A fundamental change occurred only after December 1932 Philip Goloshchekin was removed from the post of first secretary Kazkraykoma and instead was appointed Levon Mirzoyan. Became a real help provided only in the spring of 1933. From September 1932 to December 1934, Kazakhstan has received 5 million quintals of grain as food help. This is 31.2 million pounds. Bulk of them came at the end of 1933 and in 1934, when food aid is commonly provided returning.
Kazakhstan Goloshchekin left unnoticed, having been appointed to the post of Chief State Arbiter of the USSR, under the patronage of his friend Nikolai Yezhov, who at the time was head of the distribution department and the Human Resources Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). His departure was not covered in the press, and at first no one even Goloshekin criticized. Only on Kazkraykom VI Plenum in December 1932, at a closed meeting of the party leadership of Kazakhstan, the new first secretary still very cautiously began to criticize the former leadership: "The most important cause of the current difficulties experienced are undoubtedly mistakes and excesses committed by the leadership of the regional party committee and local party and government organizations".
Wide criticism distributed only in the summer of 1933 and was marked by the publication in the journal "Bolshevik Kazakstan» № 7 in 1933. Around the same time were released and reports Levon Mirzoyan at the plenum Kazkraykom.
Distribution of livestock
Pastoral economy of Kazakhstan as a result of collectivization and sedimentation was virtually destroyed. Goloshchekin and his associates until the very last moment thought that they are all well and good, and if not for "the destruction of predatory animals the socialist economy would grow and prosper. They were so sure of this, that even if a catastrophic reduction in livestock.
At the 1932 Plan was to increase livestock thousands golov525 7834. Under this flock, of course, meant only socialized herd. But then he pointed out that the farms had to be 75 % of the livestock. That is, it was planned that in 1932 Kazakhstan will 10,445,000 head of cattle.
The reality was quite the opposite these plans. In January 1928 in Kazakhstan there were 30,694,700 head of cattle, and in late 1929 even 40.3 million head. In early 1933, there were only cattle 4,513,500 heads. Decline was 85.3 % 526. In 1933, the total population decreased by 8 %, i.e. up to 4,152,500 heads.
In July 1933, at the VI Regional Committee Plenum, the first secretary was Levon Mirzoyan, representative State Plan of KASSR Nurmukhamedov that summed up the unprecedented defeat of the economy. In Aulie - Ata district in 1929 was 500,000 head of cattle in 1933 left 7000 goals. In Chubartauskom area was 473,000 head of cattle, 783 head remained. In Kegen area was 1,000,000 head of cattle, and in 1933 there was nothing left. In Turgay district it were 100,000 heads of cattle left in 1933 - 4000 goals. In Pavlodar region was 300,000 head of cattle in 1933 left 30,000 heads.
In state farms at the end of 1933 remained 727,000 heads of cattle, 1,582,000 sheep, 33 pigs and 23 thousand thousands horses. State farms even increased their livestock. If in 1931 they were 1795.2 thousand heads of cattle and sheep, in 1933 - 2.309 million heads. This is despite the fact that in 1932 27% of farms have lost their herds, and in 1933 - 14% 529. These figures show that even in the most severe famine in Kazakhstan continued "acquisition" of the farm livestock, which were selected from the population.
In these extremely difficult circumstances, the only way to somehow help people was only the distribution of collective farm livestock farms and state farms, as well as the dissolution of the collective farms created naked administration. Moreover, distribute cattle became almost the only means to keep at least these remains of livestock, "has now been distributing several hundred thousand head of cattle, and very important, of course, give this beast, it is crucial to maintain and further increase of cattle". Finally, after a terrible famine, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Uraz Isayev said: "In this case it is necessary to listen to the secular experience of the population". A startling discovery, I must say!
On I Congress on striker’s livestock 6-12 November 1932, Uraz Isaev summed up this campaign distribution of livestock and the dissolution of the collective farms. 1117 collective farms were disbanded in 1933 and transferred to the articles of partnership, with the formation of tovarischestv532 3406. In fact, there was a fall back to the system of economic villages. Of the farms were distributed to the collective farmers in private households 227,000 head of cattle, of the farms - 300 000 head of cattle. Almost all the nomadic and semi areas were exempt from meat tax.
