistic reflects only the formal number of individual farms, whereas in fact, a considerable part of them have already fled to construction sites, factories, or even outside of Kazakhstan.
In such a situation, the areas in need of food aid, ambulance and emergency. But the help did not come.
Starting of famine
Mass death famine started in Kazakhstan in early December 1931, indicating that a number of documents. So, in a telegram from Ushtobe, sent in February 1932, states: "The hunger strike covers all villages near Lake Balkhash. In the remaining six administrative villages were 4417 farms, now it left 2260, of which 63% are starving. Rest of the population needed. The hunger strike began in early December 1931. The total deaths from inaccurate data, was at least 600 people".
From the statement of the Presidium of the USSR Central group of political exiles Pavlodar, dated February 1, 1932, also says: "For about a month and a half in Pavlodar regions flock of hungry, swollen and ragged people, mainly Kazakhs. City is overrun by them". In other words, in Pavlodar starving began to arrive in mid-December 1931, i.e. famine began in November and early December 1931, or even earlier, in the early autumn.
Special report confirms letter of OGPU KASSR "Special report OGPU Kazakh ASSR in CPC Kazakh ASSR on Hunger Strikes farmers and deaths from hunger. December 23, 1931" included the starvation in Pavlodar and Abralinsk areas.
Aulsovet number 4 of Maxim Gorky district wrote in the USSR Central Executive Committee that in 10 February 1932 in their area have already died of starvation three village numbers 9, 10, 11, and people are dying of hunger in the Pavlodar Irtysh and areas.
Spring famine began in the Northern Kazakhstan. Petropavlovsk regional committee reported in April 1932: "In 12 districts of North Kazakhstan region to April 17, 1932 accounted for 246 deaths from hunger and swelling of the fact".
These messages allow reconstructing the death march of famine in Kazakhstan. First of all, in the spring of 1931 famine was celebrated in 33 districts of the former Ural, Kustanai and Aktobe regions, which for winter 1931 was the massive and disastrous. In October and November 1931 a strong mortal hunger began in East Kazakhstan, covering the northern part of the Alma-Ata, and central part of the East Kazakhstan region. Spring severe famine began northern Karaganda region and Northeast Kazakhstan area. This, of course, extremely inaccurate data, but they allow you to see how the wave of famine spread over the territory of the Autonomous Republic.
The most eloquent message of the death of hunger came from Bishkaragay district: "Almaty’s lightning to Kazakh Central Executive Committee. In Bishkaragay district of Baukov board people begin to dead of hunger for information report of broad".
The atrocity of destructive mass starvation cannot be described in words. All eyewitnesses extremely stingy words, talking about the same: people eating carrion, dead horses, dog meat: "Most of the remaining time of the survey are scavengers, decayed meat, bone soup, mash bran and cooked skin,"- said in a survey report points settling" Kazgorodok". In the spring of 1932, when the snow melted, the starving collected rotten ears in fields peeled the grain ate and died. Thousands of people wandered in search of food, fell and died on the roads. "My dear, I do not wish you to see even in a nightmare that I've experienced in my life" - said the oldest inhabitant of Kazakhstan Sahan Dosova eve of 130th anniversary.

Re: The Great Famine in Kazakhstan in 1932-1933 years. D.N.

СообщениеДобавлено: 07 апр 2014, 11:56
Aliya
Resorts of hungry time
However, except of dying of hunger in Kazakhstan there were people who do not hungry and did not experience deprivation. These services were not only responsible for good cuisine and excellent supply of workers, but also resorts in different parts of Kazakhstan.
Just only after seeing the card in the library catalog, I realized that I will have a small discovering. The card reads: "Resorts of Kazakhstan. Guidebook. Almaty - Moscow, 1933 ".
I have to say, the card did not disappoint me, and the book really contain valuable information revealing this era perfectly with the other hand. Here it is the book in front of me. Customary to begin the 1930 edition in a nasty gray-brown paper, dingy font, besides with rough sawn-off pages and uncut somewhere rebate sheets. However, the cover clearly makes to order a designer, though it was printed very dull colors.
What kind of reference -guidebook? In 1932, Kazakhs Resort Trust organized in April 1, 1931, united the then 13 resorts in various fields, decide to issue Guidebook. The preface states: "This book is the first attempt to give a relatively complete description of resort resources of Kazakhstan".