In general, the crumbs were distributed. In Karaganda region in livestock of 156 collective farms established 267 partnerships in which by 15865 farms. These farms have allocated 27 000 head of cattle, an average of 1.7 head on household. This hungry norm , but as you can see , and so many cattle associations somehow allowed to rise after economic and defeat hunger, the more that this herd had 16,000 head of cattle and on horses.
This distribution of cattle, of course, does not compensate for any of the terrible loss of livestock, which was in the year 1931-1932, no looting during the collectivization of farms, state farms and the creation of kolkhoz farms. But it still gave some livelihood starving population and stopped the spread of hunger. Events assistance in 1933 was given a certain effect. According to UrazIsayev, by November 22 regions of Kazakhstan were marked increase in the number of livestock.
In spring 1933 sowing was conducted almost entirely seeds obtained from seed loan. Kazakhstan required for planting 7.5 million tons of seeds from which 6.25 million pounds was provided by seed loan. Remains - 1.28 million pounds were taken, obviously, from the remnants of bread is not removed from the grain procurements.
It was a terrible sowing, even worse than in 1932, such that it is difficult to imagine. Tatiana Nevadovskaya in 1933 lived in the village Chimdavlet of Almaty area on an experimental agricultural station. In her album save a snapshot of a young male Kazakh who was sitting on the road. Beside him lay a hoe. Nevadovskaya writes: "Early Spring 1933. I was with someone from the specialists had a camera with me. Along the highway sat exhausted , drained Kazakh ... he barely dragged from field work , exhausted groan , asked to eat and drink ... I handed the camera to his companion , and hurried to fetch water . He drank greedily. I did not notice when my friend took a picture of me. I hurried back home to bring him a piece of bread and sugar ... When I approached him with the bread ... he was already dead".
In many places, sowing grain produced from the air. Mekemtas Myrzahmetov recalled: "In the spring of 1933 the seed grain to sow distrust people. They would simply eat it. In that year, over fields of flying planes - air seeded bread. In the place where the plane turned around and fell on grain Mezhuyev like chickens, swarmed starving.
Similar experiments on agronomic management of Kazakhstan has pushed the disastrous situation in the collective farms, which had virtually no draft animals, but one that was needed feeding. Mirzoyan, in his speech at the IV session of Kazakh Central Executive Committee February 15, 1933 cited data that the number of collective farms sown area per cutting horse reaches 125-211 hectares , averaging 40-60 acres : "It is clear to everyone that Horse 40-60 hectares not execute . "
It followed and that the work on the existing cattle farmers will not be able to plow and sow their fields in the required agronomic terms, sowing is tightened again until June, and again, as in previous years, the crops will burn out and a poor harvest. From this position of leadership of Kazakhstan decided on a risky experiment: "This year Kazakhstan first widely held very early sowing in the mud".
The assumption was that immediately after the snow sow seed from aircraft into the wet, muddy ground, even without treatment and plowing. About any crop farming practices there was no talk, the main thing was to get at least an average harvest hands at minimal cost to the cultivation of the land forces. It was the Wildcats step, since the error evaluation weather threatened the complete destruction of crops. However, it had no choice, and one hand was a risky but likely harvest very early sowing, and on the other hand had a guaranteed crop failure, if we force to plow and sow farms defeated and exhausted from hunger farmers.
In those places where the collective still left to plow, the quality of field work was beneath criticism. Mirzoyan on I Vsekazaksk Congress of Collective Farmers June 2, 1933 said: "Even these farms (meaning leading collective farms - auth). Failed to deliver qualitative aspect of cultivation, sowing and plowing with huge flaws, plow at a shallow depth, sometimes literally scratch the ground, the ground spiked green band and create the appearance that was sown".