The book consists of descriptions of resorts and their specific features.
Shown climatic conditions, medical contraindications, explain how to get to the resorts. At the end of the book accompanied by information on how ordered vouchers, as well as rules on the treatment location. In this sense, the book is a unique source, which displayed the very first steps of development of resort business in Kazakhstan, and the then state resort resources.
Let us leave aside the famine, and see what resorts are listed in this directory: climate - Chimghan, Alma -Arasan,
Climatic-kumys - Kamenskoe plateau, Ber - Chokur, Ak- Kul, Shungay,
Aul, mud - Yana -Kurgan, Sor, Ak- Kul Aral mud baths,
Warm water - Alma -Arasan, Rakhmanov fount, Barlyk -Arasan,
Arasan - Kopal.
The book provides a fairly detailed overview of known at the time the mineral springs of the Tien Shan and the Zaiyliskiy Alatau as used in resorts and promising.
The largest ski resort was and climatic resort Chimghan in Chimganki River gorge at a height 1370 meters. It contained 750 people at the same time, and in 1931 received the 2257 people.
In second place was the resort Aul, 4 km from the station of the same name. Capacity of this resort was 500 people, and its specialization was treatment of various forms of tuberculosis. Then the great place in the treatment of tuberculosis patients played kumiss, and the resort was its economy, as well as standing yurts for treatment.
Third scale was Borovoye resort, which was established in 1929 year and at the beginning in 1933, which could take 365 people. The complex is constantly developed in 1931 were built four new housing in 1932 was a winter resort, and the plans for 1934 Trust intended bring up to 1000 people in resort . The oldest resort was Ber-Chokur, founded in 1910, restored in 1924, and also specialized in the treatment of tuberculosis.
In Kazakhstan, there were two large mud baths: Yana -Kurgan (170 seats) 170 km from Kyzyl-Orda, and Soar (200 seats), 10 km from Semipalatinsk.
Warm-water resorts were small. Alma-Arasan, opened in 1931, could accommodate only 100 people. At the time of the directory, there was built a new building. Rakhmanov fount in the foothills of the Altai, as housed 100 people, the smallest water resort was Barlyk -Arasan contained up to 60 people.
By reading this guide, a guide, and the picture appears solar Kazakhstan, where people go to resorts and rest on beautiful mountain resort Chimghan. However, if you remember, against any events started this book, the picture is quite different. It is very unsightly. And amid all these events Kazakhs resort Trust decides to release a reference - guide to resorts Kazakhstan to make it easier for travelers to choose a place of rest and treatment. Resorts actively build and expand even in the peak hunger as Borovoye resort.
In Guidebook there was no hint of what resorts provide some help to the starving. The handbook was Information about visiting spas because some were closed for reconstruction. Capacity resort was small, and if they are at a little help starving, their work would have been profiled completely paralyzed, and about any Guidebook then we would speech was not.
The very fact that this guide suggests that even in peak hunger resorts Kazakhstan continued their main job, and taking visitors. Here it is the very small discovery. In Kazakhstan, at the time of the famine was a layer of people very somewhat, which not only starving, but even checking heal and relax at the resort. Of course, these were not ordinary farmers and workers that while hundreds of thousands died of starvation. Most likely, they were representatives of diverse leadership: the party and state, including the people who brought to Kazakhstan disastrous famine.
Of course, all people of Kazakhstan while somehow knew about what was going on, even if not from government reports and briefs, and from what we saw firsthand and through numerous rumors. At a time to go on holiday to heal, I must be absolutely senseless death, perceiving them as strangers or enemies. Between the masses farmers of the villages and by spa was great, huge and totally irresistible social chasm.
These advertising resorts during disastrous famine may shed light on why the famine in Kazakhstan at Goloshchekin was exerted no significant help. Even under the most cynical attitudes toward people as Manpower, extra wide suppression of hunger and famine relief was badly needed. In the USSR, as well as in Kazakhstan went completion of the first five-year plan was being built numerous industrial facilities, and entire cities. Kazakhstan on high hopes is as one of the suppliers of grain, meat and wool. Huge damage to agriculture of Kazakhstan, which for decades pushed the republic from the standpoint of the largest breeding areas of the USSR, was very disadvantageous to the Central Committee, the Regional Committee of the Party and personally Philip Goloshchekin. He was at the first signs of hunger to take drastic measures to suppress hunger, in general, is relatively simple, as the experience of the first secretary of the regional committee of Kazkraykom, Levon Mirzoyan.
Reason for this strange behavior under the leadership kraykom Goloshekin evidently is sought in respect of this guide to the people, primarily to the Kazakhs. Manual obviously did not consider the rest of the population of Kazakhstan fully human, to treat them as enemies, and was prepared to accept the death of nearly half the population of the republic. Guide only required, in spite of that, grain, meat and taxes, and itself in the most difficult moment of hunger continued to go to rest and to be treated in the mountains and on the water.
These were the true enemies of the people, destroying people all ways. Resorts hungry this time show and highlight.
Sowing of the hungry years
In terms of destructive hunger, which in November-December 1931 year fell on most of Kazakhstan, Kazkraykom demanded sleep seeds. "Create a threat to the collection of seeds is has no excuses", - said in an editorial in the journal № 2-3 "Bolshevik of Kazakhstan" for 1932. In essence, it was the policy of murder.
Did the leaders know about the situation? They did. Firstly, in Kazkraykom and Kazakh Central Executive Committee and the continuous flow were telegrams and letters describing the horrors of dying from hunger villages and farms. Judging by the letter Isaev and Roshal in the CPSU (b) of 15 March 1931, they are well imagined scale of the disaster and even requested food aid. But at the same time, plans for further support of "socialist construction", made speeches about the "successes" and planned Bolshevik sowing in spring 1932. Kazkraykom planned to plant 5.5 million acres.
Plan sowing generously reduced by 140,000 hectares by compared to 1931. However: "The main task this year - to plant a smaller area than last year, but sow in compliance with all agronomic rules and thereby give the country more products."
Sarymuldaev knew what the situation, and what farmers will seed that all winter eat carrion, decayed meat and bran, emaciated and swollen from hunger that has not yet been scored and uneaten horse barely stand on his feet. Only absolutely heartless person could write a line about "respecting all rules Machinery", knowing mortal famine that engulfed Kazakhstan.
Malnourished, hungry people forced to seed. It is difficult to imagine the cruelty of Commissioners and activists drove them to agricultural work, heavy and well-fed man, and it is difficult to imagine all the suffering and hardships that have fallen on the shoulders of farmers. Third Bolshevik sowing was carried out mainly by them as independent farmers, in fact, refused to sowing. In 1932 they were just planted 80,900 hectares throughout Kazakhstan, instead of the planned 237 500 hectare.
Sowing was virtually none. Dry statistics kept information about it. In Kostanai region accounted for 40 hectares of crop on the farm in Mamelyutsk area - 26 hectares of household. Of course, in a position of no "to any rules Machinery" and there could be no.
According to statistics, up to 15 June 1932 was planted 5.1 million hectares of spring crops, or 92.7 % of the planned acreage. But what are the crops? At the end of 1932 Goloshchekin admitted that sowing 1932 was much worse than in 1931. Here is just a collective board deceived district committees and guide a variety of methods, exaggerating all ways acreage. In some areas Alma- Ata region (probably more authorized Kazkraykoma already ventured to travel), the size of crops was an exaggeration thousands hectares. So, in TaldyKurgan district fraud was 21 thousand hectares (21.5% of the cultivated area in 1931), in Lepsinsk Area - 7000 hectares (14% of the cultivated area in 1931). In areas were willing to do anything to show only reports these hectares.
Goloshchekin criticized and cited figures: 151 nasty case processing Hemley, 105 cases of reduction of cultivated area, 198 cases deliberate understatement yield 92 show case sown areas as sown. Fed no one is hungry, whereas peasants made every effort to conceal at least a handful of grain to survive. For example, sowing rate was 6 pounds of seed per hectare, and sowed everywhere 1.5 pounds. Remaining grain hid in pits.
Commissioners and activists, as follows from the speech on Goloshekin V Plenum Kazkraykom December 16, 1932, even at the peak of the famine collected from farmers even hid it in a hungry time grain. Goloshchekin said that Kazakhstan revealed rifled bread 200 thousands of pounds. You can be sure that none of these tons of grain is not was left starving. Only this confiscation killed thousands people.