When planting in terms of 4.43 million hectares, all tricks failed 93% of the plan that is somehow sows 4,119,900 acres across Kazakhstan.
Yields expected to be very mediocre, however, peasants, after two years of poor harvest, grain procurement and ferocious hunger, were happy and such: "Harvest of 4-5 tons per hectare, and say it is a good crop". Of course! While crop yields and such, Kazakhstan in 1933 could collect about 20.6 million cwt (128.7 million pounds) gross harvest crops. Mirzoyan posed the problem for two years to reach the level yield 8 tons per hectare.
With all the plight of collective farmers still put a very complex task. First, it was necessary to ensure that the reduced grain procurement plan for 1933. Secondly, it was necessary to fill the order of 15 million tons of seeds and get 2 million pounds of the number issued in 1932 and 1933, 17 million pounds of seed loan.
Rehabilitation of agriculture was very difficult and slow. Despite the fact that Mirzoyan and Isaev strongly encouraged work to improve quality and productivity, growth and development required, however, statistics show that their calls for the most part remained unanswered. No rapid growth has occurred.
Over the years 1933-1934 were distributed and collective farmers otkochevschikam 892,000 head of cattle. This is a tiny amount, on average, only collective farm, the number of cattle was passed out about 1.6 head per farm. However, according to district data, more than half of the cattle were dispensed Horse and cattle. This greatly facilitates the provision of collective farmers, since the distribution of plow and allowed them to use milk. Moreover, in 1933 it was decided to leave for the needs of farmers 50 % of milk produced in the collective farm commodity farms.
In 1934 in Kazakhstan there were 5971.2 thousand heads of cattle, of which 2866.2 thousand heads, or 48 % were in livestock. Slight increase in livestock made the CPSU (b) adopt December 11, 1934 another decree "On Measures for the development of livestock in Kazakhstan", which further expands the rights of collective and individual farmers to own personal herd. In breeding areas farmers were entitled to keep 150 sheep and goats, 10 head of cattle, 10 Horse and 5 camels.
In settled agricultural areas were introduced other rules. In areas adjacent to nomadic - 40 sheep and goats, five heads of cattle and 2-3 sows. In areas adjacent to nomadic - 3 cows, 25 sheep and goats, 2-3 sows.
At the same time the collective released from grain procurement for 1935-1936 years, individual farmers for 1935, state meat purchase reduced by 50%, and in 1935 was released from the agricultural tax. For recovery of unprecedented economic defeat of the CPSU (b) it went on to provide a hitherto unprecedented freedom and lightness of taxation.
These measures have resulted in some positive changes. Already in 1934, it was almost doubling the grain on the farm, which has averaged 5105 quintals (against 2645 quintals in 1933). Rose slightly and camaraderie that in 1934 began to give 1.2% of commercial products, and in 1935 this figure rose to 14.7% of total production.
Overall, in 1934-1935 the Kazakhstan gradually began to recover from the effects of an ambitious economic catastrophe and hunger.
Victims of hunger and the destruction of the economy
Now it is time to evaluate the victim of unprecedented famine in Kazakhstan and economic devastation. During the 1990s and 2000s were published various estimates of the number of famine victims from 1.75 million to 2.5 million people dead and 616,000 permanently migrated.
These estimates repeatedly challenged by demographers. By 1930, after the census in 1926 (number of Kazakhs - 3.718 million people), with growth of 4.5% per year, the number of Kazakhs reached 3,886,000 people. If in fact the number of deaths amounted to 2.5 million people, the Kazakhs as a people today simply do not exist, since the population of such losses no nation survives and is not saved.