Judge the harvest in 1932 is very difficult, because now no one can not establish the actual dimensions of crops, crop yields and real acquisition. The papers could be written any numbers that are seen from the above examples, it is very far removed from the terrible actually dying of hunger in Kazakhstan. If conventionally Agricultural areas of Alma- Ata region forged statements on 20% of its area, it is easy to imagine that happening in other places. Goloshekin report shows that a large part of the harvest in 1932 year If there was, it was only on paper.
Even where some were able to gather the harvest, it is in all way plundered . Another source of food, in addition to stealing, in 1932 year, the rural population of Kazakhstan was virtually no because their private households were looted socialization, blanks and seizures cleaned, and the sale of bread and food products simply not conducted. In December 1932, the Karaganda regional committee Party admitted: "In these collective (meaning collective Presnovskogo district of Karaganda region - auth.) large amount of bread pilfered . Stealing organized and polls, ranging from government, predselsovetov cells and secretaries".
Policy of Goloshekin resisted everywhere and always. Over the years 1929-1932 in Kazakhstan occurred about 300 revolts in which took about 80 thousands of people. Party members were also resisted. Becker said: "They approved a secretary District Committee and until he reached the area, they were forced to exclude it from party. The fact that he said bluntly: "I'm not going on the bones of farmers procure bread for the state".
This, of course, was not isolated examples. Facts resistance of Goloshekin’s disastrous policy was set. However, until mid- 1932 Kazakhstan's senior management to maintain the unity and supports the continuation of the "socialist reconstruction", even when the roads became republic carpet corpses of hunger and exhaustion.
Summer of 1932, resistance to the Goloshekin’s policy erupted on higher levels of the party and state authorities in the Autonomous Republic. July 4, 1932 in Kazkraykom received a letter from five Communists G.Musrepov, M.Gataullin, Davletgaliev M., E. Altynbekov, K. Kuanyshev in which they sharply criticized the policy Goloshekin and indicated that Republic remains eighth livestock 1930:" ... this huge damage unprecedented destruction of cattle took place not only at the bai and fist, not only middle and poor-individual farmer, but mainly in socialized and non-socialized herd collective farms and farmers (partially and state farms) ... There is unheard of reduction in the number cattle ... there is a complete absence of grain stocks until the next harvest ... Correct if our point of view in the field of real help returning to Kazakhstan ‘s transhumance, who have absolutely undermined any economic basis, still dying in some areas in large numbers? How well ... still continuing reticence that looks like fear of the Bolshevik self-criticism in matters of disaster reduction in livestock and famine that engulfed many Kazakh areas with mass mortality some areas (starting from the second half of winter)?”
Goloshchekin responded to this letter threatening expulsion from the party and arrest, and as a result, 11 July 1932 four signatories except M.Gataullin, who was on a business trip brought repentance statement, and at the meeting of July 15, 1932 letter to reviewers gave a reprimand. According to Gafu Kairbekov Goloshekin personally offered to Gabit Musrepov go to Turgay to yourself to make sure that no there was no famine.
Failure to contacting Kazkraykom nevertheless received some effect. Senior members of the Kazakh leadership were certainly familiar with the contents of this letter or even themselves present at the meeting of Regional Committee, which was his analysis. This is probably what prompted the letter chairman SNK KASSR Uraz Isayev for his act. Uraz Isaev lived unrighteous life. He personally conducted and implemented the policies that led to the death of half of the population of Kazakhstan from hunger. In August 1932 he betrayed his party fellow writing a letter over his head in the CPSU (b) on the situation in Kazakhstan. In fact, it was a denunciation of Goloshekin. However, the combination of these actions, and led to the termination of the great famine. Letter of Uraz Isayev has had a result for several reasons. Firstly, being the chairman of the SNK KASSR, knew the situation in Kazakhstan, as it was to him was a large flow of letters and telegrams from the field. Second, a letter was written to Stalin personally through the head Goloshekin and contained a direct criticism of the first secretary of Kazkraykom proposal to replace the manual. If the reports of famine little allocated to the Politburo of the CPSU (b), and against the background of Stalin personally widespread famine in several regions of the USSR: Ukraine, the Volga region, in Siberia, and the associated flow of information and requests, here is the fact split the party organization, certainly drew attention.
So Uraz Isaev wrote: "In 10-12 areas of the Central Kazakhstan are hungry and now a significant part of the population. According to approximate data, in the spring of this year died from starvation 10-15 thousand people, mass carting, care in other territories and republics, especially efforts in 1931 not halted now. Many Kazakh areas, compared with 1929, not even half of the population. Common number of farms edge now less than 1931 on 23 -25 %. Kazakhs and their hungry street children accumulate around industrial enterprises and state farms in the Semipalatinsk and Aktobe railroads involved theft, precipitated the collective farm fields, cut off ears. Hunger, congestion, dirt were ground for the spread of epidemics: smallpox, typhoid, dysentery and others ".
Isaev proposed measures to remedy the situation: "It is impossible, of course, the blame of our shortcomings blame on someone one. Here is guilty of all Regional Committee of the Bureau as a whole. Personally, I carry some responsibility for shortcomings and mistakes and regional committee and all of our work in Kazakhstan, for Kazakhstan is the governing employee. However, in order to decisively to restructure and strengthen the work of leadership, it is necessary refreshment and renewal of regional committee leadership. It is special role First Secretary. Personally, I think that Goloshchekin did great job in Kazakhstan (Sovietization villages, fighting and factionalism etc.), will not have the required strength to turn determined based on harsh criticism of errors and territorial committees, and their own”.
Stalin's reply was followed by 17 September 1932. On this day, the CCVKP (b) adopted a resolution on assistance to Kazakhstan. It put forward the following measures to help:
- Release 2 million tons of food aid and seed loans
- Free for two years from state purchase of cattle
- Cancel the debt and release of two years from the statetaxes and mandatory payments
- Allow the use of up to 100 head of sheep, 8-10 head of cattle, camels, 3-5 and 8-10 on stock of herd horses.
This ruling was abroad, which separated and destructive Goloshekin destructive policies from a long and complex process restoring the economy of Kazakhstan, virtually destroyed insane "socialist reconstruction".

Chapter 8 The defeat without war
In October 1932 Gabit Musrepov traveled to Turgay, where, as he said Goloshchekin, "there is not hunger." Reaching Kustanai, he and its attendant came to the Executive Committee, whose chairman said them: "Where are you suffered? Deserted road, storms sweep, and to Batpakkary half thousand miles. Freeze. Or eat you". But, behind the request, chairman of the executive committee gave horses, sleighs and armed guards.
He was driving down the road, littered with corpses. Gafu Kairbekov with words Gabit Musrepov Valery Mikhailov said: "For the aul Aulie -Kol in the steppe storm began. Snow dust clouds shrouded the sun.They strayed from the path, the horse stood. And suddenly Musrepov remarks aside something sticking out of the snow, like gnarled branches of Haloxylon. He jumped down from the sledge and went. Under the snow lie the corpses of people. Shuffle, side by side. Walked on and saw the corpses, collected together and stacked in piles. "They were like towers on the picket lines ... - Said Gabin. - Thanks to them and found a way, corpses towered on either side. Nothing worse than into seen..."
They got out of the snow drifts and drove this road dead. Ahead lay completely empty villages. Conductor of the local calling numbers of these villages - only numbers and different: nowhere left empty. Drove to an unusual eye Kazakh town of yurts. Since the beginning of many such collectivization came across the steppe. Yurts are written for some reason in the series, and each room is hung, as if this town house on a city street. Tents are spacious, new, made of white felt mat - the driver explained that recently their local bais away. Another two or three months ago, he added, there was crowded. Now there was dead silence. No sound, only the rustling blizzards. Dead city of white yurts on the white snow.
Go into one tent to another: all things in place, but no people. Life as if in a moment stopped, and the people disappeared.
Musrepova particularly struck by a wealthy six-winged the wagon. It was cleaned bright silk blankets and satin pillows, plush carpeting with subtle pattern. Things collected in the middle, lay bagged, if hosts second ago out of the house and is about to enter again. But it is only at first glance. Felts and carpets on the floor all froze, and snow pours through the open tundik - hole in the dome.
They took measure of somedoby - and this huge pack clothes reminds shelter. Small hole in the middle ... as if a dark window in a strange world. And suddenly all four men, two of whom were armed, suddenly afraid of something. Trembled, shuddered and began to retreat toward the door. They could not stand out on the street. Gabit Musrepov left home last. He paused on the threshold, if he felt: there, inside a small hut of piled clothes, there is someone.