Based on the analysis of changes in the age structure of the population according to the 1926 census and 1939, AN Alexeenko identified all the losses in the Kazakh population 1.84 million people or 47.3 % of the total number of people. These losses by region, according to calculations the researchers accounted for the following indicators:
Region Wastage (thousand people) The share of people’s number (%)
East Kazakhstan 379,4 64,5
North Kazakhstan 410,1 52,3
West Kazakhstan 394,7 45
South Kazakhstan 632,7 42,9
Central Kazakhstan 22,5 15,6
It must be borne in mind that the researcher took its division into regions of Kazakhstan, made on the basis of the administrative- territorial division of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1939:
- West (Guryevskaya West Kazakhstan, Aktobe region)
- South (Zhambyl, Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan. Alma-Ata region)
- Central (Karaganda)
- North (Akmola, Pavlodar, Kostanai, North Kazakhstan)
- East (Semipalatinsk, East Kazakhstan region).
This division does not coincide with the division of the early 1930s, or with the modern division. In other words, the lowest proportion of Central Kazakhstan in this table due to the fact that in this part of Kazakhstan, the researcher got only one of Karaganda region.
Data NA Alexeenko can be regarded because they take into account the fullest censuses in 1926 and 1939 - the main sources of information about the demographics of Kazakhstan in 1930, and counted on the most correct procedure.
Many Kazakh historians and public figures tend to exaggerate the number of famine victims. Apparently, they believe that by doing so you can emphasize the grand scale of the disaster. However , more than one million deaths and the flight from Kazakhstan over half a million Kazakhs already caused tremendous damage to the Kazakh people , completely changed its face and lifestyle. Tragedy of the people is so great and terrible that not needs any amplification.
There are other ways to estimate population losses. Data are available for the general movement of the population. Population dynamics of Kazakhstan for the period 1930-1936 years (as of June 1 of each year) according to the Office of Economic Accounting as follows:
Year Strength of population (thousands people)
1930 5873,0
1931 5114,0
1932 3227,0
1933 2493,5
1934 2681,9
1935 2926,0
1936 3287,9
From these data it is clear that for 1932-1933, the population of Kazakhstan decreased by 2,620,500 people, a decrease of 51.2 %. This number includes both natural mortality and death from starvation and disease, escape from hunger in other parts of the USSR and abroad. Population growth since 1934 has more to do with the relocation than natural population growth. Number of Kazakhs, which was in 1929, was restored only in 1960.
Grand defeat was in agriculture in Kazakhstan. This time the little touches in the Soviet and in the Kazakh literature. However, if we compare the figures, it is immediately visible scale economic debacle.
In 1935, the Deputy Commissar of Agriculture KASSR W. Dyuysenov said that in 1935 90.6 % of all households - 540,800 labor farms were merged into kolkhoz. That is, only in Kazakhstan at the time, there were 596,900 farms. In 1931, there were 1,098,000 households. In other words, during the 1932-1933 501,100 farms disappeared. In 1934, according to Uraz Isayev, collectivized farms were 539,600, or 85.9% 547. That is, in Kazakhstan there were 628.1 thousand households. These data show that after the cessation of hunger for several years was a process of further destruction of agriculture, expressed in reducing the number of farms. During the year they disappeared 31, 2 thousand - that corresponds to the number of farms of two regions of Kazakhstan. This is most likely not the loss of hunger, and just people throwing agriculture and moved into industry and numerous construction projects unfolding in Kazakhstan at the time. Experience hunger showed that construction sites can somehow have to subsist by working supply and the same people who held the plow or cattle perished bones middle of the steppe.
It was a terrible loss that far exceeds the damage from the widespread famine in 1921. For comparison, in 1922, after the Civil War and the disastrous famine in Kazakhstan were 737,500 households. There can be assessed in relative changes. From 1920 to 1922, the number of farms decreased from 857 400 to 737 500, i.e. 119 900 farms. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 has destroyed 501,100 households, almost five times more.
Kazakhs after the Great Famine
Famine in 1932 has seriously changed the face of the Kazakh people, he said, not only on its size, which has been restored to the 1929 level only in 1960 but also in the appearance of the people. However, this thesis has long been speculative and was used mainly in the emotional coloring. However, the study data shows that the Kazakhs to hunger and beyond are, in fact, two different people.
The first step during collectivization, famine and settling nomadic collapsed. Kazakhs and starvation in considerable was nomadic and semi-nomadic people, leading traditional pastoral economy in some areas with elements of agriculture.