They did not go anywhere else, as if afraid of something. Went to the edge of town voiceless piled with snow, stood with bowed heads. It was time to go back. When walked back, I doubt crept Musrepov: indeed there really no one? And where, finally, are the bodies of the dead? He suggested that all of the regional committee of the instructor, who was accompanied by his inseparable. He replied glumly that Turgai many such towns of yurts and the beginning of autumn people are scattered in all directions. In Kustanai left in Chelkar, the Urals, in the direction of Tau and SyrDarya. And almost all of them perished on the way. That their corpses lie piled in stacks. Both Kustanai guard nodded in confirmation of their heads. "How do you know?" - Have asked Gabit to kraykom. He only smiled sadly.
Hard pulling legs of snow, they marched to the sledge. Suddenly Musrepov, unable to resist the apprehension of the unknown, turned to the yurt of rich white felts where they came. His companions followed behind him.
"Ohh, but someone here traces" - someone exclaimed.
They huddled near the strange prints in the snow. Traces were very fresh ..
"Who is it? Korsak? Fox?"
"No, not like! It seems to be ... but this cannot be!"
The men went on the trail that led directly to the yurt.
Unexpectedly came home empty inside thin shrill sound, from which all went cold. Whether the dog yelp, whether furious cry cats - and this was accompanied by rumbling.
Of pinhole of shelter popped a small living creature caught on and people. It was all in the blood. Long hair icicles are frozen in a bloody and stuck to the side, legs thin, black like a crow’s feet. Crazy eyes, his face caked in blood and smeared with fresh blood dripping. Teeth bared, mouth - red foam.
All four recoiled and ran beside him with fear. When looked, this creature was gone.
"What was that?" - Croaked Gabit looking at satellites. They were silent, trembled trembling. No one said a word. Only later, in Kustanai, one of the travel companions said to him:
"You probably think that it was a genie? No, it’s not a genie. I could see clearly discerned. This was a man. Kazakh girl seven years -eight»
Gafu Kairbekov obviously changed a bit the end of this story, to spare the listener. Armed men do not run from an unknown creature. Most likely, as soon as they saw it, one of the guards raised his rifle, slammed a shot and shot by satellites considered a little girl.
This story writer and poet treated explicitly based on the story of the Gabit Musrepov, and contain a shred of information about what was happening in the Turgay steppe. His description of the towns of white yurts - these are typical "settling point" nomadic households. They saw no permanent structures such as houses, sheds, it may indicate that these farms were upset in the spring of 1932, and had nothing but their own property. While it was possible to graze cattle on the surrounding pastures, people lived in settling these points. But in the fall, when the feed was gone, cattle fell or was jammed, could not gather the harvest (not known whether the crops here), people began to disperse and found their death on the road. The road itself was a roadway, and the travelers, apparently guide corpses dragged from the road to the sidelines in the heap and stack, which saw Musrepov. Last people in the "points of subsidence" ate human flesh, and his companions found Musrepov horrible end of the last inhabitants of these villages perished.
Leadership, both in the executive committee of Kustanai and in territorial and knew what was happening, but did nothing to help poor people, literally finger and thumb do not hit to help them.
Goloshchekin sent Musrepov in Turgay look at socialist prosperity. Musrepov native Turgai saw piles of corpses and dead villages.
In July 1932, when in Almaty went proceedings Kazkraykom letter, one of its signers - GATAULLIN Mansour was sent on a mission to Kent district of Karaganda region. In 1937, at the trial, where he was tried in the District Karkarala including leadership, he spoke about what he saw there : " ... I came out of the car - anyone or anything around, only LWB cattle worth. I opened the door, and there corpses. Some eyes are still open, but it is clear: to die at any minute.
I went back. And on the street there were screaming. Crazy, disheveled woman with knives attacked the driver, trying to kill him. I shot into the air, they fled. Looked more closely, and stands close to the cauldron on the fire. Something brewed. Opened the lid - and there , in the gurgling water, the flash of leg , then the pen, children's heel ... That's when I became the enemy of enemies".
Gafu Kairbekov told more about the traces of the terrible tragedy Turgay: "Before the war, when I was ten years old, somehow we went on a cart zatoplivom. Shrubs, reeds, dry grass - all went into the furnace. Just outside the town, the wooden wheels of steel grit waddle through something. And the creaking - strange, bad, hearing cuts. I jumped down from the wagon, and in the sand round bone. Who scattered them here? Tear the grass, collect dry branches - and everywhere, bone. Or lying on the surface or a little sand drifted. Then the skull steel fall, human". According to him, the whole Turgay was in the ring of human bones.
Writer Mukhtar Magauin recalled: "In 1944, we wandered, I was four years old. Nomadic came twelve days after the ancient ways of our family from the south to the north of the Semipalatinsk region Dzhezkazgan. We drove a distance of three kilometers. I still remember : the empty wintering home with broken windows and doors ripped off , so long been inside leschbischa wolves human skeletons and skulls scattered all around the ground; thousandths herds of saiga ... No man , no village is not met on the way - all emptied the thirty- second year".
Zeitin Akishev in the book "Zaual" describes how in May 1934, he visited the extinct village from starvation in Akkuduk in May area of Pavlodar region "we Carried 120 tons of seed grain. We stopped in the village. Empty: no people, no Sobko . On the outskirts looked into a house - no one. Go into the room. It blocks a curtain - so usually in the Kazakh young family homes separated. I took over the matter, and it's all crumbled to dust. On the bed lay two skeletons. Hair - one had long black hair, the other is much shorter - we guessed that it was a young man and woman. Looks like newlyweds. Probably when approached starvation, decided to die together. So in an embrace and died".
Director of the Kazakh radio " Free Europe - Radio "Freedom" Edige Magauin leads memories of his father:" That summer 1952 , my father learned about how his own father, who in 1932 year immediately after receiving the certificate of the teacher , was sent teach in the village, but could not find a single disciple, because all children died. He learned how our relatives survived because half bag of wheat, which was issued to my grandfather as a fee, how they saw people near the train stations, eating human corpses, as they went back to his native village after end famine and met only 13 families, survivors of initial 70.
Documents are also preserved traces colossal disaster that engulfed Kazakhstan. Chairman of the SNK Turar Riskulov in his letter to Stalin, Kaganovich and Molotov on March 9, 1933 wrote: "According to local authorities, and Turgay Batpakkarinsk areas 20-30 percent of the population died and most of the rest of the population migrated. In Chelkarsk area some 30-35 percent of the population died. In general, the Aktobe region, (where are these areas), chairman of the executive committee Comrade. Ivanov said in a report to the Regional Congress of Soviets (July 1932) that in 1930 the population was 1,012,500 people, and in 1932 left 725,000 people, or 71%. According to the chairman of the Kyzyl- Orda executive committee, in this area the remaining it was 15-20 percent of the population. In Balkhash area (according to the local people to migrate 12,000 people, 36,000 people died and 12,000 people left the Kazakhs. Karatal In the area last winter during the forcible resettlement by settling three Kazakh villages elsewhere killed half the population ... In Chubartavsk area in 1931 was 5,300 households , and on January 1, 1933 1941 left farming. Karkarala in the area in May 1932, there were 50,400 people, and by the month of November left 15,900 people.
Of course, the accurate accounting was not conducted even OGPU organs. July 7, 1933 "512 states that from March to May 1933 were registered in Kazakhstan 7000 deaths from starvation. Apparently, the GPU could be detected only a negligible number of deaths and in many areas that are dying without exception, the staff did not even OGPU owl.
Failure to provide assistance
Philip Goloshchekin to the moment when it was removed from the post of first secretary Kazkraykom, managed to commit another crime - failure to provide famine relief. Despite the straight directive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), virtually no assistance was provided. There is an impression that the actual implementation of this decision sabotaged and delayed. Kazakhstan became Prodpomosch provided in March 1932. March 9, 1932 the Politburo of the CPSU (b) issued a decision on the allocation of additional food help: 500,000 tons of rye and 1 million pounds pros. The next day the decision was formalized SNK decree signed by Molotov. July 9, 1932 the Politburo adopted another solution: ship from Central Asia in Kazakhstan 6000 tons of grain and 2,000 tons of grain from the Middle Volga in the East Kazakhstan region.
March 27, 1933 the Politburo decided to leave 15 000 tons of wheat, 167 tons of barley, 500 tons of oats against seed loan.
September 14, 1933 the Politburo decided to release as food help for 500,000 tons of grain from the reserve fund SNK.