In 1930, Kazakhstan had 42 nomadic and semi- district, which occupied 52% of the territory of republic. Nomadic way of life was completely original, mainly due to the extreme dispersal of the population over a vast territory. For example, the richest villages numbered only 5-10 yurts. Known custom of rich pastoralists with increasing herd divide it into pieces and distributed across different auls. Large villages in which there were more than 30 yurts, settlements were poor pastoralists with small herds.
On the eve of collectivization Kazakhs lived in bulk such way of life. In 1928, when Kazakhstan was reformed aul Soviets, the average administrative village consisted of 20-30 economic villages (8-10 households each), which were distributed within a radius of 20 to 120 km, sometimes even up to 200 km550.
This peculiar way of life, which put on a commanding position household skills, knowledge and independence of each individual owner, was ruthlessly destroyed by collectivization and subsidence. Settling sharply escalates villages, farms and created an average of 300 farms in Central Kazakhstan - from 100 farms. In itself, this was one of the reasons for the economic disaster that led to the death. Firstly, the pastoral economy based on the use of natural pastures, could not exist in such a concentrated form. It was lacked the productivity of pastures to feed large masses of cattle. For settling such a large collective farms required preliminary development of fodder farm. Secondly, the Kazakhs pastoralists, unlike sedentary peasants, there was virtually no skills of collective farming on such a scale. It was one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of organizational created farms, not to mention the fact that there were many farms, created by the arbitrary decision of district and existed on paper. Kazakhs definitely needed a preparatory period to adapt to the collective farms and large collective farms.
Because the main victims of hunger were just nomadic and semi-nomadic areas where nomads were driven by "settling point" with cattle feed is not secured. Yesterday nomads slaughtered cattle first from starvation, then from hunger, and more endless steppe became a trap for the exhausted man who has not had a chance to find the means of subsistence.
It would seem that after the decision was made to abolish de facto collapsed collective and transfer them to the articles of partnership, and began mass distribution of livestock for personal use collective farmers, one would expect that the population of Kazakhstan returns to its previous structure of life. But in fact, was quite the opposite process. After hunger percentage collectivization not only did not fall, but rather grew rapidly. When in September 1931 the percentage was 64% collectivization of farms, in July 1937- 97.5%. Moreover, by this time were completed translation associations (association for the individual farms agricultural work without socialization of property) to the Charter cooperatives (collective with the socialization of property). In the years 1936-1938 at the farm were again reorganized 3091 partnerships.
These data imply that the ridge Kazakh nomads’ was broken once and for all. After collectivization, sedimentation and subsequent disastrous famine Kazakhs could not go back to the traditional nomadic way of life and, even if they wanted to.
Such dramatic changes in lifestyles mean drastic changes in the social psychology of the Kazakhs. Before collectivization Kazakhs lived basically every man for himself, scattered over a vast area with its own economy. After collectivization Kazakhs lived in villages on hundreds of farms had a very weak private sector and worked in the public sector, the products of which immediately went to the state. So far, we can only record the presence of these changes in the social psychology of the Kazakhs. A detailed study of this requires special studies. Exceptional importance of these changes, and most likely in them lays the roots of many social problems in Kazakhstan.
Another consequence of collectivization, famine and sedimentation was the disappearance of the yurt. Nomadic economy was impossible without a tent, easily transported from the parking lot to the parking lot. As of the first half of the twentieth century, the semi-nomadic Kazakh population areas by 30-40% lived in yurts in the winter, while the purely nomadic areas (eg Mangishlak) lived in yurts almost without exception.
Kazakhs expedition USSR Academy of Sciences, who has studied the life of Kazakh herdsmen of East Kazakhstan in 1927, left a unique materials sanitary conditions of everyday life of the population resident in the yurts . Member of the expedition NA Trofimchuk explored how lived in yurts and made the necessary measurements. These materials are unique in that they have recorded a natural and not reconstructed life yurt.