November 28, 1933 the Politburo decided to leave as food help in 1 million pounds of seed.
Overall in 1932-1933, only on these decisions were released Kazakhstan more than 3 million tons of grain as food aid. At this time, Kazakhstan has ceased to be the "main breadbasket" and survived by central food aid.
However, in the Kazakhstan this aid rarely reaches the starving . Leading cadres were such that about 90 % of supplied food aid either plundered or taken and grain procurements. Field already had such leaders who were willing to make any, even the most insane directives price even death of most of the population of the district.
Documents saved numerous cases of looting food aid. Turar Riskulov in a letter dated March 9, 1933 wrote: "The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on September 17, 1932 was released one million tons of grain for starving food help to Kazakhs. Of permission from ( count 1 million pounds ) center in IV quarter and I quarter of this year and 600,000 tons of residue in 1932 - 280 thousand tons of grain Kazakh authorities to assign 783,158 pounds , got population 11,066 pounds or 15 percent (and that probably not completely). Most of the famine of bread intended diverted district centers and the various agencies and handed back to the part of the expense of grain procurements. These crimes are detected: in Kuvskom, Karkarala, Chui, Turgay areas and the perpetrators brought to justice". This was everywhere. In Chubartavsk area of 2770 tons of grain population received 943 pounds, of which 56.5 pounds received district employees. In Kurgaldzhinsk area of 3,000 pounds food help came to place only 300 pounds.
These data are confirmed by the OGPU documents. In the Central Archive of the FSB Russia remained "Special report secret-political department of the OGPU of abuse and embezzlement in the distribution food help in Kazakhstan. It says that on the 104 region of Kazakhstan, which was taken into account according to official figures 205,000 starving, was allotted 391,366 pounds food help. Since December 1932 of this bread were stolen 86,000 pounds. So, in Jean- Arka district were stolen 10,000 pounds food help, whereas in the area for six months (May - oktyabr1932 years) died of starvation 1000. Troops arrested 78 people in the area responsible for the thefts food help.
While leaders and activists took away food aid, the population in many places came to cannibalism. In the same document the OGPU recorded such cases: "During this same time in some areas noted 67 cases of cannibalism, accompanied in 39 cases of murder". In Dzhuvalinsk and Keles area were detained group, engaged in murder, cannibalism, and in the latter case, even human flesh was sold in the market.
Of "operational Spetssvodki the Main Department of the Workers ' and Peasants' militia at the OGPU "Cannibalism and murder for the purpose of cannibalism”. It seems that this information - it is only a tiny fraction of what was actually going on. If ogres brazen enough to wear human flesh in jail as transmission, it means that cannibalism was widely distributed and they were engaged in almost openly.
Troops of documents and letters Ryskulov can understand that executives looted food aid on its own initiative and for themselves. But it is not. The fact is that at this time in Kazakhstan were grain reserves, and on this occasion in November 1932 passed the correspondence between Kazkraykom and the CPSU (b). November 20 Central Committee sent a telegram to Kakhiani. Over Kazakhstan on November 1932 raised bread for 8 million pounds less than last year.
Goloshchekin, as follows from its telegram to Stalin persistently continued to pursue repressive measures: "We believe the correct item and our Ad collective farmers in settled agricultural areas listed on the black board, particularly reluctant blanks that before implementation of the plan are not permitted to use the right of individual expansion cattle by the decision of the Central Committee of 17 September".
In early 1932, he did not give out loans to those seminal collective that not filled seeds, and in late 1932, he did not allow the establishment, so the cattle farms that have not fulfilled the plan of grain. In the midst of hunger, farmers continued to peel and abrade work pieces.
Stalin replied by telegram Goloshchekin, Isaev and Kakhiani November 24, 1932. It says that the grain reserves are falling, that the plan not fulfilled more than 10 million pounds. Stalin ordered: "In such circumstances, the challenge is to strike in the first place by the Communists in the regions and districts located entirely below captive petty and rolled on rails kulak sabotage of grain procurement".
Kazkraykom "hit the communists in the areas,"forced them to carry out the plan of grain. Since bread every now and there was no place to take in the course went looting food aid, handing it back to the grain procurements. Kazkraykom got their figures run grain procurement, and the population was dying of hunger and eating human flesh.